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Abstract
The globalisation process of national economies, through trade and foreign direct
investment flows, has been one of the most important forces of economic changes
in the latest decades. This thesis contributes to the growing literature on firm level
adjustment to globalisation. This literature initiated a new paradigm in international
trade based on heterogeneous firms. The recent availability of large firm-level data
sets and new theoretical models allow to examine how heterogeneous firms react to
internationalisation processes, and how their responses determine changes at more
aggregate levels.
In each chapter of this dissertation we deal with one different aspect of firm-level
adjustment to globalisation processes using a data set of manufacturing firms based in
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a good example of a glob alised economy
given that it is second largest host of multinational enterprises and relatively open to
international trade.
Overall, our results support the view that heterogeneous firm-level adjustments
are important to our understanding of the impact of internationalisation processes on
national economies. We argue and find evidence (in chapter two) that import compe-
tition does not necessarily lead to higher elasticity of the demand for labour at firm
and industry-level, as it has been claimed before. Furthermore, we show (in chapter
three) that foreign affiliates contribute disproportionately to the export performance
of United Kingdom manufacturing sectors. The export decisions of multinational en-
terprises seem to depend on motives different from those of domestic firms. Finally, we
11
present evidence (in chapter four) of the relationship between firm-level productivity
and participation to globalisation processes, through trade or foreign direct invest-
ment, comparing not means, but productivity distribution functions, which allows to
account for the heterogeneity of productivity level across firms.
In general, these findings underline the importance of building from micro economic
evidence to gauge the likely impact of globalisation processes on national economies.
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Chapter 1
Introd uction
1.1 Motivation of the thesis
The general aim of this thesis is to contribute to the fast growing literature on firm-
level adjustment to globalisation processes. Globalisation is here intended as both
international trade and foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) flows.
Research interest in this topic has risen dramatically in the last decade in parallel
with the seemingly unstoppable process of internationalisation of national economies
and with the availability of firm-level data sets. The latter have provided economists
with an additional and extremely rich source of information, which has made it possi-
ble to analyse the impact of international trade and FDI flows at the highest possible
level of disaggregation, namely firms or plants.
Overall, this new research line can be seen as a major step forward further de-
velopment in the international trade and FDI literature, where attention has shifted
from countries and industries to heterogeneous firms. Traditional trade theories, built
1
2upon the works of Heckscher, Ohlin (1933) and Vanek (1968) (HOV), deal with coun-
tries and industries, the former characterised by different factor endowments. The
relative abundance/scarcity of factors is the only determinant of international trade.
Countries will specialise in and export the product of the industry that uses inten-
sively their relative abundant input. These models have subsequently evolved in the
so called "new trade theory" (Helpman and Krugman 1985), which allows for increas-
ing return to scale and imperfect competition. This development has made it possible
to explain some important empirical phenomena completely unaccounted for by the
HOV framework, notably intra-industry trade and FDI (i.e. multinationals). How-
ever, this strand of research still relies on the representative firm, thereby yielding
knife edge-solutions in which all firms in an industry will behave in exactly the same
way. Therefore, although new trade theory is able to explain important empirical
regularities, which are unexplained in the HOV framework, little understanding has
been gained of how heterogeneous firms respond to globalisation processes and how
these determine aggregate responses at industry and country-level.
The last stage in this evolution, stimulated by the availability of firm-level data
sets, puts heterogeneous firms at the center of the analysis. This has been mainly an
empirical-led research endevour, so far. Indeed, empirical findings have pointed to the
fact that firms, even in narrowly defined industries, are diverse in many respects, such
as productivity-level and growth, participation in international commerce through ex-
port and FDI, spending on research and development, employment, skill of workers
and so on. International economists have tried, subsequently, to explain these find-
ings in new theoretic trade models (Melitz 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004;
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 2003) and incorporating heterogeneous firms
in the "traditional" factor endowment trade model (Bernard, Redding, and Schott
32004).
This new literature on globalisation and heterogeneous firms has already had
important consequences from both an academic and policy standpoint. From an
academic point of view, it has improved our comprehension of how decreasing in-
ternational trade barriers may affect firms and industries (for instance, productivity
seems to be the main determinant of survival probabilities after trade liberalisation
policies and of export-FDI decisions). This has important implications for policy
makers as well, since taking firms as a unit of reference makes it possible to target
more precisely economic policies towards those agents that are likely to benefit from
them most. For instance, countries undertake export promotion policies in various
fashions; knowing what firms are more likely to export may allow officials to offer
incentives to those firms that most need them. Furthermore, if imports from low
wage countries displace jobs at home at different rates in different firms (according
to their productivity level, for example, or ability to diversify into new products),
compensation programs aimed at workers who lose jobs may be better targeted and
their cost more precisely estimated in advance.
This new international economics literature is still in its infancy. Although, it
has already contributed answers to some important questions it has raised also new
ones, such as: How is the level of employment at the firm and industry-level affected
by rising imports? Are FDI and exports complements or substitutes at the firm
level? What are the main determinants of acquisition of domestic firms by foreign
companies? This thesis aims at providing a contribution to answering some of these
questions.
41.2 Firm-level analysis of the impact of globalisa-
tion
The globalisation process is a pervasive phenomenon that is changing dramatically
the economic landscape where firms operate. In the latest decades the world economy
has experienced a surge in both international trade and FDI flows. As table 1.1 shows
exports of goods and non-factor services increased nearly threefold from 1982 to 1999.
The total assets of foreign affiliates (as a measure of FDI) rose even more, from nearly
2000$ billions to 17680$ billions. These increments correspond to an average annual
growth rate of world exports of about 9 percent, during the 80s, and 7 percent,
during the 90s; for FDI the corresponding figures are 24 percent, during the 80s, and
23 percent, during the 90s.
It is worth noting that these figures dwarf the average annual rates of growth of
the world GDP for the same periods. Thus, it appears that the growth in trade and
FDI flows cannot be explained by the growth of the world economy alone. This is
better seen as a phenomenon that is changing the structure of national economies
around the world.
Furthermore, from table 1.1 it is possible to note as the exports of foreign affiliates
outpaced, in both decades, the worldwide exports of goods and non-factor services.
In 1999, figures show that foreign affiliates accounted for nearly half of the worldwide
exports.
The rise in international trade and FDI flows poses threats and opportunities
for firms. On the hand, they may face increased import competition from low costs
countries or from foreign multinationals establishing new foreign affiliates. On the
5Table 1.1: Major trends of the globalisation process
Value at current prices Annual growth rate (%)
(billions of USD)
1982 1990 1999 1982-1990 1990-1999
Exports of goods and non- 2401 4173 6892 9.2 7.2
factor services
Total assets of foreign af- 1886 5706 17680 24.30 23.31
filiates
Sales of foreign affiliates 2462 5503 13564 15.44 16.27
Exports of foreign affili- 637 1165 3167 10.36 19.09
ates
GDP at factor costs 10611 21473 30061 12.80 4.44
Source: UNCTAD - Division of Transnational Corporations and Investment.
other hand, domestic companies may take advantage of these processes. They could
benefit from knowledge spillovers originated from their geographical proximity to
more productive and more technology intensive foreign firms or they may become
exporters and/or multinationals themselves.
There is a burgeoning literature of firm-level adjustment to globalisation. It
presents different, but obviously related, strands. This PhD dissertation presents
three distinct contributions to this literature. The fist regards the impact of imports
on the elasticity of the demand for labour. In the second, we look at the export strate-
gies of foreign affiliates, whereas the third concerns how to rank unambiguously, in
terms of productivity, non-exporters, exporters and multinationals. Before outlining
in more details the work in this thesis and its findings, it is worth to step back and
discuss what are the more actively researched topics in the literature of firms-level
adjustment to globalisation.
One research area that has attracted particular attention concerns the relationship
between productivity and participation in international commerce. This literature has
6been initiated by the seminal work of Bernard and Jensen(1995, 1999), which showed,
for the US, that exporting firms are larger, more productive and pay higher wages
than those selling to the domestic market only. In addition, their analyses support
the idea that more productive firms self-select into the export market, rather than
becoming so after having started exporting (learning by exporting). This type of
study has been replicated using data for many other countries (Delgado et al. (2001 )
for Spain; Bernard and Wagner (1997) for Germany; Girma et al. (2004) for the UK
to cite a few).
Overall, these studies provide further evidence that exporters are more productive
than non-exporters irrespective of the sample period and country considered. These
types of studies have also looked at how exporting may actually improve overall indus-
try / country productivity. There are mainly two hypotheses: learning by exporting
and reallocation. The latter seems to be the main effect of exports on aggregate pro-
ducitivity for the US; indeed, Bernard and Jensen (2004a) have shown that after entry,
exporters present higher output and employment growth rates than non-exporters,
but not productivity growth rates. This suggests that there is a reallocation of ac-
tivity from less productive plants (i.e. non-exporters) to more productive ones. The
learning by exporting hypothesis, whilst rejected by Bernard and Jensen, has found
some support in other empirical studies of Girma et al. (2004), Castellani (2002), for
Italy, and Wagner (2002), for Germany. The main contribution of these studies has
been to make theorists and policy makers pay attention to the importance of sunk
costs of entry into the export market and how exports may actually contribute to the
evolution of productivity at the country and industry-level.
Other work has dealt with job turnover and trade. Here, analysts have tried to
identify the effect of trade on jobs at the industry-level, building from microeconomic
7evidence. The first contribution of this literature has been to distinguish between
gross and net job turnover of industries and, more importantly, that net job turnover
appears to be only a tiny fraction of the gross figure. Several studies have corroborated
the finding of Davis et al. (1996) who shows, for the US, that there is "excess" job
turnover. For what concerns the impact of trade on gross and net job turnover,
Klein et al. (2003) have shown that, for the US, long-term changes in the exchange rate
significantly affect gross job flows, but not net job flows, in manufacturing industries
producing tradable goods. This represents a further advance in the understanding of
how trade might affect jobs with respect to aggregate level studies where only net job
flows where considered.
Another fruitful research area has looked at spillovers from foreign affiliates to
domestic firms. Governments allover the world engage in inward-FDI promoting
policies. These have been motivated on the existence of productivity /techonology
spillovers, which should raise the productivity of domestic enterprises. However,
empirical studies have not shown significant evidence of positive spillovers (see Gorg
and Greenaway (2004) for review of the literature). This casts some doubt over the
expected economic benefits of those financial incentives offered to multinationals to
establish foreign affiliates.
Other researchers have looked at industry productivity dynamics and import com-
petition. Overall, reallocation of economic activity from low productivity plants to
highly productive ones seems to be one of the main sources of industry productivity
growth (see for instance Foster et al. (1998) for the US, and Disney et al. (2003) for
the UK). In addition, it has been observed that import competition is a significant
determinant of within-firm productivity improvement (Tybout 2000; Disney, Haskel,
and Heden 2003; Pavcnik 2000).
81.3 Outline of the thesis
This doctoral dissertation aims at contributing to the literature about firm-level ad-
justment to globalisation. It presents three contributions concerning the relation-
ship between the elasticity of the demand for labour and trade, the different export
strategies of domestic firms and foreign affiliates, and differences in the productivity
distribution of non-exporting, exporting and multinational firms.
The firm-level data set that has been used for this dissertation is OneSource. It
contains information on all private and public companies operating in the UK. This
makes the studies contained in this thesis empirically consistent. The dissertation is
organised as follows.
Chapter two deals with the issue of labour demand elasticity and trade. This
has been an active research area since Rodrik (1997) argued that trade makes labour
demand more elastic. This statement has been subject to further qualifications (Pana-
gariya 2000b) and empirical tests. It has attracted the attention of policy makers too,
given the debates about the effect of trade on workers that have appeared regularly
in the popular press.
Figure 1.1 and table 1.2 give a crude idea of the relationship between the elastic-
ity of the demand for labour and the import penetration rate in the UK during the
nineties. As it is possible to see the average import penetration rate across UK manu-
facturing industries grew steadily over this period. This signals that the UK economy
became more open to foreign products and competition. The average elasticity of the
demand for for labour is reassuringly negative, as expected, throughout, but its be-
haviour over time seems to be more erratic. The demand for labour appears to have
become less elastic until the mid-nineties; after this point, it grew more elastic.
9The correlation between the import penetration rate the elasticity of the labour
demand is shown in table 1.2. As it is possible to observe the correlation became
negative and stronger over the course of the nineties. Although for the whole sample
period there is a positive correlation, from 1994 onwards it becomes negative, i.e.
the higher the import penetration rate of an industry the higher (in absolute value)
the labour demand elasticity, and more pronounced in the latest years. This lends
support to hypothesis advanced by Rodrik (1997).
Then, for the UK it seems that the elasticity of the demand for labour became
more elastic, during the second half of the nineties, as the import penetration rose.
However, empirical studies to date that have dealt with this issue have mainly failed to
detect any significant effect of trade on the elasticity of demand for labour. In chapter
two we advance some motives why it may be so. The whole empirical literature has
referred to the Allen-Uzawa elasticity formulation. However, this is appropriate only
at the industry level considering constant return to scale. We extend the Allen-Uzawa
relationship to imperfectly competitive markets and allow for a non-homogeneous
production function. This extension is consistent with a profit maximising firm. In
this setting we show how the elasticity of demand for labour is still composed of two
terms, namely the substitution and scale effect. However, unlike in the Allen-Uzawa
framework, the scale effect is comprised of two elements, one of which is the result of
the pro-competitive effect among firms. This reduces the absolute value of the scale
effect. The extent of the reduction depends on industrial structure, but our estimates,
using a firm-level data set of UK manufacturing sectors, show that it is noteworthy.
Aggregating the firm-level relationship to a higher level, we can formally show how
the industry-level elasticity of the demand for labour is increasing in the import
penetration rate. Yet, because of the scale effect reducing element, the increase in
10
Figure 1.1: The relationship between import penetration and the elasticity of the
demand for labour in the UK
•
• • •
0
• ••• • •• •
......
I
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Calendar year
• Average of the elasticitity of the demand for labour
• Average of the import penetration rate
Note: The elasticity of the demand for labour was computed as ~I:gg~ (where I and ware labour and wages,
respectively) using only manufacturing firms in the OneSource data set. To avoid outliers the values below the
5th and above the 95th percentiles were not considered. The import penetration rate was calculated using yearly
the Input-Output Supply and Use Tables. It is the ratio between imports in each industry and the total domestic
production (plus imports) of each industry.
Table 1.2: Correlation between the discrete approximation of the elasticity of the
demand for labour the import penetration rate.
1992-1999 1993-1999 1994-1999 1995-1999 1996-1999 1997-1999 1998-1999
0.47 0.16 -0.35 -0.95 -0.98 -0.97 -0.94p
Note: p is the correlation coefficients of the variables of interest. Their values were computed as described
in the note of figure 1.1.
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the elasticity due to a rise in the import penetration, is found to be limited.
The next chapter deals with the different export strategies of domestic and foreign
firms. Policies aimed at attracting foreign firms and promoting exports have figured
prominently in the agenda of policymakers the world over. Under these policies, var-
ious financial incentives have been offered to multinational enterprises to establish
plants within national borders. By the same token, export promotion activities rang-
ing from financing trade fairs to offering export credit insurance are widely used. All
such initiatives are based on the belief that foreign affiliates and exports positively
affects economic growth. A neglected aspect of the literature on FDI and export is the
contribution of foreign affiliates to exports. This chapter investigates and compares
the export strategies of foreign multinational and domestic firms.
To give an idea of the growing importance of the export activities of foreign
affiliates, table 1.1 shows that their exports rose notably during the eighthes and
and nineties (respectively by 10 and 19 percent). In addition, the share of worldwide
exports accounted for by foreign companies rose from 31 percent in 1982 to 45 percent
in 1999. The surging export activities of foreign firms suggest that they are not
established to just sell products in host countries. Products produced therein are
likely to be exported back to the home country and/or to third countries. These
FDI strategies do not fall neatly within the dichotomy, vertical versus horizontal
FDI, which the theoretical literature refers to (Markusen 2002). Then, the expansion
policies pursued by multinational enterprises appear to be more complex than those
envisaged in the literature.
To assess the relevance of the export activities of foreign firms in the UK, figure 1.2
depicts the median of the export share of foreign and domestic manufacturing firms
12
Figure 1.2: Median of the export share of foreign and domestic manufacturing com-
panies in the UK (1988-1999)
Foreign
Domestic
o .05 .1
Median of export share
.15 .2
Source: Author's calculations from Oneflource.
operating in the UK. Foreign firms seem to be more export intensive than domestic
enterprises, their median export share being 12 percent higher than that of UK com-
panies. Furthermore, as shown in figure 1.3 foreign affiliates had throughout nineties
an average export share higher than domestic businesses. Whereas indigenous com-
panies appear to be less export intensive than the average firm, enterprises owned by
foreigners seem to be more export intensive.
In the empirical analysis of chapter three we find that foreign firms contribute
disproportionately to UK exports of manufacturing industries. Not only are foreign
firms more likely to export than UK owned firms, but also, when they export, their
13
Figure 1.3: Behaviour over time of the export share of foreign and domestic manu-
facturing companies in the UK (1988-1999)
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Source: Author's calculations from OneSource.
export share is higher. This finding sits somewhat awkwardly with economic the-
ory. The export activity of foreign affiliates is not strictly consistent with traditional
theories of the multinational enterprise (Markusen 1995) and with past empirical ev-
idence, which have shown that most FDI flows are motivated by horizontal motives,
According to theory firms invest in foreign production facilities to avoid the costs of
international trade; empirically, it has been shown that the bulk of the FDI flows
is between developed countries, which is consistent with horizontal FDI strategies.
Then, we consider theories that can explain the export behaviour of multination-
also In addition, in this chapter we show how export affects the mode of entry of
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multinationals.
Chapter four deals with the ranking of the productivity distribution of non-
exporting firms, exporting firms and multinationals. This is of relevance given that
one of the main concerns of policy makers is to rise overall productivity. In addi-
tion, vast amount of public funds are spent in promoting exports and FDI on the
ground that exporting and multinational firms are "better" companies, in terms of
productivity, than others. Recent empirical and theoretical works (e.g.: Bernard and
Jensen (1999) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)) has shown that productivity
is the main determinant of involvement of firms in international trade, either as ex-
porters or multinationals. This is because of the sunk costs of exports or establishing
affiliates in foreign countries.
Figure 1.4 shows at glance how labour productivity levels of domestic exporters,
non-exporters and foreign firms differ in the UK manufacturing sector. Domestic
non-exporting firms appear to be the least productive, their median value added per
worker being around 20700 pounds. Domestic exporters are more productive than
non-exporting firms, but less productive than foreign firms; their median value added
per worker is 21600 pounds. The latter appear to be the most productive kind of
firms with a median of about 24300 pounds of value added per worker.
Most of the previous empirical research has conducted this type of comparisons,
namely of means, among different types of firms. This approach, although appealing
because of its simplicity, may be highly misleading given the large dispersion of firms
productivity levels even in narrowly defined industries. If distributions overlap, means
are insufficient statistics to judge random payoffs (productivity levels in this case)
without specifying a precise objective function to be maximised (Wolfstetter 1999,
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Figure 1.4: Labour productivity of manufacturing firms in the UK (1987-1996).
Domestic non-exporters Domestic exporters Foreign firms
Note: Author's calculations from OneSource. The labour productivity has been computed as value added (in thousands
of pounds) per worker.
pp. 135). To show that this is likely to be the case for the UK manufacturing sector,
figure 1.5 exhibits the box plot of labour productivity for the three types of firms
under consideration. It is worth noting that the distributions have different degree
of dispersion, the one of exporters being the less disperse and the one of foreign
affiliates being the most. Simple comparisons of means ignore these features, which
may invalidate conclusions based on these tests if they are not properly allowed for.
To tackle this issue, we depart from the previous literature and employ a non-
parametric approach that allows us to rank productivity distributions and therefore
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Figure l.5: Distribution of the labour productivity of manufacturing firms in the UK
(1987-1996).
Domestic non-exporters
excludes outside vallies
Domestic exporters Foreign firms
Note: Author's calculations from OneSource. The labour productivity has been computed as value added (in thousands
of pounds) per worker. The grey box represents the interquantile range (25 and 75 percentiles of the distribution).
The white line inside the bos is the median. The two extreme horizontal lines are the lowest and largest value; outliers
have been excluded for the sake of clarity.
firms, unambiguously, i.e. irrespective of who is the judge. More specifically, we de-
ploy the Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests of stochastic dominance, using firm-level data on
UK manufacturing firms. Establishing stochastic dominance implies that one cumu-
lative distribution lies to the right of another. In addition, we also report evidence
on the issue of self-selection versus learning. This chapter provides the first evidence
on this issue for the UK using tests of stochastic dominance.
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The ranking of productivity distributions of firms involved differently in the inter-
national trade is of interest from a theoretical viewpoint as well. Recently, trade the-
ories have been developed in which firms are heterogeneous (Bernard, Eaton, Jensen,
and Kortum 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Melitz 2003). Firm hetero-
geneity results in self-selection in the structure of international commerce (Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple 2004). Only the most productive firms find it profitable to estab-
lish production facilities abroad; the next set of firms serve foreign markets through
exporting only; while the least productive firms find it profitable to sell goods in
domestic market, only. This model assumes that the choice to establish foreign af-
filiates is based, exclusively, on considerations of market access. All FDI is indeed
horizontally motivated. Nevertheless, when there are factor price and market size
differentials across countries, firms that become multinationals may no longer be the
most productive (Head and Ries 2003). Then, the empirical analysis conducted in
this chapter can be viewed as a test of whether or not the export/FDI and export/no-
export decisions are ordered according to the productivity of firms as predicted by
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).
Finally in chapter five we present the main conclusions and briefly discuss the
policy implications. In addition, we suggest what may be future interesting areas of
research, which may further enhance our understanding of the firm-level adjustment
to globalisation.
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1.4 Appendix: Data set
The firm level data used throughout this doctoral dissertation were extracted from
the OneSource database. This is made available by InfoUSA under the payment of a
fee. For this thesis we used the CD Vol. 1 2000 and CD Vol. 1 1996.
This database contains information about the Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss
account, ownership details, industry activities, parents and subsidiaries of all UK
companies that under the Companies Act and related legislation have the obligation
to submit the Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss account every year to Company
House.' In this data set there are information about 110000 companies operating in
the UK and we will focus on the manufacturing sector only.
Whereas all companies operating in the UK have the obligation to provide in-
formation concerning their existence and operations to Company House, the nature
of these information varies according to the size of the company. More specifically,
medium-sized, small, and very small companies can prepare and file" abbreviated
accounts" (246 and 246A of the Companies Act 1985). The size of the company is
determined considering its turnover, balance sheet total (i.e, the total of the fixed
and current assets) and average number of employees.
Medium companies are those that meet at least two of the following three criteria."
• the annual turnover is equal to 11.2 million or less;
IThe stated main functions of Companies House are to: incorporate and dissolve limited com-
panies; examine and store company information delivered under the Companies Act and related
legislation and make this information available to the public.
2Note that the legislation concerning the size classification of companies has changed. We refer
to the old taxonomy since our database contains data until 1999 and the new legislation need be
applied to financial years ending after 30 March 2004
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• the balance sheet total is equal to 5.6 million or less;
• the average number of employees is 250 or fewer.
Small companies are those that meet at least two of the following three criteria:
• the annual turnover is equal to 2.8 million or less;
• the balance sheet total is equal to 1.4 million or less;
• the average number of employees is 50 or fewer.
Very small companies are those that satisfy all the following conditions:
• classify as as a small company;
• have a turnover of not more than 1 million;
• have a balance sheet total of not more than 1.4 million.
Medium and small-sized company can file" abbreviated accounts". These include
the abbreviated balance sheet, notes, and a special auditor's report (unless the com-
pany is also claiming audit exemption). Medium companies have to present" abbre-
viated accounts" which must contain: the abbreviated profit and loss account, the
full balance sheet, a special auditor's report, the directors' report, and notes to the
accounts.
Very small companies qualify for the total exemption from audit. In this case
unaudited accounts can be submitted in the form of an abbreviated balance sheet
and notes.
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Given the aforementioned exemptions granted to small and medium companies the
data set we used present many missing values and therefore the sample of firms we
were able to work with is significantly less than 110000. Therefore, all the estimates
we present in this doctoral dissertation pertain to the population of firms classified
as large companies since only for them a complete set of variables concerting output,
exports, and inputs is available.
To infer estimates about the whole population of firms in the UK one should
take into account the selection problem of this database through some technique
such as the Heckman (1976) selection model. This methodology involves computing
the probability that each firm is exempted from presenting "full accounts". This
probability or some function of it (such as the inverse Mills' ratio) then should be
used in the second stage regressions/tests to allow for the fact that these are conducted
on a sub-sample of firms (the sample of firms that present" full accounts").
However, this methodology relies on a well specified selection rule, whereby some
firms are selected and some others are not. This specific case is complicated by the
fact that there are not one, but three types of firms that are be exempted from
presenting" full accounts". In addition, there are three criteria (l.e. selection rules),
different for each type of exempted firms, that need to be considered. Also, not all
firms will comply with these selection rules since firms that are exempted may present
"abbreviated accounts", but they also can, if they want, file" fulls accounts" .
Thus, the selection rule (which determines the exemption) cannot be accounted for
in a satisfactory fashion. In addition, consistent and efficient self-selection estimators
have not yet been developed for some of the tests used in this dissertation (like the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of Chapter 4 and the seemingly unrelated regressions of
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chapter 2). The development of these estimators is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Given the selection issue, caution is needed in interpreting the estimates reported
in this dissertation. The problem, however, is not probably so severe in chapter 3
and 4. In these chapters, we consider the export behaviour of foreign and domestic
firms and their productivity distributions. Since theoretical and empirical studies
have shown that both exporters and foreign firms are larger and more productive
than purely domestic firms (Bernard and Jensen 1999; Griffith, Redding, and Simpson
2004; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Haskel, Pareira, and Slaughter 2002) in these
chapters we will make like to like comparisons and our estimates will be conservative.
Table 1.3 contains the list of the variables extracted from Onesource and used in
this dissertation. Their description is from Onesource. Nominal values of output,
exports, value added, intermediates and capital were deflated using price indices.
Output and exports were deflated using Producer Price Indices of output of detailed
manufacturing industries provided by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). In-
termediates were deflated using the Producer Price Indices of materials and fuels
purchased by manufacturing industries provided again by the ONS.3 The deflation of
capital presents many problems due to the fact that it aggregates different types of
fixed assets (i.e. properties, equipment, plant and machinery and so on). Each kind of
fixed assets should be treated separately since they have different prices and different
degree of depreciation. Given the unavailability of industry-level price indices of fixed
assets, capital figures in OneSource were deflated using the deflator of fixed capital
formation. This is an economy-wide (i.e. macro) price index that is, again, provided
by ONS.
3The Producer Price Indices of output and materials and fuels purchased can be obtained in
electronic form from the website of the ONS. These indices are also published in the ONS periodical
MM22.
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As it is possible to see from table 1.3 OneSource contains information about the
country of origin of each company. This is defined as the country of the company that
ultimately controls firms registered in the UK. Yet, this information is available for
the latest year alone. To track the dynamics of foreign ownership we obtained from
the ONS the list of firms operating in the UK that were acquired by foreigners from
1988 to 1996. This information, which is in hard copy format, was matched by names
with the OneSource data. Table 1.4 exhibits the number of foreign acquisitions by
year that were matched with OneSource.
Our firm-level database does not provide information on the multinational ac-
tivity of UK-owned firms. To single out UK multinationals we merged OneSource
with a database containing information about multinational activities. This database,
named European Linkages and International Ownership Structure (ELIOS), was built
at the University of Urbino by Davide Castellani and Antonello Zanfei.", The infor-
mation in ELIOS about foreign plants owned by firms registered in the UK was
retrieved by Amadeus. This is a pan-European data set containing firm-level data
in 38 European countries. More specifically, this database has ownership informa-
tion, so that firms can be classified as multinationals if they own subsidiaries abroad.
The multinational indicator was available for 1996 alone and we backcast the indi-
cator to the start of the sample period. The information obtained from ELIOS was
also complemented with a list of U.K firms that made foreign acquisitions compiled
from various issues of Acquisitions Monthly. This is a monthly periodical published
by Thomson Financial Services, which reports mergers and acquisitions conducted
world-wide. This allowed us to match a total of 209 multinationals in 1996.
To give an idea of the range of values of the variables in OneSource, Table 1.5
4We wish to thank them for having made this data available to us
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Table 1.3: Description of variable from OneSourse used in this dissertation.
Variable Description
Turnover (Output) Turnover is defined as the value of all services
rendered and goods or equipment sold in
the UK and overseas and includes: Work In
Progress adjustments where shown for con-
tracting companies, duties in some sectors
such as Distillers and intra-group turnover
(where non-consolidated).
Value added Employees Remuneration, Directors Remu-
neration, and Depreciation to the Operating
Profit. Value Added is that fraction of mar-
ket value of production which has been added
by a company's processes of production, ad-
ministration, selling and distribution. Gen-
erally speaking, it is the difference between
turnover and the cost of bought-in materials
and sources.
Exports Exports are defined as total direct exports
from the UK.
Employment Number of employees defined as the average
number of employees during the accounting
year.
Capital Fixed Assets defined as tangible fixed assets
at their net book value, ie: cost less accumu-
lated depreciation.
Intermediates (materials) Calculated as the difference between
Thrnover and Value added. (Author's
calculation)
Employees remuneration Defined as the amount paid to employees in
wages and salaries, excluding any tax, insur-
ance, social security and pension payments.
Wage per employee Calculated as Employees Remuneration di-
vided by Employment. (Author's calcula-
tion)
Country of Origin The country of origin of a company's ulti-
mate holding company, if the ultimate hold-
ing company is not a UK company.
Industry Primary 1992 SIC Code is the 1992 UK
Standard Industrial Classification for a corn-
pany's principal line of business.
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Table 1.4: Number of foreign acquisitions by year.
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Number of foreign acquisitions
48
108
103
124
123
84
148
151
Source: Office of National Statistics and OneSource.
exhibits the minimum, median and maximum values (in 1996) for some of the variables
in table 1.3, distinguishing between domestic non-MNEs, foreign firms and domestic
MNEs. As it is possible to see foreign companies appear to be larger (in terms of
output, employment and capital), pay higher wages and also export more than their
domestic counterparts. Foreign and UK MNEs appear to be similar. The same raw
relationships between foreign and domestic companies have also been found using the
UK census manufacturing database (Griffith 1999; Criscuolo and Martin 2004). This
lends support to the matching processes we have undertaken to identify foreign firms
and UK multinationals in OneSource.
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Table 1.5: Summery statistics of main variables.
Domestic Foreign UKMNE
Min 151 0 573
Turnover (Output) Median 5566 11682.5 10244
Max 5707000 7111000 768389
Min -48727 -34645
-3554
Value added Median 1744 2920 3301
Max 1280664 1190506 254639
Min 0 0 0
Exports Median 327 2697.5 2076
Max 5008000 3054400 247591
Min 3 1 10
Employment Median 83 111 132
Max 45173 39335 7241
Min 0 0 0
Capital Median 860 1686 1651.5
Max 1650000 2121800 229471
Min 38 1 345
Intermediates (materials) Median 3589 9190 6512
Max 4432440 6204464 580269
Min 56 0 183
Wage per employee Median 1256 1813 2059
Max 731000 853900 129761
Source: OneSource.
Notes: The year used for these summary statistics is 1996. All the values are in thousands
of pounds expect employment, which is in unit.
Chapter 2
Labour demand and international
trade: Theory and evidence
2.1 Introduction
In recent years the relationship between globalisation, in particular international
trade, and the labour market has elicited much attention and discussion in and out-
side the academic environment. From a theoretical point of view the topic is rooted
in the general equilibrium theory of international trade, but recently, as with all other
aspects of globalisation and trade, it has also been examined in partial equilibrium
models. These models have been mainly concerned with the shift in labour demand
caused by globalisation, which should result in an increase in the demand for certain
types of workers and in a reduction for other kinds of labourers.
Recently, however, it has been highlighted that international trade and generally
globalisation could also affect labour demand elasticities, rendering them more elastic.
Our concern is to test this proposition. As Rodrik (1997) has underlined, this is a
topic worth investigating since increases in the elasticity of labour demand could have
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three main effects: 1) it shifts the cost of higher labour standards and benefits from
the employer to employees; 2) it leads to greater variation in labour market outcomes,
since for instance, shocks to labour productivity will result in larger changes in salaries
and hours worked; 3) it moves bargaining power away from employees (or unions) to
employers, thus reducing the rents of the former.'
The next two sections of this chapter provide a brief overview about how to derive
the labour demand and its elasticity of a profit maximizing firm. The following two
sections describe what effects international trade may have on the elasticity of the
demand for labour and the main empirical studies conducted thus far on the subject.
In the following section we extend the Allen-Uzawa elasticity, which is based on the
assumption of perfect competition, to imperfectly competitive markets. Next, we
assess how this affects the labour demand elasticity at industry level and proceed to
test the labour demand elasticity formulation we derived with a firm level data set of
UK manufacturing firms. The last section concludes.
2.2 Demand for labour
Labour is an input used in the production process along with other factors of produc-
tion such as capital, energy and materials. Therefore its demand can be derived in
the same way as that for other inputs and in the following treatment we will consider
the demand for a general input that can be interpreted as labour.
The demand for any factor used in the production process is a derived demand
in the sense that it originates from the profit maximizing behaviour of the firm. For
IThis issue has been investigated by Borjas and Ramey (1995) who have confirmed that import
penetration diminishes the rent shared by less skilled workers in concentrated industries.
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this reason it can be obtained analytically considering a firm choosing the profit
maximizing level of output and combination of inputs. Assuming a production func-
tion y = F (x) with of (x) 10Xi > 0 and 02 F (x) lox; < 0, where x E R~ is the
vector of the inputs employed, and the firm operates in perfectly competitive in-
put and output markets with factor and output prices being respectively ui, for ev-
ery input i = 1,2, ...n and P, the first order condition (FOC) to maximize profits
rr = PF(x) - wx is,
orr = P fi(x*) - Wi = 0 for every i = 1,2, ...n
OXi
where fi(X) = of (x) 10Xi is the marginal physical product of input i. This is the
additional output that the firm obtains using an additional unit of input i. Thus,
the first order condition can be rewritten as P fi(x*) = Wi where the right hand side
can be defined as the marginal revenue product of input i and the left hand side is
its price. The marginal revenue product of input i is, in fact, the additional revenue
that the firm can attain employing a marginal additional amount of the same input.
Since we are assuming that of (x) 10Xi > 0 and 02 F (x) lox; < 0, this condition
implies that input i will be utilized up to the point where its (decreasing) marginal
revenue product equals its price (which is fixed). Hence, the demand for factor i
can be identified in its marginal revenue product P fi(X*), which is indeed downward
sloping since its derivative (that is the second derivative of the production function
02F (x) lox;) is negative. The FOC also implies that for a profit maximizing firm
the real remuneration of each input (wd P) is equal to its marginal physical product.
This is true both in the short-run, when only one input can be varied whereas all the
others are fixed, and in the long-run, when all factors can be changed.
However, the response of the firm to a change in input prices will be different in
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the short-term from the long-term. On the one hand, in the short-run, only some
factors of production, say input i, can be varied. In this situation the demand of
input i can still be derived from the first order condition necessary to maximize the
restricted or short-run profit function 7r = P F(Xi,5Li) - WiXi - WX_i where WX-i is
the sum of the product between each fixed input and its unit cost. Maximizing this
short-run profit function involves respecting the first order condition (1), this time
concerning input i only. If ui; decreases to wI, the demand for factor i will increase.
This is because the marginal revenue product of input i is, now, higher than the cost
of an additional unit of it, namely wI, and therefore the profit can be raised producing
more output, which in turn involves expanding the employment of factor i until the
marginal revenue product of it is equal to its price (wI) again.
On the other hand, in the long-run not only will the demand for input i depend on
its price Wi, but also on the level of employment of all the other inputs, which can be
adjusted freely. This can be proved by the Young theorem, whereby 82 F(x)/8xi8xj =
82P(x)/8xj8xi. Thus, for instance a decrease in ui, leads, in the short-run, to an
increase in the demand and use of Xi as highlighted before. In addition, this modifies
the marginal physical product of factor j (if 82F(x)/8xj8xi =1= 0), more precisely it
rises if 82P(x)/8xj8xi > 0 or decreases if 82F(x)/8xj8xi < O. In the former (latter)
case the employment of Xj will be increased (reduced) to bring its marginal revenue
product back to Wj, which is unchanged. However, the increase (decrease) of Xj will
increase the marginal physical product of factor i so that the firm can further augment
employment of factor i up to the point where its marginal revenue product equals uu.
Still, this will modify the marginal physical product of factor j again and this process
will be repeated until the marginal revenue product of each factor equates with the
corresponding price.
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Thus, in the long-run the increase (decrease) in the use of an input following a
reduction (rise) in its price is, in absolute value, equal or larger than the corresponding
variation in the short-run since the firm can adjust all factors of production, not only
those whose price has changed. Mathematically this means that the absolute value
of the prime derivative of the demand function (18wd8xil) in the short-run is the
same as or larger than that of the long-run and that the own-price elasticity of the
demand for labour (I (8xd8wi) Iwdxi) in the short-run is equal or smaller than the
corresponding one in the long-term.
This is the LeChatelier-Samuelson theorem (Samuelson 1966) and can be formally
proved through Hotelling's lemma (1935). In fact, long-run profits are always at least
as large as in the short-run, hence
where 7rL (p, w) and trs (p, W,Xi) are the long and short-run profit functions, re-
spectively, and input i is the only fixed factor (note that the long-run profits depend
on the parameters p and W; then condition (1) must be met for all inputs, whereas
the short-run profits are a function of the parameters p, wand Xi; thus condition (1)
can be satisfied only for all inputs but factor i, since its employed quantity is fixed).
Thus, it is possible to define a function
(2.2)
This function will reach its minimum zero, if Wi is such that the quantity of the
factor i employed in the long-run is equal to the fixed amount that is employed in
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the short-run (Xi). Since this is a minimum point D (Wi) is a convex function. So it
is possible to write
(2.3)
that is equivalent to
d2D (Wi) 0 - xf (p, w) 0 - xf (p, w)
_ ____:,,.--:..= - > 0
dw; {)Wi OWi-
The last formula shows that, in absolute value the slope of the long-run demand
(2.4)
function is as large as or smaller than the slope of the short-run demand 2
The demand for labour and all the other inputs can be more easily derived starting
from the assumption that firms minimize costs of production after having decided the
level of output to produce. Indeed, in this case we do not have to worry about whether
the firm is operating in a competitive product market or not.
The cost minimization problem provides the conditional input demands. This can
be written as (see for instance Jehele and Reny (1998))
c (w, y) = min wx subject to F (x) 2: y
XER+
2The last passage follows from the HoteHing's lemma(1935) whereby the profit-maximizing de-
mand functions can be derived from the profit function. This lemma states that the demand of input
i is equal to the prime derivative of the profit function with respect to the price of input i (Wi),
:::, = -Xi (p,w). Obviously this is the quantity that satisfies the first order condition in expression
(1). The above derivative is negative since if the price of an input increases, provided that nothing
else changes, then the profit must decrease. The Hotelling's lemma allows to derive some properties
of the input demand straightforwardly. Indeed: (i) it is homogeneous of degree zero in (p, w) since
it is the first derivative of the profit function that is a linearly homogeneous function in (p,w); (ii)
it is downward sloping, i.e. its first derivative with respect Wi is negative (8Xi (p, w) /8Wi < 0) since
the profit function is indeed convex in (p, w).
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Setting the Lagrange equation, deriving the first order conditions and assuming
that the solution x" = x (w, y) exists, is positive and that the production function is
differentiable at x", it is possible to obtain
Ii (x") / Ii (x") = wdwj for every i =1= j and i, j = 1,2, 3 ...n (2.5)
where the right hand term represents the ratio of the first derivatives of the produc-
tion function with respect to the factor i and j, that is the marginal rate of technical
substitution (i.e. the decrease in one input per unit increase of another that is just
sufficient to produce the same quantity of output) and the left hand side represents
the ratio of the cost of the two inputs (i.e. the slope of the isocost line).
From the first order conditions of the cost minimization problem it is possible to
derive the conditional input demands that can be written as x" = x (w, y). Multi-
plying each conditional input demand for the respective factor price we get the cost
function e (w,y) = wx* = wlxi + W2X; + ... + wnx~. Then, if the cost function is
differentiable at wand y it is possible to obtain the conditional input demand of each
factor applying Shephard's lemma (Shephard 1970), whereby
Be (w,y) _ * _ ( )
B - Xi - Xi w,yWi
Provided that the production function is homogeneous of degree el, strictly increas-
ing and strictly quasiconcave the cost function and the conditional input demand can
be written as
e(w,y) - yl/O!c(w,l)
x (w, y) - yl/O!X (w, 1)
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where c (w, 1) and x (w, 1) are the cost function and the conditional demand
function for one unit of output.
If instead the production function is homothetic, strictly increasing and strictly
quasiconcave the cost function and the conditional input demand can be expressed
as
c (w, y) - h(y)c (w, 1)
x (w, y) - h(y)x (w, 1)
2.3 The price elasticity of labour demand
The price elasticity of any input demand can be decomposed into two effects, namely
the substitution effect and the scale effect (see for example Sapsford and Tzan-
natos (1993)). The former is a function of the elasticity of substitution between
the factor whose price is changed and all the other inputs. The higher in absolute
value the elasticity of substitution, the larger the substitution of the factor whose
price is varied with all the other factors. It captures the price elasticity of the factor
demand at constant output. The scale effect derives from the elasticity of the output
demand. This is because the more elastic the output demand, the larger the effect on
output of a reduction in, say, wages, that induces an increase in output and therefore
results in employment of more workers.
Thus, in the case of linearly homogeneous production function with 2 inputs the
elasticity of factor i with respect to the price of input j can be written as (see
Hamermesh (1993 pg. 27) and Allen (1938, pg. 373)
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In the above expression lli is the cost share of factor i (i.e. wixd (WiXi +WjXj)),
aij = dln(xdxj)/dln(wj/wi) is the elasticity of substitution between input i and j
(which is always> 0 in the 2 input case) and 'T] is the absolute value of the elasticity
of product demand.
The own-price demand elasticity of input i is
Thus it is possible to see these types of elasticities can be divided in two parts
that represent respectively the substitution and the scale effect.
For the case of more than 2 inputs the above expressions become (Hamermesh
(1993 pg. 35) and Allen (1938 pg. 508))
8Inxi(w, p)
llj (aij - 'T]) (2.6)
8lnwj -
8Inxi(w,p)
lli (aii - 'T]) (2.7)
8lnwi
-
where aij is the the partial elasticity of substitution between input i and j and a«
is the elasticity of substitution of input i with respect all other inputs, both proposed
by Allen (1938, pg. 505).
As it is clear from the above expression the substitution effect depends on factor
share and on the elasticity of substitution. The latter was further investigated by
Hicks (1963) in a 2 factors production framework. His original intent was to assess
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quantitatively and qualitatively the proportional change in the relative factor share
(O:k/O:l) caused by a proportional change in their price ratios (WdWk). This can be
expressed as
[J In £.&.
al
[J In WkW
wll
[Jln~
Wk
[Jln~
Wk
[Jln k [Jln ~
I WI
- -[J-In-l!!1.=-+ [J In l!!1.
Wk Wk
akl -1
The above expression links the proportional variation in the relative factor shares
due to a proportional change in relative input prices to a scalar measure (viz. akd,
which represents the ease of substitution between inputs. If akl > 0 the inputs are
said to be substitutes and this is necessarily true in the two inputs case.
Different generalizations of au to the case of more than two inputs have been
proposed since the seminal contribution of Hicks. The most ubiquitous, at least
so far, has been the Allen (1938)-Uzawa (1962) elasticity of substitution (thereafter
AES). Allen (1938, pg. 504) has shown that
where IPI is the determinant of a bordered Hessian matrix containing all the
derivatives and partial derivatives of the production function while Fij is the co-factor
of the ij partial derivatives in the bordered Hessian.
The previous equation is quite involved since it requires all the derivatives of the
production function. A much simpler formulation, which appeared in Uzawa (1962),
is the following
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C (w,y) Cij
O"ij = O.O,
A well known property of the 0" is symmetry whereby O"ij = O"ji' Before proceeding
(2.8)
further in our discussion it is worth underlining the connection between the O"ij and
the elasticity of the cost-minimizing demand equation Xi with resect to Wj (for any i
andj) , i.e.
Cij = olnxi(w,y) = OXi(W,y) Wj (2.9)
o In Wj OWi Xi(W, y)
Multiplying and dividing the right hand side by Xj = Cj and C(w, y) and remem-
bering that OXi(W, Y)/OWj = Cij, it is possible to write
C (w, y) Cij
Cij = {Xj CiC
j
= {XjO"ij
where {Xj is the cost share of input j. The above expression is indeed the sub-
(2.10)
stitution effect (i.e. the effect due to the substitution among inputs taking output
as given). The sign of the Cij depends on O"ij. Therefore, if O"ij > 0 the two factors
are said to be Allen substitutes whereas if O"ij < 0 the two factors are said to be
Allen complements. As it is possible to see from relationship 2.9, the importance of
the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution derives from the fact that multiplying it
for the factor share one obtains the constant output cross price (or own price) input
demand elasticity. In addition, it is worthwhile mentioning the following property
of the AESs, which derives from the homogeneity of degree zero in W of the input
demand Lj Cij = 0.3
3Indeed the homogeneity of degree zero in W implies the Euler's theorem, whereby
Lj [OXi(W, Y)/OWj] Wj = 0 from which it follows that Lj Cij = Lj [OXi(W, y)/8wj] Wj/Xi(W, y) = O.
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The Allen-Uzawa formulation has figured prominently in empirical studies trying
to assess the degree of substitutability between inputs. Yet, Blakorby and Rus-
sel (1981) have argued that this measure is not a generalization for the multi-factor
setting of the corresponding concept in the 2 factors framework. More specifically, the
authors have underlined that the AES: is not a scale of the ease of substitution be-
tween inputs; does not provide any information about proportional changes in factor
shares; cannot be derived from the logarithmic derivative of the quantity ratio with
respect to the price ratio. They conclude that the AES is quantitatively meaningless
and qualitatively has not more information than the constant output price elasticity.
The ineffectiveness of the Allen-Uzawa elasticity as a measure of the ease of sub-
stitution derives ,mainly, from the fact that it depends on prices and therefore it can
assume different values whenever prices change. Its inability to provide information
about proportional changes in factor shares is due to the fact that it cannot be derived
from the logarithmic derivative of the quantity ratio with respect to the price ratio,
8In(xdxj) j8In(wjjxi); this is because this partial differentiation requires that only
Wj varies and not Wj and Wi' Since both input demands Xi and Xj depend on all factor
prices if ui, were to vary along with Wj, this would not be consistent with the rules
of partial differentiations, whereby differentiation may be computed with respect to
one variable at a time (see Blackorby and Russel (1989)).
For these reasons the Morishima (1967) elasticity of substitution (henceforth MES)
seems to be more appropriate. As Blakorby and Russel (1989) have emphasized,
contrary to the AES, the MES is a measure of the easiness of substitution; provides
information about proportional changes in factor shares; can be derived from the the
logarithmic derivative of the quantity ratio with respect to the price ratio (when only
one price changes).
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The MES for the ij input pair can be derived as the logarithmic derivative of the
quantity ratio with respect to the price ratio when only one price changes, say Wj,
which yields
(2.11 )
Thus as can be noted from above, the proportional change in the quantity ratio
generated by a proportional change in the price ratio (when only one price varies)
is decomposable into two parts. The first represents the proportional change of one
input with respect to the price that is changed. The second stands for the proportional
change on the other input with respect to the same price.
The MESs are not symmetric in the n input case. This is at odds with AESs, which
are indeed symmetric. The asymmetry of the MESs arises from the fact that MESij
and MESji measure the proportional variation of the quantity ratio in two different
directions. The former in the Wj direction while the latter in the Wi direction. Only,
when there are two inputs MESij = MESji.
The symmetry of the MESs in the 2 factors case can be proved together with the
fact that in this setting the MES is equal to the AES (Blackorby and Russel 1981).
Using the relationship between the MES, the AES in the previous formula and the
fact that the AESs are symmetric we have that
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M ESlk - AESlk - G'.IAESlk - G'.kAESkk = AESkl - G'.kAESkl - G'.IAESll = M ESkl
MESlk - AESlk = AESkl =MESkl
If MESij > 0 the inputs i and j are said to be Morishima substitutes whereas if
MESij < 0 they are said to be Morishima complements.' Yet, the Allen and Mor-
ishima substitutability/complementarity concepts are not equivalent. This is because
the former simply refers to the effect of a change in the price of input j on the de-
mand for factor i (and therefore depends on the sign of AESij only) while the latter
concerns the effect of a variation in the same input price on the quantity ratio xd Xj
(and for this reason hinges on the sign of both AESij and AESjj).
In contrast to the MES, the AES, is consistent with the original purpose for which
the concept of elasticity of substitution was envisaged by Hicks more than seventy
years ago. In fact, the MESs provide information about the proportional change in
relative factor shares as a result of the proportional change in the price ratio (caused
by the variation of only one price not both). This can be seen below; when Wj varies
we have that
(J In §.
OJ
(Jln~
Wi
(J In WjXj
WjXj
(Jln~
Wi
(J In ~ v In !£i.
Xi Wj
- "':'(J-In---::-:~~·+ vin ~
Wi Wi
- MESij-1
Thus increases in the price ratio (generated by the variation of the price in the
numerator, say input j) will increase the factor share of factor i relative to factor j if
4It is worth noting as two inputs can be at least theoretically Morishima complement and sub-
stitute at the same time. This is because the MES is not symmetric thereby it is possible to have
MESij < 0 and MESji > 0 or viceversa
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MESij > 1 and will reduce it if MESij < 1.
2.4 The effect of international trade on the labour
demand function
Openness to international trade can have effects of different kinds on labour demand,
or more generally, on any input demand. These effects can be dichotomized in shifts
in the labour demand schedule (predicted by general equilibrium trade theories) and
in changes that flatten or steepen it, modifying directly its price elasticity (the latter
having recently been stressed by Rodrik (1997) and predicted by partial equilibrium
models).
According to general equilibrium international trade theories, greater openness
will increase the export of goods for which domestic firms have a comparative advan-
tage and increase imports of goods for which they have a comparative disadvantage.
This will cause outward or inward shift of input demands. The exact repositioning
depends on whether we are considering a developed country (DC), an economy with
a relatively abundant endowment of capital/highly skilled labourers or a less devel-
oped one (LDC), viz., an economy with a relatively abundant provision of low skilled
workers.
Considering a 2 factors, 2 goods production process, a DC trading with a LDC
will cause an outward shift in the demand for the relatively abundant factor (capi-
tal/highly skilled workers) and inward shift in the demand for the relatively scarce
factor (low skilled labourers). This is the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson (1941) the-
orem. This theorem in embedded in the Hecksher-Ohlin framework where perfectly
competitive inputs and output markets are assumed and the remuneration of factors
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of production are adjusted to guarantee full utilization of all inputs. The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem posits that openness to international trade will increase the real
remuneration of the relatively abundant factor and reduce that of the relatively scarce
one, thus increasing the real wage differential between the two. It is worth adding
that real factor price changes are caused by alteration in product prices; without
them, there can not be any modification in the real factor price. Changes in the
relative endowment of any input and trade with other DCs (which have similar factor
endowments) does not have any effect on the input demands and on the real input
prices since products prices are unaffected.
With regard to the impact of international trade on input demand elasticity, gen-
eral equilibrium trade models are mute. Indeed, in this framework input demands are
infinitely elastic simply because product demand is infinitely elastic, as it possible to
see from 2.6 and 2.7. However, in empirical studies estimates of the elasticity of the
labour demand never approach infinity (Hamermesh 1993).
Long ago Marshall (1890) in his Principles of Economics stated the four rules
governing the elasticity of input demands. The elasticity of the demand for labour
will be larger: 1) the larger the elasticity of substitution among inputs (O"ii in 2.7);
2) the greater the elasticity of demand for the final product ('" in 2.7); 3) the greater
the share of labour in total cost (o, in 2.7); 4) the greater the elasticity of supply of
the other factor of production.
Thus, how can trade actually modify labour demand elasticities? Firstly, trade
could increase the elasticity of substitution among inputs. However, this is unlikely
to be a direct effect of international trade since O"ii is determined exclusively by the
technology used. Nevertheless, trade may trigger, at least in principle, technology
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progress, which, in turn, might render factors more substitutable. Secondly, assuming
imperfectly competitive output market, trade with both LDCs and DCs makes the
output market more competitive and thus input demands more elastic." Finally,
international trade can alter factor shares, but it is not clear in which direction.
Indeed, if trade liberalization changes the relative remuneration of inputs, firms will
try to use more intensively the now more economical inputs and less intensively the
now less economical inputs. The total effect on factor shares of these changes in the
usage and remuneration of factors depend on the technology of production and is
thereby ambiguous.
2.5 Empirical studies
Empirical studies have so far been mostly concerned with estimating the effect of trade
on labour demand shifts trying to explain the rising wage gap between production
and non-production workers recorded in the USA and UK during the 80s. They went
in search of the Stolper-Samuelson effect (1996) that predicts that trade with LDCs
will shift the demand schedules of the relatively abundant factor outward and that of
the relatively scarce one inward.
However, these general equilibrium trade theories have performed so far very
poorly empirically (Trefler 1995). Empirical results point to the fact that trade con-
tributed to a tiny measure of the wider wages differentials. Cline (1997) provides
a research literature on the rising skill wage gap in the USA and claims that the
contribution of trade is likely to be around 20%. Krugman (1995) reaches a similar
5Some of the theoretical models of international trade with less than perfect outputs markets are
discussed in Helpman and Krugman (1989 chapter 3)
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conclusion underlining that imports of manufactured goods from LDCs amount to
only 2% of GDP of OECD countries and this small figure cannot explain the much
larger wage inequality experienced in the 1980s. Greenaway and Nelson (2001), in
the conclusion of their synthesis of the literature on globalization and labour markets,
argue that, in contrast with public opinion, there seems to be very limited empiri-
cal support corroborating the hypothesis of large impacts of globalization on labour
markets.
A different approach which yielded much higher estimates of the effect of inter-
national trade on wages is the factor content of trade. This methodology is rooted
in labour economics more than in general equilibrium trade theory. Indeed, labour
economists consider the labour market in partial equilibrium, thereby assuming a
downward sloping demand curve and a vertical supply curve. In this framework the
labour content of imports and exports can be added to the domestic supply of labour
causing it to shift.
More specifically, the factor content of trade approach consists in assessing how
much skilled and unskilled labour is necessary to produce the products a country
exports and and how much it would be necessary to produce the imported ones.
Then, the difference between these figures can be interpreted as the net impact of
trade on the demand for skilled and unskilled workers.
Wood (1995, 1994) is probably the most eminent advocate of this methodology.
The estimates he obtained suggest that trade could actually have played an important
and significant role in explaining increased wage inequality. Indeed, Wood(1995)
argues that taking into account non-competing imports, defensive innovations and
the impact on services trade reduced the demand for labour by about 20%. However,
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Leamer (2000) and Panagariya (2000a) argued that the assumptions on which the
factor content of trade is based are too restrictive to obtain reliable estimates.
Pizer (2000) also looked at the impact of international trade on wages, but from
a different perspective. He concentrates on the impact of imports on wage premia
under different mode of competition. If firms engage in Cournot competition, then
imports decrease wage premia, whereas under price competition, imports increase
wage premia. The latter results is due to the fact that with lower barriers prices
decrease, This raises sales, which in turn stimulates labour demand.
The relatively poor performance of the Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory in explain-
ing the rising skill wage gap should not be surprising since they assume perfectly
competitive product markets and that factor returns are adjusted to guarantee full
employment of any input. The input-demands are therefore horizontal or completely
elastic." Yet, empirical estimations of the latter suggest that the own-price labour
demand elasticity never approaches infinity. Indeed, Hamermesh (1993 pp. 103) in
his authoritative survey of labour demand studies proposes a range with limits -0.15
and -0.75 as plausible estimates of the own-price labour demand elasticity,
Thus far, skill biased technological change (SBTC) has mostly been deemed to be
an alternative explanation for increasing wage inequality. Mainly, this has been a tool
in the arsenal of labor economists who consider a one sector economy and a downward
sloping input demand curve. Slaughter (1999) highlighted this distinguishing between
the labour and trade approach to study the determination and changes of real wages.
The change in technology has been advocated by exponents of the former to explain
the rising skill premium relying on its skill biased nature. In fact, SBTC raising the
6This is true only in the non-complete specialization case (Panagariya 2000b).
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marginal productivity of more educated workers will cause the increase of the skill
premium, accompanied by a rise in the share of skilled workers on total employment.
Yet, as suggested by Rodrik (1997) and more recently underlined by Greenaway
and Nelson (2001) some of the technological change could be trade-induced. Indeed,
firms that are or feel to be under threat from increased foreign competition could be
induced to adopt labour saving technology to slash costs and be more productive to
compete better with foreign products. One of the examples of empirical evidence of
this phenomenon is provided by Morrison and Siegel (2001) using the NBER data
set." Indeed, not only do they find that both trade and technological change have
a direct impact on labour composition (the latter having a larger effect than the
former), but also that trade has an indirect role, since it stimulates computerization.
The empirical literature concerned with the consequences of trade or more gen-
erally of globalization on labour demand elasticities is fairly limited. Greenaway et
al. (1999) have estimated a log-linear labour demand equation controlling for the
technological efficiency improvements induced by international trade. Using a data
set covering UK manufacturing industries from 1979 to 1991 they have estimated a
negative relationship between the level of imports and exports and the labour, de-
mand. However, the authors have not found an absolute increase in the own-price
elasticity due to the trade variables as advanced by Rodrik (1997).
Slaughter (2001) has estimated whether or not the own-price elasticity of the
demand for labour increases because of international trade. In this study, using
industry level data from 1961 to 1991 of the NBER manufacturing database it has
been found that the overall manufacturing labour demand for production workers had
7This data set contains information about inputs, outputs and productivity of US manufacturing
sectors; for more information see Bartelsman and Gray (1996).
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become more elastic in that period whereas that for non-production workers had not
experienced significant increase in the own-price elasticity.
As regards the hypothesis that trade had contributed significantly to the aug-
mentation of the wage-elasticity of labour demand Slaughter (2001) has not found
definitive support for that. Indeed, for less skilled workers when the estimated elas-
ticities are regressed on trade variables these have the expected effect when industry
effects, only, are used. Yet, when time controls are employed they disappear. For
skilled workers the trade variables have the plausible sign and are generally signifi-
cant at least at the 90 % significance level when both industry and time controls are
employed. In the end Slaughter (2001) concludes that the rise in labour demand elas-
ticities is mostly explained by time( since it is presumably a proxy of some unobserved
variable).
Krishna et al. (2001) have investigated the effect of trade liberalization in Turkey
using yearly plant level data for the period 1983-1986. They set up a monopolistically
competitive model with a Cobb-Douglas production function to derive a log linear
labour demand function. The estimates obtained of the change in the own-price
elasticity of the labour demand after the liberalization reforms are not significant
in most of the industries examined, thus leading to the conclusion that more trade
openness did not have any effect on it.
Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) have compared the own-price labour de-
mand elasticities of non-production and production workers considering UK non-
multinational, UK multinational and foreign multinational plants, using the ARD
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data set for the period 1973-1992.8 Over the sample period, the estimated wage elas-
ticities of the demand for the former type of labourers in overall UK manufacturing
grew significantly (in absolute value) from -0.25 to -0.35, whereas the analogous es-
timates for the latter kind of workers seems to have been stable. With regard to the
demand for labour of the different types of firms analyzed, the results show how the
wage elasticity of the demand for blue collar increased, in absolute value, for all the
categories of companies. Besides, those of UK and foreign multinationals augmented
more than that of UK non-multinational companies, thus corroborating the hypothe-
sis that international companies have more flexibility organizing their production. On
the contrary, the estimated elasticities of the demand for white collar workers do not
show any precise trend upward or downward in the sample period. It is noteworthy
that the results of this paper could be due to the fact the multinational enterprises
enjoy more power over unions than non-multinational firms and therefore find easier
to substitute non-production labour with other factors of production.
Jean (2000) has presented a model concerning the impact of trade on aggregate
labour demand elasticity. He rightly motivated his work stressing the fact that 2.7 is
a partial equilibrium relationships that does not necessarily hold at a more aggregate
level. His model is characterised by perfect competition and homogeneous goods, but
finite elasticities are generated through the Armington hypothesis, whereby domestic
products are differentiated from foreign ones. He notes that the scale effect (i.e. the
effect of the elasticity of the product demand on the elasticity of the labour demand),
in general equilibrium, is of a different sort, since one has to consider the sectoral
trade specialisation of an economy. The intuition behind this is that in an open
8This paper does not deal with international trade per se, but with the related phenomenon of
FDr.
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economy with perfect competition an exogenous increase in the price of, say, labour,
has the effect of making domestic producers less competitive. This effect will be
stronger in labour-intensive sectors, which will experience large decrease in market
shares. The higher the degree of openness the larger the decrease in market shares
since domestic firms are less protected from foreign competition. Therefore, the loss
of competitiveness due to the increase in wages will modify the trade specialization of
the country, that will become more specialized in the less labour intensive industries.
His computation, for some French industries, show that this effect is relevant.
Overall, the results obtained in these studies (summarised in table 2.1) support
the conclusion that the elasticity of production workers is larger than that of non-
production ones and that the former has grown more elastic over the last two decades.
Besides, there is not enough evidence to support the hypothesis that international
trade affects it, although it seems that FDI can be regarded as a plausible cause since
multinationals have a greater ability to re-organize their production.
2.6 The Allen-Hamermesh relationship
2.6.1 Perfect competition
As we have highlighted above, a growing body of the literature in international trade
has tried to investigate whether openness has resulted in an increase in labour demand
elasticities. From a labour theory perspective in partial equilibrium, the theoretical
relation in 2.7 became one of the few general frameworks to refer to." This theory
states that labour demand elasticity should be positively affected by two principal
90ne should also note that Leamer (1996), Wood (1995) and also Panagariya (2000b) discussed
the effect of trade on labour demand elasticities, but applying HO or specific factor trade theories
in General Equilibrium.
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Table 2 l: Selected studies on trade and labour demand elasticities..
Author (year) Data Results
Greenaway et al. (1999) UK industry No relation between the level
data set 1979- of imports and exports in the
1991 sectors and the elasticity of the
labour demand
Slaughter (2001) NBER manufac- The constant output own price
turing data set elasticities of the demand for
1961-91 production workers increased
in the sample period. That
of non-production workers did
not. Time explains most of the
increase
Krishna et al. (2001) Turkish firm The trade liberalization under-
level data set gone by Turkey in the sam-
1983-86 ple period did not increase the
elasticity of the labour demand
Fabbri et al. (2002) UK ARD firm The constant output labour
level data set demand elasticities for blue
1973-92 collars of UK-MNEs, non-Uh-
MNE and UK-non-MNEs in-
creased in the sample period.
The same elasticities for white
collars did not have any precise
trend
determinants: the elasticity of substitution between labour and other factors and
the elasticity of demand for goods to prices. Under the assumption that openness is
affecting these factors by increasing the possibility of substitution among factors and
goods respectively, that relationship would then predict a consequent increase in the
elasticity of demand for labour.
Although most of the empirical studies in the field have been inspired by this
relationship (i.e. Slaughter (1999), Fabbri et al. (2002) among others), two issues
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remain. Firstly, Allen (1938) showed that this relationship holds in a perfect compe-
tition environment at the industry level. It is now widely recognized that an imperfect
competition framework is necessary for explaining the rise in trade and multinational
activities. The first question addressed then in this chapter is how this relationship
can be extended to an imperfectly competitive setting!", Following Dixit's (1990)
modelling framework, we show that AH can be generalized to allow for imperfect
competition. In particular, under the assumption of oligopoly, the elasticity of labour
demand depends on a third term, neglected so far by the AH relation. This term is
reducing the burden on labour demand elasticity: the elasticity of prices to wages.
Actually, an increase in wages has a pure cost effect, but is reducing at the same time
the market share of the firm and thus its mark-up. As a result of this pro-competitive
effect, there might be incomplete pass through between prices and wages and the
adjustment of labour demand would be smaller than expected.
The second issue left out by the AH relation is that it does not show formally the
relationship between trade openness measures and labour demand elasticities.'! We
try to fill that gap by showing that the average elasticity of labour demand depends,
in a formal manner, on the import penetration rates. Also, our model provides an
explanation for why the elasticity of demand has not been increasing that much with
trade, a result that was pointed out by previous studies. In fact, it predicts that the
effect of import penetration would be high, if there is complete pass-through from
lONote that Krishna et al. (2001) have studied the impact of trade on labour demand elasticities
by emphasizing the role of imperfect competition as well. However, the authors design a framework
based on monopolistic competition (i.e. they do not consider strategic interaction among firms) and
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function.
11Jean (2000) could also link trade measures with the elasticity of labour demand but he uses
a different framework than that of Allen-Hamermesh. His work is built on a perfect competition
world in general equilibrium with an Armington type hypothesis on the demand side and a Leontief
production function on the supply side
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wages to prices. But in the case of incomplete pass-through, then a small effect of
import penetration should prevail.
Previous empirical works have used as theoretical framework the industry-level
relationship in 2.7, which was derived by Allen (1938), further investigated by Uzawa
(1962) and discussed in details by Hamermesh (1993). We report it below for conve-
nience
(2.12)
where at = ;~ is the share of labour cost to revenue in the industry; au represents
the elasticity of substitution between l and all all the other factors of production in
the industry'{. Allen (1938) proves this relation by resolving a program of profit
maximisation in perfect competition.
What is the intuition behind this relation? If wages increase, and given a fixed
output, employers will want to substitute labour towards other factors of production
whose price is now relatively lower (the employers change the technique of production
along the same isoquant). The extent of this effect depends on a. The higher the
share of labour cost, the smaller the pass-through from a to T]L.
However, industry output is not fixed. In fact, for a given production technique
an increase in wages positively affects commodity prices in the industry which in turn
reduces industrial production overall. (The isoquant moves inward.) This affects
12The concept of the Allen elasticity of substitution has been called into question not long ago.
Blackorby and Russel (1981) highlight that the AH elasticity of substitution is completely uninfor-
mative about the ease with which inputs can be substituted (when there are more than two inputs).
They underline that the Morishima (1967) elasticity of substitution is the true elasticity of substi-
tution. However, this argument is not strictly relevant to the purpose of this paper since what we
are interested in is the own price labour demand elasticity. Although 0'11 is not the true elasticity
of substitution, multiplied by the cost share of labour, yields the constant output wage elasticity of
labour.
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downward the demand for the two factors and a fortiori that for labour. The extent
of this decrease in labour demand following the adjustment of production to the new
prices, depends on the share of labour cost.
Notice moreover that the factor of pass-through from substitution to labour de-
mand is now aL. Hence, the effect of substituting from labour towards all other
factors has a greater impact on labour demand, the greater the share of labour in
total cost.
2.6.2 Generalization to imperfect competition
The elasticity of the labour demand (or of any other input) can be obtained from a
more elegant and simpler formal setting by Dixit (1990) who minimizes total costs
instead of maximizing profits. We thus follow the same type of formulation as Dixit
in what follows, but extend the framework to the case of imperfect competition.
Assume a firm that produces with constant returns to scale. If the production
function is linearly homogeneous, i.e. with constant return to scale, its total cost can
be written as follows13 (e.g.: Jehele and Reny (1998, pp. 239))
(2.13)
Where c(w, 1) is the cost of 1 unit of output, w = (WI, ... Wm) is the price vector of
m factors of production and yS(w,p) is the supply function. By Shephard's Lemma,
13Wecould have supposed an increasing returns to scale technology by assuming an alternative
expression that includes fixed costs likeC = ySc(W) +F, but this does not affect the relation to be
estimated hereafter.
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the conditional demand for labor is the derivative of total costs with respect to the
price of labor: 14
(2.14)
Taking the log and deriving with respect to log of Wl we obtain the elasticity of
the labour demand with respect to wages
(2.15)
Then, the labour demand elasticity can be expressed as the sum of two terms: 1)
the constant output labour demand elasticity, i.e. (Jll(}:l ; 2) and the elasticity of the
supply function to wages (also known as scale effect), viz. T}y6Wt = T}YWt~.
We have that (Jll is the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution, (Jll = c(W)CWtWt (Uzawa
CWtCWt
1962; Hamermesh 1993). The elasticity of the output function to wages T}y6Wt may be
also expressed as the elasticity of the industry output (Y) to wages (T}YWt)over the
market share (8 = yS /y).15
Knowing that the optimal supply depends on factor prices and the price of the final
good, to wit yS = (w,p), we can derive an analytical formulation of T}y'Wt in different
competitive settings. In perfect competition the price is taken as given, therefore
T}y6Wt = T}y.wtlp, where Ip indicates that the derivative has been taken keeping the
price, p, as constant. 7}y.wdp is the effect on the labour demand of a variation in
14The labour demand with output considered as given L(w; y8) is called conditional labour demand
since it is conditional on the given level of output y • .
15This is because a log y/a logWI = (alogy"/alogy)(alogy/alogwz) = 'r/Yw,ls. If we consider a
monopolist, i.e, y8 = Y or s = 1we have that the two elasticities are the same since, in equilibrium
the output supplied by the firm is the same as the total output demanded by consumers.
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output, taking the product price as given, caused by a change in wages. In imperfect
competition firms can affect prices, thus the elasticity of the supply function must
include another term that takes into account the variation in the product price induced
by a change in wages. By the rule of partial differentiation it is possible to show that
in imperfect competition
The first addend of the right hand side is the elasticity of the output supplied with
respect to wages, taking the market price fixed. The second addend is the product
between the elasticity of the firm supply function with respect to the market price,
keeping wages constant, and the elasticity of the market price with respect to wages.
Substituting this expression in 2.15 we can write
(2.16)
where the rightmost term is the total scale effect and is derived from 'f}YWl
'f}yP'f}PWl (where 'f}yp is the elasticity of the market demand to the market price). Note
that the scale effect is 1}y'wzlp + 1}y·pIWl 1}PWl = 1}yP 1}pwJ S.
The above expression decomposes the labour demand elasticity in all its compo-
nents and allows to assess which one is likely to be affected by international trade.
In the central term, clWl is the constant output labour demand elasticity; the sum of
the first two addends (elWl + 1}Y'wdp) is the constant price labour demand elasticity,
denoted by 'f}lwdp' This is the elasticity of the unconditional labour demand L( w, p) .16
16Note that L(w,p) is the profit maximizing labour demand function L(w,p) = L(w, y8(W,p)) ob-
tained assuming the firm chooses the profit maximizing output Y8(W,p), see Jehele and Reny (1998,
pp. 239-241)
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It is indeed the sum of the constant output labour demand elasticity and the elastic-
ity of the profit maximizing output with respect to wages, taking the market price
as given. The sum of the last two terms (7]y.wtJp + 7]Y'PIWI 7]PWI) is the scale effect.
It encompasses the effect on the labour demand of a variation in both output and
product price caused by a change in wages.
From the central term in 2.16, it is already possible to see that the scale effect
in imperfect competition (i.e, 7]Y'wdp + 7]Y'pIWI 7]pwJ is smaller than the scale effect
in perfect competition (i.e. 7]Y'wdp), in the likely case that 7]PWI > O. However, the
scale effect is still negative since, as it is possible to note from the rightmost term
in 2.16, 7]Yp(l/s)7]pwl < 0 (since 7]yP < 0, i.e. the product demand is downward
sloping, and 7]PWI > 0). This is because as wages increase output will decrease, as in
perfect competition; however the decrease in output will be less than in a perfectly
competitive setting since producers will be able to pass part of the increase in wages
to prices.
Thus, from equation 2.16 it is possible to see that in a oligopolistic competition, as
it is the case in a perfectly competitive market, the labour demand is more elastic the
higher the cost share of of labour ai, the larger the absolute value of the Allen-Uzawa
elasticity of substitution between factors (Le. all), and the more elastic is the the
product demand (7]yp). In addition, the labour demand of a firm is less elastic the
higher its market share. This is because given 7]Yp, the higher the market share, the
lower the perceived product demand elasticity 7]y.p = 7]yp/ s.
Relationship 2.16 is quite different from the familiar expression in 2.12. To write it
in more comparable terms, we start noting that the the mark up J.Lis the ratio between
the price and the marginal cost, J.L= p/c(w), so J.Lc(w) = p. Then, the elasticity of
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the market price with respect to wages can be expressed as 1}PWI = 1}/l-WI + 1}c(w)w.
When the production function presents constant return to scale, the elasticity of the
marginal cost with respect to wages 1}c(w)w is equal to the cost share of labour (0:1).17
Therefore we have that
1}PWI = T}",WI + 0:[ (2.17)
Substituting 2.17 in 2.16 we obtain an expression of the elasticity of the labour
demand like the one in 2.12
(2.18)
In an oligopoly framework, however, T}",WI =f. O. In this case, the third term of the
right hand side in expression 2.18 will be different from zero and its sign will depend
upon T}",WI' In the conventional case where T}jJ.WI < 0 this term is positive and therefore
it is reducing in absolute values the elasticity of labour demand to wages. It is doing
so because of the pro-competitive effect generated by the variation in wages on mark-
ups. In order not to lose much of their competitiveness, the firms are constrained
to pass a part of the increase in wages on to less mark-ups, making eventually a
relatively small adjustment on prices and thus demand. Hence, in an oligopoly world,
this incomplete pass through between wages and prices would make labour demand
less elastic.
In both perfectly competitive markets and monopolistic markets the last term of
the right hand side of expression 2.18 disappears, since 1},..WI = 0, and therefore reduces
to 2.12. In perfect competition 1}",WI = 0 since the profit maximization condition
17This can be obtained writing the elasticity of the marginal cost to the wage as
8 logc(w)/8Iog WI = (8Iogc(w)/8c(w)) (8c(W)/8wl) (8wt/8 logWI) = (l/c(w))lwi = (}:I.
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ensures that the market price (p) equals the marginal cost (8C(w, y)/8y = c(w)), i.e.
the mark-up is one, and therefore its elasticity is zero and T/PWI = T/C(W)WI = oa. Thus,
in perfect competition if the wage increases by 1 percent, the price must increase
by al percent for the firm to continue to produce. In other words, the price (i.e.
marginal revenue) has to increase by the same proportion as the marginal cost for
the firm not to exit the market.l". In monopoly we have that T/J.LWI = 0 since the
profit maximization implies that the mark-up depends only on the elasticity of the
product demand.l? Hence T/PWI = ai. This means that a monopolist who experiences
an increase in the wage by 1 percent will increase the price of the final good by al
percent.
However, in perfect competition the elasticity of the demand for labour is infinitely
elastic whereas in monopoly is not. This is because in the former case s = O. This
implies that the perceived product demand elasticity (T/yP = T/yp1/ s) is infinite. On
the other extreme, in a monopolistic setting s = 1, which means that the perceived
product demand elasticity is equal to the finite industry product demand elasticity
(T}yp = T}yp).
If we assume that firms compete in the quantity space (l.e, Cournot oligopoly) we
have the mark-up is /l = 1/(1 + s/T/YrJ So, the elasticity of /l with respect to wages
is,
(2.19)
180bviously, in perfect competition the firm cannot affect the market price. Therefore, whenever
the wage or the price of any other input increases the firm will have to exit the market since it
becomes uncompetitive (viz. its marginal cost is higher than the market price). What we are saying
here is that in perfect competition if the wage increases by 1 percent there must be an exogenous
increase by Cl:l percent in the market price for the firm to stay competitive.
19Ina monopolistic setting the mark-up is IL = ~
~11"
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where T/swi is the elasticity of the market share to wages. Under the traditional
assumption of downward sloping best response functions, it is well known that market
share is decreasing with the marginal cost of the firm: thus, T/swl < 0 and for this
reason T/J1.WI < O. Substituting expression 2.19 in 2.18 we obtain the elasticity of the
labour demand in Cournot competition,
(2.20)
The last term in the right hand side of the above expression is negative and will
lower the elasticity of the labour demand (in absolute value).
Thus far, we have considered a production function with constant return to scale,
whose cost function can be expressed as in 2.13. The relationship shown above are
slightly modified in case of a homothetic production function with no constant return
to scale or a non-homethetic one.
Assuming that the production function is homothetic with no constant return to
scale the cost function is multiplicative separable and can be written as (Jehle and
Reny 1998, pp. 231)
(2.21)
where h(yS) is strictly increasing. In this case, by Shepard's lemma the labour
demand is L(w, yS) = L(w)h(y8). Therefore taking logs and deriving with respect to
the log of wages we obtain the elasticity of the labour demand
(2.22)
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This relationship is the equivalent to that in 2.15. The only difference is in the
scale effect, where the term "ley appears. "ley is the elasticity of the cost function
with respect to yS (i.e. the inverse of the return to scale).20
As we have seen above the elasticity of the market price with respect to wages can
be expressed as the sum of the elasticity of the mark-up to wages and the elasticity
of the marginal cost to wages, "'P'WI= "l/l-Wl+ "leI/WI' The second term of the right hand
side of the above expression is equal to al as in the constant return to scale case."
Therefore the equivalent of equation 2.18 is,
(2.23)
The only difference with 2.18 is that the scale effect is multiplied by the elasticity
of the cost function with respect to yS ("ley), that is the inverse of the return to scale.
It is worth noting that if "'ey = 1, we have constant return to scale and relation 2.23
is equal to 2.18. If "ley> 1, i.e. decreasing return to scale, ("ley < 1, i.e, increasing
return to scale) the labour demand elasticity will be higher (lower), in absolute value,
than in the constant return to scale case, ceteris paribus.
Assuming Cournot competition and, therefore, substituting, 2.19 in 2.23 we get
an expression analogous to 2.20
(2.24)
2°1]Oy = 8Iog[c(w)h(y)]j8Iogy = 8 logh(y)j8 logy = h'(y)(h(y)jy). This quantity is the inverse
of the return to scale; indeed if the output supplied augments by 1 percent and the cost by 1.02
percent, i.e. 1]Oy = 1.02, this means that input usages increase by 1.02 percent, since C(w,yS) =
U:=i qi Wi : y = y(q). The return to scale of the production function y = y(q) can be shown to be
RTS =EiTlyq, = IjTloy.
21Thisis because 1]OyWI = [8Iog(c(w)h' (y))]j8 logWI = 81ogc(w)j81ogwl +8 logh' (y)/8Iogwl =
QI·
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If the production function is non-homothetic then we have C(w, y) =1= C(w, 1)h(y).
The elasticity of the demand for labour is
(2.25)
where 1JlySlwl is the elasticity of the labour demand with respect to output (1Jlyslwl >
0). Note that when the production function is homothetic 1JCy = 1Jly and the expres-
sion 2.25 will be the same as 2.22.22 The elasticity of the market price to wages is
1JPWI = 1JIJWI + 1Jly/1JCy al· Therefore the mathematical relationship 2.23 becomes
2
1JlY'lwl 1 1
1JIWI = Elwl + --1JYp - al + 1JlY'lwl 1JYp-1JIJWI
1JCy S S
Perusing 2.26 it is possible to observe that if the production function is homothetic,
(2.26)
since 1Jly = 1JCy, 2.26 reduces to 2.23. In the non-homothetic case the labour demand
will be more elastic than in the homothetic setting if the use of labour is augmented
(diminished) more than that of the other inputs when output is increased (decreased),
i.e. if 1Jly > 1JCy'
Again, if we assume firms compete in the quantity space, we can substitute 2.19
in 2.26 we get a relationship comparable to that in 2.20
2
1JlY'lwl 1
"liwi = Elwl + -- 1]yp - al + 1JCy JL 1Jswl
"lCy S
22The homotheticity of the production function implies that factor shares do not depend on the
level of output since if the output increases by 1 percent, all demands for input will increase by 1
percent as well and therefore the cost will grow by the same percentage; then, homotheticity ensures
that ?JCy = ?Jiy for any factor i.
(2.27)
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2.7 Elasticity of labour demand and trade at in-
dustry level
Trade could affect labour demand elasticity through both the elasticity of substitution
and the elasticity of the supply function (viz., scale effect). The first elasticity, could
indeed be affected as openness increases the possibility of combining domestic and
foreign factors in the production process of a firm (e.g.: Slaughter( 200 1)).
In addition, international trade may augment or reduce the scale effect due to
the perceived elasticity depending on whether it causes an increase or decrease in the
market share and in the cost share of labour. These are not obvious questions. The
answer hinges on how firms react to increased foreign competition.
The literature concerning international trade and labour demand has amply inves-
tigated the effect of trade on the cost share of skilled and unskilled workers. Generally,
trade has not been found to affect directly the cost share of labour while technology
has. The relationship between the market share and trade has not been investigated
sufficiently thus far. Consider first that the number of domestic firms is given in the
market. An increase in foreign firms' shares due to a larger openness would then
reduce the domestic firms market shares and hence, increase the elasticity of product
and labour demand. However, the number of firms might be endogenous to trade.
Under this new assumption an increase in foreign competition might lead the least
productive firms to exit the market, thereby resulting in a more concentrated market
and hence higher market share for all surviving firms.
To sum-up, at the firm level the effect of import penetration on market shares is
62
ambiguous. However, the effect becomes unambiguous at the industry level, irrespec-
tive of whether the number of firms is endogenous or not. In order to see this, we
relate formally hereafter import penetration to the mean labour demand elasticity
prevailing in the industry.
From equation 2.16, we multiply each term by the market share of the firm com-
puted considering only domestic companies (st = #h- )23 and sum over all domestic
firms in order to obtain an expression of the weighted mean elasticity of labour de-
mand in the industry, rhwi =EiS1'f/ilwl' After simplification we obtain:
1
'filwi - (JllOl +~ 'rJiYp'f/ipw 8
t
(2.28)
with 8 = s] s1 = ydlY being the total market share of domestic firms on their
market. 1/8 is increasing in the import penetration rate Ilyd since 1/8 = y/yd =
(yd + I)/yd = 1+ Ilyd. Hence, at the industry level, the higher the import pen-
etration, the higher the industry mean elasticity of the labour demand, in absolute
value. In this relation, we can thus estimate the pure effect of import penetration via
its impact on perceived product demand on average in the industry.
2.8 Data set
UK firm level data were used in this chapter. These come from the OneSource
database from 1989 to 1999. It includes information on all public limited compa-
nies, all companies with employees greater than 50, and the top companies based
23yD is total sales of domestic firms; i indexes firms
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on turnover, net worth, total assets, or shareholders funds (whichever is largest) up
to a maximum of 110,000 companies, in both manufacturing and service industries.
Companies that are dissolved or in the process of liquidation are excluded from the
OneSource sample. In this paper we concentrate on manufacturing firms from this
data source, which do not export.P' Full description of the data set is given in the
data appendix at the end of the Chapter 1.
The data set was screened to keep only those firms for which there were a complete
set of information about turnover (i.e. output), inputs and prices. In addition, outliers
that were eliminated; the 1 percent tails of the distribution of employment, wages per
employees, net book value of fixed assets, and deflated turnover were not considered
in the analysis. This left an unbalanced panel data of around 26000 observations
regarding 9897 firms.
Full details about the variables used can be found in Appendix.
2.9 Empirical results
2.9.1 Labour elasticity regression
Equation 2.18 can be estimated on firm level data using variables for employment,
wages and market shares. Taking discrete approximations, accounting for firm i
cross-section and time t variations, equation 2.18 could be estimated as:
~ log lit = -(1 [ait~ logWit] -
24Selecting the sample of non-exporters was necessary because we need market shares. Reliable
market shares are available only for the UK market.
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{31 [(adsit)~logwitl + {32 [(l/sit)~logwitl
+dt + di + cit (2.29)
where d, and d; represent individual and time effects and Cit is standard error
term. The ~ operator expresses here first differences. The parameter {31 represents
the product demand elasticity (i.e. 'f]y) whereas {32 estimates the interaction between
the product demand elasticity and the elasticity of the mark-up to wages (viz. 1]yr".).
Independent variables, ~logw, a, and (lis) can be easily computed from our data
(see appendix) which would allow us to estimate the above regression.
Equation in 2.18 is derived from theory and therefore refers to the long-term.
It does not allow for any adjustment dynamics, which in reality may be important.
Here, we are interested in the long-run behaviour of our variables since we want to
test the proposition implied by theory.
It is widely believed that cross-sectional studies tend to yield results concerning
the long-run while time series studies conduce to short-run estimates. This association
was investigated by Kuh (1959). By the same token, the between estimator in a panel
data set is supposed to generate long-term results since it exploits the cross-sectional
(i.e. between) variation of the data whereas the within estimator is thought to yield
short-term coefficients because this methodology uses the time series (viz. within)
variation of the data (Baltagi 2001, pp. 197-198).
Various authors have tackled the issue of why between and within estimates often
differ markedly while theoretically they should not. The culprits have been identified
in unobserved individual heterogeneity, dynamic misspecification and measurement
errors. The former leads to a source of bias which arises if the individual effect is
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correlated with the regressors. In this occurrence the within estimates would be con-
sistent while the between would not, since the former wipes out the individual effect
whereas the latter does not. Dynamic misspecification could also be the cause of
the discrepancy between the within and between estimates as underlined by Balt-
agi and Griffin (1984). Indeed, long-lags and short panel data, as is the norm in
firm level data, may result in dynamic misidentification. With regard this problem,
Pirotte (1999) shows that the static between estimator converges towards the long-
run coefficient even though the true data generating processes is dynamic.P Griliches
and Hausman (1986) have investigated the bias induced by measurement error. They
claim that any transformation that eliminates the individual fixed effect such as the
within and first difference transformation is likely to exacerbate the measurement
error bias. This point is further analysed by Mairesse (1990) who underlines that,
provided the measurement error is not auto correlated , the between estimators min-
imizes the bias induced by measurement errors, because of the averaging, whereas
within estimates magnify it.
In the estimation of regression 2.29 biases due to the unobserved individual het-
erogeneity, measurement errors and dynamic misspecification are likely to be encoun-
tered. Between the first two, measurement error seems to be the gravest since the
discrete approximation of continuous derivative admittedly cannot be expected to be
very precise. Thus, this would favour the between estimator since, as discussed before,
the within may aggravate the measurement error bias (Grilishes and Hausman 1986).
Besides, the bias related to the unobserved individual effect is probably eliminated
by first differencing the data in order to obtain a discrete approximation. In addition
25Forthe converge it is required that T tends to infinity, N is fixed and the parameters are homo-
geneous. In addition this result holds irrespectively of the number of autoregressive and distributed
lag terms appearing in the true data generating process
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the between estimator has the advantage of being robust to dynamic misspecification
as Pirotte (1999) has shown.
Given the above discussion, regression 2.29 has been estimated by means of the
following more general panel data model
(2.30)
where Yit is ~ log lit and Xit is the vector of explanatory variables as in expres-
sion 2.29. This model permits to distinguish the effect of a temporary variation in the
independent variables from the impact of a permanent one. Indeed, it assumes that
changes in the mean of variables (Xi) to wit long-run changes, affect the dependent
variable differently than temporary deviations from it (Xit - Xi).
It therefore combines the within and the between estimator. Indeed, Xi is the
between transformation (Xi = L:t Xit) whereas Xit - Xi is the within transformation.
It is worth noting that averaging over time it is possible to obtain
(2.31)
where ch is the Between estimator. Subtracting the last equation from 2.30 one
obtains
Yit - fh = (Xit - Xi) 82 + J.-tt + cit - €i
where now, the 82 is the Within estimator.
(2.32)
The parameters of 2.29 were estimated according to model 2.30. To control for
the size of the firm the lagged log of employment was included as additional regressor.
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The results are shown in table 2.2. The coefficients of variables with a bar refer to the
effect of permanent variations whereas the others concern the effect of a temporary
variation. In other words, the first set of results are the between estimates whereas
the second set are the within estimates.
With reference to the long-run, it is possible to note that the size of the firm seems
to increase the absolute value of the elasticity of labour demand. This means that
other things equal large firms are more inclined than small companies to substitute
labour with other inputs when its cost increases. Furthermore, the long-run constant
output wage elasticity of labour, the AH elasticity of substitution, is negative as
expected and significant. It implies that a permanent increase in the cost share of
labour will result in a more elastic labour demand.
Finally, the terms concerning the scale effect provide somewhat mixed results .
Indeed, the product demand elasticity is estimated to be negative and significant at
the 5 percent confidence level whereas the pro-competitive term is positive, as theory
predicts, but insignificant.
With regard to the coefficient of the variables concerning a temporary departure
from their mean (within estimates) it is possible to note that the size of the firm
appears to affect the labour demand elasticity in the same direction as in the long-
run. In fact, the two lagged values of employment in log are both negative and
significant.
In addition, the elasticity of substitution is expected to be negative and significant,
but the last two terms, which refer to the short-run scale effect are insignificant and
have the opposite sign of what the theory posits. Therefore, it seems that whereas
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Table 2.2: Elasticity of labour demand equation: The following model was estimated
by OLS:
L),lnlit 150+ (hlnli + al~exliL),ln ui, + 7J:(exli/si)L),ln ui, + 7J:7J!(1/si)L),ln Wi
+ J2(lnlit-1 -ln1i) + J3(ln1it-2 - ~) + aU' [exlitL),lnwit - (exliL),lnWi)]
+ 7J~ [(exlit/sit)L),lnwit - (exli/Si)L),lnwi] +
+ 7J~7J: [(1/Sit)L),lnwit - (l/si)L),lnwi] + Cit
l; -.018611 **
(.001236)
-.842043**
(.203486)
-.000122*
(.000058)
.000015
(.000021)
-.135285**
('02664)
-.27508**
(.016242)
-.817545**
(.157535)
.000024
(.000064)
-1.00e-07
(.000018)
.14133**
(.00729)
26150
9897
.143915
In lit-1 - In li
In lit-2 - In li
cons
Observations
Firms
R2
Notes
(i) Robust standard errors in parenthesis
(ii) * significance at 5% confidence level; **significance at 1%
(iii) Time dummies included
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the elasticity of substitution has a role both in the short-term and the long-term the
scale effect does not have any effect in the short-run.
However, these results should be interpreted keeping in mind the econometric
caveat discussed above. More specifically, all the short-term coefficients are probably
biased because they are in fact within estimates. These are subject to the likely major
sources of bias impairing our estimation, namely measurement error bias (Grilishes
and Hausman 1986) and dynamic misspecification (Baltagi and Griffin 1984; Pirotte
1999). Contrariwise, the estimates derived from permanent variation of independent
variables, i.e. the between estimators, are not affected by dynamic misspecification
(Pirotte 1999) and less affected by measurement errors (Mairesse 1990).
For this reason it appears that from this first set of results the theory is only
partially corroborated by the data exploiting the between variation. Indeed, only
one term of the two scale effect terms is significant. More precisely, the elasticity
of product demand is negative and significant whereas the elasticity of the product
demand times the elasticity of mark-up with respect to wages is estimated to be
positive, but insignificant. 26
2.9.2 Cost function approach
In the previous section we have estimated relationship 2.18 a simple via linear regres-
sion. This method has yielded estimates of coefficients representing the AllenjUzawa
elasticity of substitution and the product of the elasticity of product demand to prices
times the elasticity of the product price to wages.
261t is worth stressing that in table 2.2 not attempt was made to correct for endogeneity problems.
However, given the above discussion about possible biases, endogeneity is not likely to be the major
source of bias. Errors of measurement are probably so. The issue of endogeneity is discussed more
thoroughly in the next section.
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However, using this methodology has produced mixed results, which may be
caused by the fact that the elasticities we are interested in are highly non-linear func-
tions of firms' characteristics, such as market share, mark up and labour demand.
These parameters are likely to assume different values for each firm. In addition if
the underlining production function is characterized by non-constant returns to scale
or is non-homothetic the elasticity of the labour demand is a function of additional
elasticities, namely 7Jlylw and 7JCy as shown in 2.23 and 2.26. Hence, the interpretation
of the estimates obtained in the previous section may be further complicated by the
interactions among all these terms.
An alternative empirical strategy is to estimate a flexible cost function whose
parameters can be used to derive the different components of the elasticity of labour
demand. In addition, with this methodology we can explicitly take into account the
possibility of a non-homothetic production function.
The first issue to consider concerns the choice of the cost function. We chose
the translog variable cost specification taking capital as fixed factor and two variable
inputs, namely labour and materials. The trans log production function and its dual
cost function were first introduced by Christensen et al. (1971) and since then they
have become ubiquitous in the production function and input demands empirical
literature (see for example Berndt (1991)). The translog is a flexible specification
since it is a second linear approximations of any production or cost function. We
considered a variable cost function with capital as the fixed factor since we assume
that capital cannot be adjusted freely in each time period like other inputs."
To begin with, two cost functions were estimated. One considers output as given
27This methodology has also the advantage that we do not have to consider the price of capital,
which is not in our data set
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i.e., C(w, yS). From this, it is possible to derive the constant output labour demand
elasticity clwi = O'll (Xl, i.e. the substitution effect. The other takes the product price
as fixed C[w, yS(w, p)] = C(w,p). From this, it is possible to compute the constant
price labour demand elasticity T}lwlp' The latter elasticity must be larger (in absolute
value) than the former elasticity. Their difference (T}y6wlp = T}lwlp-Clw) is not the scale
effect, but only its first (negative) component as shown in 2.16. If the production
function is non-homothetic, then T}ly T}y6wlp = T}lwlp - Clw.28
The fixed capital cost functions can be represented by C = yVC (w, m, y, k) + rk
and C = pVC (w, m, p, k) + rk. C and VC are the total and the variable cost,
respectively; w, m and r stand for the price of labour (wage per employee), the price
of intermediates and the user cost of capital, respectively." y is the output of the
firm, p is the price of the good (assumed to be the same across all firms) and k is the
fixed capital." Given that the capital is fixed, profit maximising firms will minimize
yVC and pVC. These functions were approximated and estimated using the translog
specification''!
28Remember that if the production function is homothetic, but with no-constant return to scale,
then TJIIl = T/CII; besides if there are constant return to scale 71clI = 1.
29Note that our firm level data set does not contain information on the price of intermediates.
Therefore, 4 digit SIC92 deflators of material and fuels provided by the Office of National Statistics
were used. Other authors have used deflators as a proxy of prices of inputs in cost functions (e.g.
(Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy 2001; Levinsohn 1993). Deflators may be deemed to be reliable proxies
of the actual price paid by firms in input markets are competitive.
30Anew, since the data set does not have information on product prices we used disaggregated
producer price indexes as proxies. This index varies over industries; therefore we have restricted the
following analysis to homogeneous sectors as classified by Oliveira et al. (1996).
31The translog specification we use is a second order linear approximation of any cost function,
whose dual production function may be non-homothetic.
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1 1
+ rk In k + 2rk(ln k)2 + ry In y + 2ryy(1n y)2 +
+ L rki In k In ui, +L ryi In y In to, + rky In kIn y (2.33)
In pVC 1
- f30 + ~ f3i In ui, + 2 ~ L (3ij In ui, InWj +
I t J
1 1
+ f3k In k + 2f3k(ln k)2 + f3p lnp + 2(3pp(1np)2 +
+ L f3ki In k InWi +L (3pi Inp In ui; + rkp In k Inp (2.34)
where i and j index inputs. The first derivatives of the log of the cost function
with respect to the log of the price of one input, say labour, yields its cost share of
8ln zVC azvc WI jorz=y,p
alnWI
-
aWL zVC'
WI
L(w, k, z) zVC
- Ql
Cost shares are estimable equations since they are linear function of a subset of
parameters and variables appearing in the cost function. Therefore, a system of equa-
tions was estimated comprising the cost equation and the variable cost shares." The
estimation was conducted imposing the standard restrictions applying to any cost
function, namely symmetry and linear homogeneity in factor prices, along with the
relevant cross equation restrictions. We used Zellner's method for seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) equations. Due to the fact that the variable cost shares sum to one
the disturbance covariance matrix of the system will be singular and one equation
therefore needs to be dropped. We dropped the variable cost share of intermediates.
The SUR estimates will normally not be invariant to the equation deleted. Fortu-
nately, invariance can be obtained by iterating Zellners method (ISUR) so that the
32The estimation was conducted separately for the cases when output and price are considered as
given.
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parameter estimates and residual covariance matrix converge (Berndt 1991). The esti-
mators obtained through ISUR are equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimators.
We combined the SUR estimator with panel data estimation techniques deploying
the within-transformation to control the firm fixed effect. A full set of time dummies
was also added to the estimated equations to control for time fixed effects.33
It is worth underlining that we consider the price of inputs as exogenous to the
firm and therefore not correlated with the error term of the cost function and cost
share regressions. This is equivalent to say that firms face a infinitely elastic supply
of inputs. This assumption may be problematic using aggregate data; at county level,
for instance, the supply of labour is not infinitely elastic, but infinitely rigid since it
corresponds to the number of worker in that country. At more disaggregate levels it
is plausible to think that both the demand for and the supply of labour depends on
wages. The latter, then, are determined endogenously by the movement of both the
supply of and demand for labour curves. In this case to get consistent estimates of
labour demand elasticities it is necessary to instrument wages to control for possible
shifts of the supply of the labour curve, which determines wages.
However, at very disaggregate levels, like in this study, it is reasonable to envisage
a infinitely supply of labour since firms may try to hire workers from an infinitely
large pool (with respect to their demands) of workers. In this case, no instruments
are needed since changes in wages (determined by exogenous movements of the sup-
ply of the labour curve) trace out the demand for labour. In addition, also if we
wanted to instrument wages we would need variables determining the labour supply
33The estimation was conducted in two steps: 1) within transformation of the cost function and
cost share to be estimated; 2) system estimation by ISUR of the cost function and cost share.
Industry dummies were not estimated since they cancel out as result of the within transformation.
The ISUR estimation was implemented with Stata 8 using the command sureg.
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to be used as good instruments in the labour demand regression. This information is
extraneous to the data set used. Also previous empirical studies on labour demand
using disaggregate data have treated wages as exogenous (Slaughter 2001; Krishna,
Mitra, and Chinoy 2001).34
The results of the ISUR estimation are shown in table 2.3. Those considering
price as given are in column 1, whereas those considering output as given are in
column 2. These figures cannot be easily interpreted since they are the estimates
of the parameters of the cost functions. However, from the estimated parameters in
table 2.3 it is possible to see that the production function (dual of the estimated cost
function) is non-homothetic since 'Yyy, 'Ywy and 'Ymy are statistically significant.
Since the translog specification is in log and involves cross-product term it is
not possible to obtain the labour demand and its elasticity by simple differentiation.
However, the first derivative of the cost share with respect to wages can be shown to
be a function of the labour demand elasticity and the cost share itself
olnal oln~~~::z)
olnwl Olnwl
olnwl olnL(w,k,z) oln zVC
- + -o In WI 0 InWI 0 In WI
1 0 In L(w , k, z) . f+ 01 -ai, orz=y,p
nWI
34In results not reported we have tried to instrument wages and all its cross terms with lagged
values and their square terms applying the three-stage least square methodology. Very unreliable
estimate wereobtained since the elasticity of the demand for labour was always positive. This may be
caused by the poor quality of instruments. Lagged values of wages probably are not a good predictor
of the supply of labour so they do not help to identify correctly the demand for labour curve. It
seems that instrumental variables in this case produce more bias than that which is supposed to
correct. Slaughter (2001) reported similar problems.
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Table 2.3: Regression results of cost functions: Fixed effects ISUR
pVC yVC
(1) (2)
f3w .7104 'Yw .2015
(.0353) " (.0216)"
13m .2896 'Ym .7985
(.0353) -- (.0216)"
13k .7986 'Yk .2733
(.0715)" (.0238)"
f3p -8.9215 'Yy .6559
(1.6403)'- (.0103)"
f3ww .0411 'Yww .0678
(.0029)" (.0028)*-
f3kk .0202 'Ykk .0161
(.0028)-- (.0015)*-
e.; .0411 'Ymm .0678
(.0029)" (.0028)-'
f3pp 2.2908
"tw .0855
(.3634)-- (.0027)"
f3wk .0015 'Ywk .0154
(.0009) (.0009)'-
f3wm -.0148 'Ywm -.0405
(.0097) (.0053)-'
f3wp -.0482 'Ywy -.0556
(.0089)" (.0015)"
f3mk .0204 'Ymk -.0595
(.0137) (.0051)-'
j3mp .0483 'Ymy .0557
(.0089)-' (.0015)"
j3p -.1741 'Yky -.0303
(.0186)-- (.0016)--
cons
-.0024 cons -.0443
(.0102)*- (.0039)-'
observ. 11430 observ. 11430
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
(ii) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
(iii) Subscripts refers to labour (w), materials (rn), capital (k), output (y), product price (p).
(iv) Year dummies included.
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Then,
olnL(w, k, z)
olnWI
oln al
01 - 1+ al;
nWI
!orz=y,p
From this relationship given an estimate of alna~(w,k,z) it is possible to get all
nWI
estimator of the labour demand elasticity. From the cost function in 2.33 and 2.34 it
is possible to see that
oln al oal 1
OlnWI
-
olnwl al
a81n .VC 1
-
81nwi _
olnwl al
0ln2 zVC 1
-
a(ln WI)2 al
1
for z = y- 'Yll-;
al
1
for z = p- f311-;
al
Thus, constant output and constant price labour demand elasticities can be ex-
pressed, respectively as
oal 1 1
-- - + al - 1= "tu>: + al - 1
oln WIal a/
oal 1 1
+ al - 1= f3u- + al - 1
oln WIal a/
The variance of these estimates can be computed respectively as Var(Elwl) =
(2.35)
(2.36)
We computed labour demand elasticities and their standard errors at the median
of the cost share of labour and for each observation. At the median of the cost share,
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the elasticity estimates are 1Jlwlp = -.5847 and Elw = -.4789 and they are statistically
significant at any confidence level." In addition, their relative value is consistent with
theory, since 1Jlwlp - Clw = 1Jlylw1Jywlp < 0 (see expression 2.16). This means that the
optimal adjustment of output, caused by a change in wages, makes the labour de-
mand more elastic. This is because, as wages increase firms will substitute labour,
given output (i.e. substitution effect); however firms will reduce output as well, since
the marginal cost has increased, and this will cause a further reduction in the labour
requirements. Table 2.4 exhibits the mean and percentiles of the constant price and
constant output elasticity of the labour demand, as well as their difference, calculated
for all observations. If the cost function is well behaved the own-price input demand
elasticities, should be negative for all data points. It is noteworthy that only those
estimates in the upper tail of the distribution are inconsistent with theory, being
positive.j" For all the other observations, the estimates have the expected (negative)
sign. Excluding the upper and lower tail of the distribution, the elasticity estimates
vary between -0.60 (95th percentile) and -0.30 (5th percentile), for the constant price
elasticity, and between -0.49 (95th percentile) and -0.04 (5th percentile), for the con-
stant output elasticity. The values of the latter are, in general within the 0.15-0.75
range that Hamermesh (1993) has identified as plausible for a typical firm.
As underlined above, these estimates are consistent with theory since 1Jlwlp <
clw). As it is possible to see in table 2.4, column 3 this difference is negative for all
observations and ranges from 0.35 (5th percentile) to 0.05 (95th percentile). These
estimates suggest that the optimal adjustment in output, caused a variation in wages
by 1 percent, adds 0.05-0.35 percentage points to the substitution effect. These may
35The standard errors are respectively 0.0114 and 0.0111.
36These values are generated for very low and high value of the cost share of labour.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of the estimates of the elasticities of the demand for
labour.
'l71wlp Clw 7]lylw 7]ywlp = 7]lwlp - Clw
(1) (2) (3)
1%
-.5945 -.4791 -.8574
5%
-.5941 -.4788 -.3470
10%
-.5926 -.4779 -.2393
25%
-.5835 -.4710 -.1447
50%
-.5476 -.4447 -.0965
Mean
-.4963 -.3536 -.1407
75%
-.4844 -.3837 -.0708
90%
-.3934 -.2456 -.0575
95%
-.2988 -.0362 -0507
99%
.3501 1.20 -.0401
be deemed as substantial figures since they correspond to 40 percent of constant
output elasticity (clwlp) at its mean value (and 22 percent at its median).
To assess the statistical significance of the constant output and constant price
labour demand elasticities computed for all firms, table 2.1 graphs them against the
cost share of employment, including their 95 percent confidence interval.i" As it is
possible to see they are statistically different from zero and from each other, bar at
extreme values of the cost share of labour. In addition the constant price elasticity is
larger, in absolute value, than the substitution effect for all observations.
Thus far, we have not explored the total labour demand elasticity, which take
into account the variation in the product price besides the change in output. In the
preceding section we have seen that if the production function is non-homothetic, as
the estimates in table 2.3 suggest, the total labour demand elasticity can be written
as
375 percent tails of the distribution have been excluded to display a neater graph.
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Figure 2.1: Elasticities and cost share of employment.
o .4 .6 .8.2
Cost share of labour
Constant price lab. demo elast.
Constant output lab. demo elast.
Note: 95 percent confidence interval included
'f/lw clw + 'f/lylw 'f/yw
Clw + 'f/lylw 'f/ywlp + 'f/lylw'f/pw
The total elasticity comprises a third term, which is the result of oligopolistic
competition. It is expected to be positive, thereby reducing the absolute valu of the
responsiveness of the demand for labour to wages. To quantify the effect of this third
term, we need to estimate another cost function in which the product price is not
taken as exogenous, but determined by the behaviour of firms.
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It is well known that in an oligopoly setting the total quantity produced ill all
industry (and therefore the market price) depends on the sum of the marginal cost of
competing firms, not on its distribution (Bergtrom and Varian 1985). Furthermore,
the optimal supply of output is increasing in the relative marginal cost; firms with rel-
atively high marginal cost will produce less than those with a relatively low marginal
cost. To allow for this type of competitive behaviour, determining the total industry
output and the product price, we estimated a translog cost function analogous to
those in 2.33 or 2.34 where the output or price was substituted with a measure of
the marginal cost of firms relative to the industry average (rmc). The variable cost
function we are interested in estimating is VC(r, m, k, rmc). It is worth underlining
that its first derivative with respect to the relative marginal cost is negative since,
avc = avc _!!!L < 0
8rmc ay 8rmc
............... ~
>0 <0
The marginal cost was computed from the estimated parameters of the cost func-
tion yVC. Indeed, it is easy to show that
alnC(w,y)1}Cy= = IY + IYY In y + fLy In L + fMy In M + fKy In K
alny
From the estimated elasticity 1}Cy it is possible to derive the marginal cost as
MC = 1}Cy(Y/C). Here a problem arises because we do not have Yijt (real out-
put of firm i, in industry j at time t); what we have is total turnover deflated,
YijtPijt!Pijt!PjO = YtPjO (i.e. turnover expressed in base year pounds). Therefore
MCijt = TJc;;tY;;t (Yijt!Cijt) [Cijt!(YijtPjO)] = (a In Gijda In Yijt)/Pjo. The marginal cost
in scaled by the industry price as at the base year. However, what we are interested
in is not the marginal cost per se, but the marginal cost relative to the industry-
time average rm~jt = In MCijt -In MC.jt;38 with this transformation the scale factor
3si, j and t, respectively, index firms, industries and year.
81
cancels out. "
We estimated a system of equation (the cost function VC(r, m, k, rmc) and the
relative labour cost share equation) via three-stage least square. This methodology
was chosen to correct for the measurement errors introduced by the generated re-
gressor (i.e. relative marginal cost). Indeed, measurement errors will result in biased
and inconsistent estimates. In addition, any transformation of the data, such as first
difference and fixed effect, will worsen the measurement errors bias (Grilishes and
Hausman 1986). To correct for this, additional information (as instrumental vari-
ables) or additional assumptions to identify the parameters are needed. We followed
Hsiao (2003, pp. 305) and employed instrumental variable estimation, which in a
system of equations results in the three-stage least square methodology. We instru-
mented all the variables in the translog specification of VC(r, m, k, rmc) where the
relative marginal cost enters (i.e. its value, squared value and all its cross-product)
with the corresponding one period lag. As before we iterated over the estimated dis-
turbance covariance matrix and parameter estimates until convergence was achieved
to make our estimates invariant to the choice of which cost share is estimated.
The result of the estimation are in table 2.5.40 Given these estimates we can
compute the total labour demand elasticity like in 2.36, substituting f3ww with oww'
Before doing this, it is worth checking whether the elasticity of the cost function with
respect the relative marginal cost is estimated to be negative as expected. Table 2.6
shows the percentiles and mean of the distribution of such elasticity computed for all
39This is because rmCijt = In l/pjo + InMCijt - [liN Li(ln l/pjo + In MCi;d! = In l/pjo +
InMCi;t -In l/pjo + InMC.;t = InMCijt - InMC.;t.
4oTo assess the quality of our instruments we checked the p-value of the F-statistics of the first
stage regressions. If the p-value is above ten then the null that all regressors in the first-stage
regression is not rejected and the instruments are too weak. We found that the null is rejected at
any significance level for all first-stage regressions, thus we concluded that the instrument used are
not weak.
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observations. As it is possible, to see for all observations the elasticity is negative.
The mean and median are similar being respectively -11.6 percent and -10.81 percent.
This means that if the marginal cost, relative to the industry average, decreases by 1
percent, the variable cost will decrease by 11 percent, on average.
Turning on total labour demand elasticity, 'f/lw, we computed its estimates at the
median of the cost share of labour and for all observations. The latter is -0.5091
and is significant at any confidence interval.'! The corresponding value of the con-
stant output and constant price labour demand elasticity were "llwlp = -.5847 and
Clw = -.4789. Then, we have, as theory predicts, that the total elasticity is smaller
than the constant price elasticity and larger than the constant output elasticity, in
absolute value. The difference "llw - "llwlp = 'f/lylw "lyplw "lpw is an estimation of the pro-
competitive term and it should be positive. Previously, Slaughter (2001) has tried to
estimate the total and constant output labour demand elasticities using US industry
data. However, he failed to obtain negative scale effect. This is probably due to the
aggregation bias.
To check whether the scale effect is negative for all observations, table 2.7 exhibits
the percentiles and mean of the distribution of the total elasticity "llw, scale effect
'f/lw - Clw and the pro-competitive term "llw - "llwlp. It is noteworthy that the value of
'f/lw are in the most of the cases negative as expected. Only in the upper 1 percent
of the distribution the estimates are negative; these correspond to extreme value of
the cost share of labour. The estimates of the scale effect are all less than zero,
anew as predicted. This means that the total elasticity of the demand for labour
is larger in absolute value than the constant output labour demand elasticity (i.e.
substitution effect). This is the scale effect introduced by Allen (1938). Furthermore,
41 Its standard error is 0.0201
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Table 2.5: Regression results of cost function VC(w, rmc): Fixed effects 3sls.
VC
(1)
f3ww
«;
f3rmcrmc
f3wk
f3wm
«-:
f3mk
f3mrmc
Cons
Observ.
.0106
(.0028)"
.9894
(.0028)"
.7803
(.0797)**
4.6259
(.8612)**
.0602
(.0051)"
.0062
(.0057)
.0602
(.0051)"
-3.8678
(1.084.9)*'
-.0026
(.0016)+
.0447
(.0095)"
-.622
(.0174.)"
-.1241
(.0136)"
.6221
('0174.)"
-.1936
(.1258)
.0106
(.0028)*"
7807
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
(ii) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
(iii) Subscripts refers to labour (w), materials (m), capital (k), output (y), relative marginal cost (rmc).
(iv) Year dummies included.
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Table 2.6: Elasticity of the variable cost function VC(w, rmc) with respect the rela-
tive marginal cost.
7]Crmc
(1)
1%
-27.16
5%
-20.34
10%
-17.85
25%
-14.25
50%
-10.81
Mean
-11.60
75%
-8.29
90%
-6.09
95%
-5.05
99%
-3.17
table 2.7 shows that the difference between the total elasticity (7]lw) and the constant
price elasticity (7]lwlp) is positive throughout. This is consistent with the extension
of the elasticity of the labour demand in imperfect competition presented in the
preceding sections. This term reduces the scale effect; if the pro-competitive effect
were zero the scale effect would be higher. Indeed, the scale effect appears to be
fairly small, thereby making the total labour demand elasticity only slightly higher
than the substitution effect. According to the figures in table 2.7 the scale effect adds
around 0.03 percentage points, on average, to the constant labour demand elasticity,
whose mean value is 0.40. If the absence of the pro-competitive effect, the scale effect
would increase (in absolute) by around 0.10 percentage points.
Overall, following relationship 2.25 and given our estimates the labour demand
elasticity can be decomposed, at the median of the cost share of labour, as
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics of the estimates of the total labour demand elasticity,
scale effect, and pro-competitive effect.
Total elasticity Scale effect Pro-competitive effect
7Jlw 7Jlw - Clw 171w - 7J1wlp = 7JIylw 7Jyplw 7Jpw
(1) (2) (3)
1% -.5092 -.2471 .0291
5% -.5089 -.0937 .0364
10% -.5081 -.0653 .0411
25%
-.5005 -.0406 .0504
50% -.4725 -.0271 .0680
Mean -.3977 -.0396 .0993
75% -.4168 -.0201 .1019
90% -.3070 -.0164 .1638
95% -.1574 -.0145 .2352
99% .9851 -.0116 .6201
7]lw, tlw, + 7Jly6lw, 7]Y'wdv + 7]lY'lw,7]Y'vlw,7]vw,
~
~ -------0.5084 -0.4789
-0.1051 +0.0756
-0.0295
As it is possible to note the pro-competitive reduces (in absolute value) the scale
effect substantially. This may be one of the reason why previous empirical studies
did not find any effect of increased international competition on the elasticity of the
labour demand (Slaughter 2001; Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy 2001; Greenaway, Hine,
and Wright 1999).
Previously we have shown in 2.28 that the total elasticity of the demand for labour
in a given industry can be expressed as a weighted average of firm-level elasticities,
with weights equal to market shares computed considering only the domestic produc-
tion. This industry-level elasticity is increasing in the import penetration rate.
To aggregate our firm-level elasticities to the industry-level we need domestic
production and imports for each sector. We took this information from the Input-
Output Supply and Use Tables provided by the Office of National Statistics. They
86
offer information at disaggregated industry level, correspondingly roughly to three and
four-digit sectors of the SIC92 classification. Obviously, to compute reliable weighted
average industry elasticities it is necessary to have information on all firms in the
sector so that the weights will sum to one. Unfortunately, our data set is not a census
so the sum of the markets shares differs from one in most industries and years; however
we checked for which sectors and years the total domestic production in our firm level-
data covers at least the ninety percent of the total domestic production extracted from
the Input-Output tables. Only the industry under the heading "Production of mineral
waters and soft drinks" in 1999 meets this criterion.V
Given our estimates of the elasticity of the demand for labour for those firms in
this sector in 1999 the industry-level elasticity can be decomposed as
-.049
Knowing that liS is equal to one plus the import penetration rate (Ilyd) and
that in this particular industry, in 1999, the import penetration rate was 0.102, as
computed from the Input-Output tales, we can write
1ilwl = ~ + (1+ :d) ~ 'f/iYp 'f/ipw
-0.385 ---------~
1.102 -.044
Then, we can infer that if the import penetration rate increases by 10 percent
(from 0.102 to 0.112), this will add around 0.004 percentage points to the labour
demand elasticity, which is around one percent of its estimated value (-0.385). This
small increment in the total elasticity may be deemed due to the pro-competitive term
of the labour demand elasticity, which is reducing the responsiveness of the labour
demand to wages.
42This is the sector 19 in the Input-Output classification corresponding to 1598 SIC92.
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2.10 Conclusion
In recent years much effort has been devoted to analyze the effect of international
trade on labour demand elasticities. Rodrick (1997) has suggested that one of the
consequences of increasing international competition is a more elastic demand for
labour. This statement has spurred new empirical studies (Slaughter 2001; Krishna,
Mitra, and Chinoy 2001; Greenaway, Hine, and Wright 1999), which however failed
to identify any significant effect of trade on the elasticity of the demand for labour.
The Allen (1938)-Uzawa(1962) theoretical framework usually employed in all stud-
ies dealing with input demand elasticities assumes perfectly competitive markets and
refers to the representative firm. These assumptions make this framework relevant at
the industry-level, only; in addition, according to this relationship, at the firm-level
the labour demand results infinitely elastic because the product demand is infinitely
elastic too.
This is at odds with recent theoretical and empirical findings for two reasons.
Firstly, from a theoretical standpoint imperfect competition and increasing return to
scale have been shown to be one of the major causes of international trade (Helpman
and Krugman 1985). Secondly, empirical researches suggest that the elasticity of the
labour demand never approaches infinity (Hamermesh 1993), therefore the assump-
tion of perfect competition in the product market, although theoretically convenient,
does not seem to be appropriate.
In this chapter, following the approach of Dixit (1990) we have provided an exten-
sion to the traditional Allen-Uzawa formulation, by allowing for imperfect competition
and non-constant return to scale. The labour demand elasticity is found to depend
not only on the cost share of labour, its elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of
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the product demand, as in the traditional expression, but also on the market share
of the firm.
Furthermore, two terms feature in the scale effect. The first one is the analogous
of the scale effect in the Allen- Uzawa expression, with the only difference that the
product demand elasticity is divided by the market share yielding the "perceived"
product demand elasticity. The second term is a novelty. It is the result of the pro-
competitive effect whereby firms respond to say, an increase in the price of labour,
not only shedding jobs, but also reducing their mark-up. This term diminishes the
scale effect, thereby lessening the responsiveness of the demand for labour to wages.
In the empirical sections of this chapter, we test this theoretical relationship in
two fashions, using a firm-level data set of UK manufacturing firms operating in
homogeneous industry. Firstly, the elasticity of the labour demand, approximated by
the discrete annual changes in employment and wages, was regressed against variables
as function of the cost share of labour and the market share to estimate the three
components of the elasticity. This regression posed particular difficulties because of
measurement errors problems and non-linearities in the coefficients. However the
results seems to corroborate, at least partially, the theoretical framework. In the
long-run, the elasticity of substitution of labour, its cost share and the firm's market
share have the expected effect on labour demand elasticities. However, of the two
term characterizing the scale effect only one appears to have an explanatory power.
In the second empirical exercise, we find, consistently with theory, that the scale
effect is composed by two terms of which one, the pro-competitive effect, diminishes its
magnitude. From out estimates, it appears that the effect of this term is substantial.
Indeed, the scale effect seems to add only 0.03 percentage points to the total elasticity
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of the demand for labour, estimated to be 0.50, at the median of the factor share
of labour. These estimates were obtained estimating different cost functions, from
whose parameters it is possible to derive the constant output, constant price and
total elasticity of the demand for labour. Therefore, we were able to identify all the
components of the elasticity of the demand for labour.
Aggregating these firm-level figures to the industry level, for the only sector and
year our data set allows us, we infer that an increase of the import penetration rate by
10 percent will add only around 0.004 percentage points to the total labour demand
elasticity.
The scale effect reducing pro-competitive term that we have identified gives a pos-
sible explanation of why previous empirical studies, ignoring the strategic interaction
among firms, have failed to detect any impact of international trade on the elasticity
of the demand for labour.
One likely important point we have not considered in this research is the different
wage costs across countries. Whereas, imports from either low-wage or high-wage
countries makes the product market more competitive, and therefore both make the
labour demand more elastic, it is plausible that the former will exert a stronger
competitive pressure towards domestic companies than the latter. Then, imports
from low-wage countries should have a larger effect on the elasticity of the demand
for labour than those from countries with high labour costs.
The issue of differentiating the impact on the elasticity of the demand for labour
of imports from countries with different labour costs will be the subject of future
research.
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2.11 Appendix: Construction of variables
Labour demand (l): Total number of workers employed by the firm. Onesource does
not contain information on the number of production and non-production workers so
their aggregate measure was used in this exercise.
Wage (WI): The wage of workers in each firm was calculated dividing the total
wage bill by the number of workers (from OneSource).
Cost share oflabour (ad: This figure is the ratio between the cost oflabor and the
total cost of production. The cost of labour is the wage bill from OneSource whereas
the total cost of production is the sum of the cost of labour and cost of intermediates
(also from OneSource).
Capital (k): Net-value book of assets taken from OneSource. Since no industry
or firm level price deflator for capital are available in the UK, the nominal value was
deflated using the GDP deflator of capital formation.
Output (y): Total turnover deflated with disaggregated producers price indexes
provided by the Office of National Statistics.
Market share (8): Turnover of firms over total production of in the corresponding
industry, taken from the Input-Output Supply and Use Tables; industries are defined
according to the classification of the Input-Output table. Input-Output Supply and
Use Tables have been provided by the Office of National Statistics and are available
in its web site.
Chapter 3
Export Oriented FDI in the UK
3.1 Introduction
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and promoting exports have figured promi-
nently in the minds of policymakers in the UK. A single agency, namely UK Trade &
Investment, started recently to manage and coordinate policies concerning the promo-
tion of exports and inward FDLI Its stated role "... is to help companies realise their
international business potential through knowledge transfer, and on-going partnership
support." For "those [firms] exporting for the first time or businesses experienced in
international trade expanding into new markets ... " the UK Trade & Investment
"... can help develop export capabilities and provide expert advice, reliable data, and
professional research." As regards inward FDI, this agency" ... provides information
and services to help you locate or expand your business in the UK."2
Under these policies, financial incentives such as tax breaks, duty drawbacks, in-
vestment allowances and so on have been offered to multinational enterprises (MNEs)
lUntii not so long ago two agencies were responsible for export and inward FDI, namely Trade
Partners UK and Invest UK.
2This information have been found in the web-site of UK Trade & Ivestment.
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to establish foreign affiliates (see Haskel et al. (2002)). Likewise, export promotion
activities range from financing trade fairs, through providing free information about
foreign markets and financing market research, to export credit insurance.
The rationale of all such initiatives is founded on the belief that FDI inflows and
exports contribute positively to economic development. While this policy interven-
tion reflects, partly at least, an entrenched attitude whereby exports are good and
imports are bad, econometric evidence has recently suggested why exports might ac-
tually promote long-term growth.P Foreign direct investments are also deemed to
bring many benefits. Recently, Porter and Ketels (2003) have summarised what ad-
vantage FDI inflow may bring to the UK. FDI increases the level of competition in
the domestic economy, and offers consumers greater choice. They are also seen as
an important source of new technologies, innovation and business practice. It has
become an established fact that foreign multinationals have higher productivity and
superior technology than domestic firms and there is some evidence that these both
help to raise aggregate productivity in the economy through the reallocation of rc-
sources, and also spills over to domestic firms resulting in some self-improvement.
There are also important effects on employment and wages from FDI.
A neglected aspect of the effect of foreign multinationals on the UK economy is
their contribution to UK exports. This chapter is the first attempt to investigate the
export behaviour of foreign multinational firms in the UK, using a firm level data set
for the manufacturing sector from 1988-1999.4
3At the macro level GDP growth is strongly positively correlated with the growth of exports
(Edwards 1993; Edwards 1998), and there is now supporting evidence at the micro level. Exports
raise aggregate productivity by encouraging productivity improvements within the firm (e.g.: Girma
et at. (2004); Wagner (2002)) and by reallocating resources towards high productivity firms within
the industry (low productivity firms either shut down or lose market share; e.g.: Bernard and
Jensen (2004a)).
4The relationship between FDI and aggregate export has been investigated before by, inter alia,
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Our sample shows that foreign firms contribute disproportionately to UK exports
of manufacturing industries. In 1996 foreign multinationals accounted for one third
of all exports from the UK manufacturing sector (they contributed 28 percent of total
output)." Foreign firms are more likely to export than UK owned firms, and when
they do, exports account for a greater proportion of total sales. In the data 85 percent
of multinational firms export compared to 75 percent of domestically owned firms,
while the share of exports in total output is 10.3 percent and 5.6 percent respectively.
Moreover, the size of this gap has been increasing over time.
In this chapter we attempt to shed light on a number of issues. These include
why foreign firms export at all. The export activity of foreign affiliates is not strictly
consistent with traditional theories of FDI (for example Markusen (1995)). According
to this set of models firms invest in foreign production facilities to avoid the costs
of international trade (there is a cost advantage of proximity versus concentration,
Brainard (1993, 1997)).
Exports and FDI are substitute methods of serving markets. Exporting foreign
firms may be envisaged in three situations: 1) the good is exported to a third country
being part of a free trade area as the host country (this leads to tariff jumping
FDI; e.g.: Motta and Norman (1996) and Ekholm et al. (2003)); 2) multinational
enterprises undertake, so called, complex integration strategies, which involve export
Blake and Pain (1994), for the UK. This exercise study is more in the spirit of Hanson et al. (2001)
and Feinberg and Keane (2003) where they analyse the export behaviour of foreign affiliates of US
multinationals.
5As explained later the data set used in this study does not contain all manufacturing firms within
the UK. There is a bias in our sample towards large firms. This will have the effect of increasing
the share of multinational firms in total manufacturing output. In the manufacturing census data
set (ARD) multinational firms accounted for 21 percent of total manufacturing output in the 2001
(Griffith, Redding, and Simpson 2004). The effect on the share of exports of multinational firms
will be less affected by this bias because large firms are more likely to export than smaller firms
(Bernard and Jensen 1999;Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller 2004).
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to a third country and intra-firm trade (this happens when there are more than two
stages of production and more than two countries); e.g.: Grossman et al. (2003),
Yeaple (2003) and Ekholm et al. (2003); 3) the firm produces multiple products
that are delivered to foreign markets through different means and there is a positive
correlation in demand across these products (cross-product complementarity); Head
and Ries (2004). We try to assess which one is the more likely to explain the UK
experience.
We also focus on the policy implications of our results: Is there a one-size fits
all export promotion policy? Do foreign firms face the same incentives and costs as
domestic firms in their export decisions, or are other characteristics important? Can
the financial incentives granted to foreign affiliates to locate in the UK be justified on
grounds (i.e. export promotion) other than those traditionally advocated (i.e. direct
productivity and employment gains)? Finally, we also consider the strategic motives
for using the UK as a platform for exports.
The chapter is organized as follows. The economic theory underpinning export
and FDI decisions is outlined in section 2. Section 3 then documents the empirical
evidence for the UK. This is considered at various levels of aggregation and brownfield
FDI. Finally, Section 4 provides a summary of the evidence found and an assessment
of the predictions from the theoretical models.
3.2 What does theory tell us?
In traditional theories of the multinational firm, exporting and FDI are alternative
methods of supplying foreign markets (e.g.: Markusen (1995)). Firms invest in foreign
production facilities to avoid the costs of international trade, there is a cost advantage
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of proximity to markets versus the concentration of production facilities (Brainard
1997).
The process of modelling the export and FDI decisions of MNEs has developed
along two lines: First, export platform FDI; second, complementarity between export
and FDI. These can broadly be distinguished by the number of product lines that
the firm is assumed to produce. Export platform FDI is typically defined as the
establishment of production facilities in a foreign country and the use of part or all
of the output from those facilities to serve a third country. It therefore refers to
the export of a single product line, where these exports are not back to the parent
country. Complementarity between exports and FDI refers instead to the case of a
multi-product firm and to the export and FDI flows from the home country to foreign
countries: exports and FDI become positively correlated if there are horizontal or
vertical complementarities across product lines." We concentrate on the first of these
two strands of literature.
In a model with two countries and two stages of production (e.g. manufacturing
and headquarter services) the integration strategies of MNEs have been broadly clas-
sified as vertical and horizontal (Markusen 2002). Vertical FDI occurs when stages of
production occurs in more than one country; and horizontal FDI when the stages of
production occur entirely in one country (home and foreign). Vertical FDI is factor
seeking, whereas horizontal FDI is termed as market seeking. When there are more
than two countries and more than two stages of production, multinationals are likely
to undertake more complex FDI choices, which involves intra-firm trade and export
platform FDI.
6For a review and assessment of this literature see Head and Ries (2001)
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The process of modelling more intricate integration decisions by MNEs and ex-
port platform FDI has generally consisted in adding more countries, and stages of
production into more traditional theories of MNEs. For example in a very simple case,
adding a third country closely located to one of the others a firm may choose to locate
an affiliate in only one of the two foreign lands, thus serving the other through export.
In addition, considering intermediates a more complex picture arises since firms may
produce them in different countries. This will cause exports of intermediates where
the final good will be assembled.
When there are more than two countries and more than two stages of production,
multinationals are likely to undertake FDI choices involving intra-firm trade and
export platform FDI. The effect of adding more countries to the model is to allow for
the possibility of a horizontal motive for export platform FDI, whereas adding more
stages of production allows for a vertical motive.
Motta and Norman (1996), motivated by the observation that much FDI is be-
tween countries involved in regional trading blocks such as NAFTA or the EU, con-
sider the case of three identical countries and a single stage of production. Costs
of production do not differ between countries but costs of trading do (because two
either enter a free trade agreement or raise external barriers against the third). If we
assume that we start from an equilibrium where each firm exports to the other two
from its home country, then the action of raising external barriers or creating a free
trade area will encourage the outside firm to set up production facilities inside the
free trade area and export to the other country in the regional bloc. Which of the
countries the outside country chooses to locate production in and export from is left
undetermined, as both are identical. Again, because of identical costs neither of the
inside countries choose export platform FDI as a strategy.
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However, the actual integration strategies pursued by MNEs appear to be more
complex than those envisaged by most economic models, thus far. As emphasized
in the World Investment Report (1998) trans-national corporations have been adopt-
ing complex integration strategies, which involve FDI as export platform. Indeed,
multinationals are progressively undertaking internationalisation strategies that are
neither purely horizontal nor purely vertical, but are both at the same time. Such
strategies lead to export platform FDI, which involves exports of intermediates or
final goods by foreign affiliates.
Theoretical models have been produced trying to explain these hybrid integration
strategies, which complicate the classical distinction between horizontal and vertical
FDI (e.g.: Yeaple (2003); Ekholm et al. (2003); Grossman et al. (2003)). These models
share a common set-up, namely, there are two identical countries in the North and one
other country in the South; in addition firms produce intermediate and final goods.
Firms must provide headquarter service from their home northern country, but can
choose where to produce intermediates as well as assembly of the final product. The
predictions these three models generate are robust to different competitive settings.
Yeaple (2003) employs the new trade theory framework consisting of a representative
firm operating in monopolistic competition. Ekholm et al. (2003) uses a strategic
choice model, a duopoly, whereas Grossman et al. (2003) relies on the heterogeneous
firms model introduced by Melitz (2003).
More specifically, Yeaple (2003) considers two industries, one producing a ho-
mogeneous good sold in a perfectly competitive market and the other producing a
differentiated good sold in a monopolistically competitive market. The latter is con-
sumed in the North only and requires two intermediate inputs labour and skill, of
which skill is cheaper in the North whereas labour is cheaper in the South. Both
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final goods are internationally traded, but only that produced in the monopolistic
competitive industry is subject to transport costs and its production P" ,('ss can be
divided into different stages (production of two intermediates and costi. -,,;assembly
of the final good).
The author compares four integration strategies concerning the pro. i , t.ion of the
differentiated good: 1) no FDI: companies concentrate all the product- »rocess in
the country of origin and therefore serve the other northern market thr- I ',11 exports;
2) vertical FDI: one intermediate is produced in the South and the other he (north-
ern) home country; 3) horizontal FDI: firms conduct the entire produr 1, process in
both northern countries where the final good will be consumed; 4) COrti [II FDI: one
component is produced in the South and the other in both Northern 1'1 lies where
they will be assembled and sold.
The presence of transport costs and factor price differentials gi v" respec-
tively, to horizontal and vertical motives for investing abroad. Low r.r ,I ('I)::;ts
make vertical FDI more convenient since firms will exploit the low lal» , .u t.hc
South and ship intermediates produced using labour. By contrast, h :,,; .nsport
stimulate horizontal FDI since firms will try to save transport costs p ,g both
intermediates and assembling the final good where it will be consume: 1,
Yeaple shows the complex FDI strategy dominates the others in a: i
range of transport costs. In this case firms will invest both in the ~I' I
FDI) and in the other northern country (horizontal FDI). MNEs un.l.
an FDI strategy are neither purely horizontal nor vertical, but may 1)1' II'
hybrid. This model generates export platform FDI since internation. I J
in the south may be considered as vertical with respect to the home (, JI I
II ical
\ich
I It) be
t.ments
.uu] as
99
export-platform with respect to the other country in the North.
The conditions under which export platform FDI is likely to take place have been
explicitly analysed by Ekholm et al. (2003). In their model there are two identical high
cost countries in the North (E and W) and one low cost in the South (8). Each firm
produces one intermediate and a final good. Firms must provide headquarter services
from their home northern country but can choose where to produce intermediates as
well as assembly of the final product.
In this model, starting from high transport costs and a small assembly cost ad-
vantage for S, lowering such costs produces the following sequence of equilibria: 1) no
FDI; each country in the North serves the other through export; 2) horizontal FDI:
both countries in the North have a production facility in the other northern country
to serve such a foreign market; 3) export platform FDI: each of the northern country
has a production facility in S to serve the respective foreign market in the North,
only; 4) hybrid FDI strategy: all production is concentrated in the South; this kind
of FDI is vertical with respect the home country and export platform with respect to
the other northern country.
Furthermore, the authors deal with the case of a Free Trade Area (henceforth
FTA) between one northern country, say E, and the South. The FTA means that
it is always optimal for country E to locate production in the Southern country and
export products back home (owing to the cost advantage from doing so). Therefore,
unlike in Motta and Norman (1996), when there are no vertical motives for FDI,
the country inside the free trade area always has an incentive to undertake export
platform FDI.
For the other northern country (W) the model predicts three outcomes: 1) no
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FDI: firm B produces in its home country and exports to the free trade area; 2)
export-platform FDI: firm W produces in its home country the good to be sold there;
whereas the final good sold in the other northern country is produced in the South
and then exported; 3) hybrid FDI: firm W locates all production in the South and
exports the good to both markets in the North. Again, this last alternative is a
hybrid strategy because, towards the home country (W), the firm undertakes vertical
FDI whereas, toward the other Northern country (E), it undertakes a pure form of
export platform FDI. Which of these sets of alternative strategies occurs depends on
the size of the (marginal) cost advantage to Southern firms, and the various trade
costs between the different countries. As the cost advantage of Southern relative to
Northern firms increases we move from the first equilibrium, to the second and then
when the cost advantage of locating production in the South becomes large enough
all production moves there.
The predictions of these models are driven primarily on cross-country differences
in costs firms face (owing to the fact that some are inside and some outside the
free trade area). Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2003), adopting a heterogeneous
firms framework and developing the complex FDI model of Yeaple (2003), show that
firm level characteristics may also be important. If firms within the same industry
are heterogeneous in their productivity levels they may make different choices, even
though the costs of exporting and FDI they face are the same. Like Yeaple (2003)
and Ekholm et al. (2003), they assume three countries (two in the North and one
in the South); firms must provide headquarter services, produce intermediates and
assemble the final product. Their analysis allows for the coexistence in the same
sector of a rich array of profitable FDI strategies. In brief, the general lesson that
can be drawn from this paper is that least productive firms will not undertake FDI.
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More productive firms will choose complex strategies that involve a mix of FDI and
exports. In most situations these can be classified as neither purely horizontal nor
purely vertical, but as complex and involve the export of intermediates and/or the
final product.
A couple of empirical studies have dealt with the issue of the export propensity
of foreign affiliates. Feinberg and Keane (2003) look at the intra-firm trade of US
MNEs with establishments in Canada between 1984 and 1995. Hanson et al. (2001)
consider the expansion strategies of US multinationals in foreign countries between
1982 and 1998. They use the same data on US multinationals.
Feinberg and Keane (2003) argue that the classical distinction between vertical and
horizontal FDI does not describe well the behaviour of US MNEs. This is because the
data shows two-way trade flows between the parent company in the US and its foreign
affiliates in Canada. On the one hand, this is not consistent with purely horizontal
FDI, since in such a case foreign affiliates are expected to replicate what the parent
company does at home and not to export goods back to the parent company. On the
other hand, this is not in accordance with purely vertical FDI either, since in this
situation the trade flow is expected to be one way only (from the place of production
of intermediates to the place of assembling of the final good). Overall, these intra-firm
trade patterns suggest more complex FDI strategies.
Hanson et al. (2001) claim, as Feinberg and Keane (2003), that the vertical/horizontal
taxonomy does not fit neatly the actual expansion strategies of US MNEs. They
highlight that export platform FDI is a common phenomenon. More importantly,
they show as the export share depends on host country and industry characteristics.
Although the authors do not consider export destinations, the fact that export to
sales ratio of foreign affiliates is higher for sectors usually associated wi th
suggests that goods may be exported back to US.
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3.3 The extent of export oriented FDI in tlit UK
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
We study the export behaviour of foreign firms located in the UK us II
firms taken from OneSource for the period 1988 to 1999. A full descr ,I '
data set is provided in the data appendix at the end of Chapter 1. h '
on the OneSource dataset can also be found in Oulton (1998). Onc-«. '
information on the country of origin of parent companies. In this WH'
to identify around 740 foreign firms for a total of about 4500 observ.u
the industry wide variation we observe in the data may reflect the f31'!
multinationals tend to be concentrated in industries with high prod.« '
exports from the UK might be expected to reflect comparative advant.u«
a comparison to foreign firms we therefore also report on the expor I
domestic firms. Onesource report company account values for all firms w: I i
50 employees operating in the UK. This data set contains information 01'
of firms. Firms were screened to a complete series of turnover, export.
wages and cost of intermediates.
Nominal values of output and export were deflated using disaggrrr.
level producer price indexes provided by the Office of National Statistic
value added per worker was computed as real turnover minus the real '
sold (which proxies real intermediates). Real intermediates were obta i: I
the cost of goods sold using the price indexes of materials and fuels ! 'i
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disaggregated industry level provided again by the Office of National Statistics. Em-
ployment was measured as the total number of workers employed by the company
and wages and the total wage bill (present in OneSource) divided by employment.
To offset the effect of outliers in our econometric analysis the 1 percent tails of the
distribution of employment, exports, turnovers and wages were not considered. This
procedure and the presence of missing values left a sample of around 27000 observa-
tions concerning around 4000 firms.
To assess the extent to which foreign multinationals export we I-jl .rt by analysing
the export share for the totality of firms in our sample. Figure 3, I .l--plcts the dis-
tribution of export share for all firms, whereas figure 3.2 for dom- " ,'". and foreign
companies, separately. 7
From figure 3.1 it is possible to observe that about 25 percent (d «bscrvations
in our sample have zero exports. More than 25 percent of them hav: positive, but
low export share (Le. between 0 and 10 percent). After this pou: I,' number of
observations with higher export shares declines progressively. The !,rn of export
activities just described is broadly consistent with those of US ;,., I;'rench firms
depicted by Eaton et al. (2004). They report that the mode of \.i!. .stribution of
export intensity of firms that actually export is less than 10 percen: ,-;in our data
set. In addition, the histogram they report exhibits the same beh» ';r as the one
figure 3.1, with a progressive decay the higher the export share. Th., I) .in difference
between export activities of UK companies and US firms concerns ! :' , I 'portion of
firms or observations that have positive exports. Indeed, as report I, ! Iy Bernard,
Eaton, et al. (2003) for the US this figure is around 25 percent (199~~! r(') whereas
7The data in both figures represent averages across the full sample period. I j,,;t.ributions of
export shares do not change significantly if they are computed on a cross section
o
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of the export share for all firms
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the export share for domestic and foreign companies
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in the data set used in this investigation the proportion is slightly more than 75
percent."
Turning to domestic and foreign firms, figure 3.2 show that although their distri-
butions exhibit the same overall characteristics there are also some notable differences
between them. Foreign firms are more likely to export than indigenous enterprises,
and on average when they sell abroad they export a higher share of total output.
About 25 percent of domestic firms report no sales abroad, whereas the comparable
figure for foreign enterprises is around 15 percent. The export intensity of domestic
firms is also lower, the median export share of foreign owned firms being 21 percent
compared with 8.8 percent for domestically owned firms. This difference between
the two is manifest across the distribution of export shares. For example, 27 percent
of domestic firms export less than 10 percent of total sales whereas just 21 percent
of companies under foreign control report such a low level of export sales. Similarly
foreign firms are more likely to have larger export shares than domestic firms: around
22 percent of foreign owned firms have an export share greater than 50 percent of
total output, whereas the comparable figure for domestic firms is 13 percent.
A comparison of export sales by domestic and foreign firms of the type conducted
above does not account for the fact that foreign firms might be concentrated in export
intensive industries and may export more in certain years. To control for the effect
of industries and the business cycle (i.e. industry and time effects) we measure the
export share of each firm relative to median export share in the industry and year.
The export intensity of firm i was computed as the percentage difference between
the export share of the firm and the median export share at time t in industry j
8For other European countries comparable quantities are: Germany 45 percent (Bernard and
Wagner 1997); Italy 73 percent (Castellani 2002); Spain 62 percent (Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano
2001); and Sweden 80 percent (Greenaway, Kneller, and Gullstrand 2003).
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(industries are at SIC92 3 digit level). All values lie within the range -1 and + 1 (a
value of 0.5 indicates that firm i has an export share 50 per centage points higher
than the median firm in that industry and year). Figure 3.3 presents a box plot of
the export share for UK and non-UK firms computed using this methodology. In
addition to the median export share (represented as the vertical line inside the box)
the boxplot presents information on other aspects of the distribution. The distance
between the two extreme vertical segments is a measure of the dispersion of the data
(observations beyond these segments were considered outliers and therefore excluded
by the graph). The length of the box represents the interquartile range.
The results from this exercise would appear to confirm the evidence presented in
figure 3.2: the export intensity of foreign owned firms is greater even conditioning on
industry and time. At the median foreign firms export 3.4 percentage points more
than domestic firms in the same industry and time period. Other works have reported
that foreign businesses in the UK are bigger and more productive than domestic ones
(e.g.: Girma et al. (2001)). From this figure we note that in addition they also have
larger export shares.
Figure 3.3 also suggests however, that there are large differences in the export
behaviour of foreign firms, and more so than UK owned firms. The inter-quartile
range for the export share of foreign owned firms is 0.28. The equivalent figure for
domestic firms is 0.19. In addition, the export share of foreign firms appear to be
more dispersed than that of domestic firms. This might suggest greater heterogeneity
in the type of FDI inflows the UK receives. Among foreign companies, there are some
that are relatively export oriented (with respect to the median firm) and others that
are relatively host market oriented.
[()7
Figure 3.3: Boxplot of the export share of domestic and for-i:
Foreign
Domestic
-.4 -.2 o .2
Export share
.4
excludes outside values
Notes: The export share is measured as difference between the export
industry j at time t and the median of the export share of all firms in ill i1
We investigate these differences in the export share of foreign Iiuu:
gating according to the country of origin of the parent company I J
export platform FDI reviewed in Section 2 make predictions accord III '
try /indusry characteristics the firm. In the first two columns of tabk- .)
the percentage of observations from each country that export or do Ilot ,
third column we report the mean export share of exporters (again (,lit Iii
to the industry and year median), while the final column reports LlII' ,
servations we have on companies from each country. Figure 3.4 prcscu "
the mean export share of firms by country.
As reported already, there is a higher percentage of foreign exI Ii .
domestic firms in our sample: 75 percent of domestic firms export
percent of foreign firms. Of these foreign firms only European (bU .
Australian (50 percent) are noticeably less likely to export than the I
firm. At the other end of the scale all Asian firms observed in om
With respect to UK firms, only Australian firms appear to be less 1 i '"
EU companies seem to be slightly less export oriented, whereas all :
affiliates are considerably more export oriented.
The percentage of exporters versus non-exporters in the sampl-
country than the export intensity. In terms of the share of output
would appear to be two broad groups of countries. In the first group
and Australia where the export share is slightly below that for UK firu
group, which includes firms from the US, Japan, Asia, and non-El I
intensities are between 5 and 9 percentage points above that of UK iii .I
firms are the most export oriented in the sample and appear somewh.:
The mean export share of Canadian owned firms is 36 percentage
median in the respective industry and year."
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All in all, it is interesting to note that companies headquart 1 . tries
that are part of the EU have similar export characterisrics to domest j, "reas
firms whose parent company headquarters are in non-EU European « I' I . nore
export oriented. The former result might be used to suggest that vert ited
export platform FDI (complex FDI strategies) may be important for I the
UK as a location for production even by firms from other EU countri- ;cd
by Yeaple (2003) and Ekholm et al. (2003). The latter result is consiste: !I lea
9Australian firms seem to be outliers as well given the small number of obser. .\I
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Table 3.1: Export share and the number of exporters and non-exporters by country.
Non-export. Export Export share Observ.
All firms 23.7% 76.3% 6.0% 30715
UK 24.7% 75.3% 5.3% 27617
All foreign 15.1% 84.9% 10.4% 3098
US 10.9% 89.1% 13.9% 1045
Canada 9.6% 90.4% 36.1% 135
EU 19.3% 80.7% 4.2% 1329
Europe non-EU 12.9% 87.1% 12.5% 241
Asia 0.0% 100.0% 11.4% 34
Japan 16.0% 84.0% 10.2% 156
Australia 50.0% 50.0% 3.6% 28
Others 10.8% 89.2% 12.8% 130
Figure 3.4: Mean of the export share of firms by country of origin.
UK
USA
Canada
EU
Europe not EU
Asia
Japan
Australia
o .1 .2 .3
Mean of export share
.4
Notes: The export share is measured as difference between the export share of firm i in
industry j at time t and the median of the export share of all firms in industry j at time t.
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that firms from non-EU European countries establish production facilities in the UK
to gain access to the European market. This is a horizontal (tariff jumping) motive for
FDI, as outlined in the theoretical models by Motta and Norman (1996) and Ekholm
et al. (2003). This is apparent looking at the export behaviour of European firms,
inside and outside the EU.lO Although these firms may share the same technology,
transport costs and other industrial characteristics, which are common or similar
across Europe, those with headquarters outside the EU have higher export propensity
than those inside the EU.
Thus far in the analysis we have ignored the question of whether these patterns
have changed noticeably across time. There are some reasons to expect that this might
be the case. The available sample period coincides with the creation of the European
Single Market Programme in 1992. Given we have found that strategic motives are
important for export platform FDI we might expect a change in behaviour around
this point. Figure 3.5 shows the behaviour of the mean of the export share over
time broken down by most important country/geographic area.'! It is evident that
in general foreign affiliates from outside the EU have been more export intensive
than domestic enterprises in all years in our sample (there is some variation for some
countries possibly due to the relatively small number of observations for some groups).
The same behavioral pattern of the export share is shown in figure 3.6 where the
mean of the export share of domestic and foreign firms has been substituted with their
median. Foreign affiliates, whose parent company is from outside the EU, appear as
in figure 3.5 to be more export oriented than UK enterprises and foreign firms from
lOInour sample, non-EU Europe comprises Switzerland and Norway.
11We do not display all of the countries included in the previous analysis in the chart for reasons
of clarity, we focus instead on the main countries and the main trends.
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Figure 3.5: Behaviour of the mean export share of foreign and domestic firms by year.
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the EU (although the median export share of the latter group converges towards that
of UK companies in the last years of the sample).
Overall it would appear that foreign companies have been contributing mor over
the years than domestic firms to the export performance of the manufacturing sector
in the UK. However, there is no evidence of a clear break in behaviour around 1992.
This also occurs irrespective of the country of origin. Firms whose owners are from
the EU countries have lower export intensity than domestic firms at th start of the
period and near identical levels by the end, whereas firms from non-EU have an export
intensity that is above that of domestic firms at both the start and end of the period.
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Figure 3.6: Behaviour of the median export share of foreign and domestic firms by
year.
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3.3.2 Export decision regressions
It remains possible that firm characteristics rather than strategic I'
determine the differences among countries described above. Firm 1( \ '
metric evidence both for the UK and other countries has for example J I
export decision of domestic firms is driven by their advantageous 1111<1
mance characteristics. Firms that are sufficiently large and productiv-
becoming exporters (Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard and Jensen )ll J
Greenaway, and Kneller 2004; Greenaway and Kneller 2004a). Thereto
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for example that Canadian firms are more productive than EU mult.ln ud it
is this that explains their higher export intensity. Or similarly, mull: i I I : irms
are known to be more productive than domestic firms and as such Of H' " pect
therefore that foreign multinational firms contribute disproportionn t f I, .orts
from the UK because of these favourable characteristics.
We investigated the differences amongst countries more formally 1 " ~ for
other covariates thought to be important determinants of the probabilu ling
and the export share. For domestic firms the probability of export.im .und
to be increasing in the size and productivity of the firm (Greenav -ller
2004a). Similarly, Bleaney and Wakelin (1999) for the UK and W;I for
Germany report evidence of a significant inverted U shape relationsh i I I Iirt
intensity and size. Finally, the level of skill embodied in the workfoJ"'l.ll
important role in the export behaviour of the firm since better w( I , .id
to better quality products and higher levels of efficiency (see Ben); I on
(2004b) for a similar argument).
We therefore include in the export dummy and export share r<'!~J I be
estimated a set of firm level variables and a 0/1 variable indicating \\ : , , IS
foreign. If firm level variables fully explain the export behaviour of 1'(111 I, «m
we would expect this indicator to add no additional information t I , IIII
and to be insignificant. The firm level characteristics included in 1."1' 'Ie:
the number of employees (to control for size), its square (since it hi, -d
that export and size have an inverted U shape relationship), the W;',',' 'C
(to control for the skill level of workers) and labour productivity (till', io
added per worker). Also, a full set of time and industry dummies Wi' ,I
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One complication of performing regression analysis with the export share as the
dependent variable is that it is bounded by construction between 0 and 1. Two
salient characteristics of the underlying data generation process of bounded dependent
variable are that: the conditional expectation function is non-linear; the error term
is heteroskedastic since its variance approaches to zero as the mean tends to either
boundary point. Linear OLS is likely to produce highly biased estimates because of
its inability of coping with the non-linearity of the conditional expectation. Besides,
because of the same reason linear least square may lead to predictions of the dependent
variable outside the extreme points.
The most common alternatives to linear OLS in this situation have consisted in
employing the Tobit model (e.g.: Bleaney and Wakelin (1999)) and the log-odds
ratio transformation of the limited dependent variable modelled as a linear function
of the regressors (e.g.: Gourlay and Seaton (2003)). However, both methodologies
have drawbacks. Indeed, the Tobit model is unsuited since the dependent variable
is bounded by construction and not because of censoring. The tobit model assumes
that the latent dependent variable is normally distributed and that the dependent
variable is censored. That is, we observe the dependent variable only when the latent
variable is inside a certain interval ([0,1] in this case). However, in case of proportions
we do not observe the dependent variable when it is outside the interval not because
because of censoring, but because it is not defined outside the boundaries. Thus,
there is not censoring and the tobit model is inappropriate. The the log-odds ratio
model suffers of grave drawbacks as well since it cannot handle observations at the
extremes of the interval and it assumes homoskedastic conditional variance.
In this investigation we employ the quasi-likelihood method of estimation for
fractional response variable introduced in the econometric literature by (Papke and
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Wooldridge 1996). This methodology is a synthesis between the Generalised Linear
Model (GLM) from the statistical literature (McCullagh and Nelder 1989) and the
quasi-likelihood method from the econometric literature (Gourieroux, Monfort, and
Trognon 1984).12
Denoting the propensity to export by 0 :s Yit :s 1 and the vector of covariates by
x, we are interested in estimating
(3.1)
where 0 :s G(z) :s 1. Typically, G(z) is chosen to be a cumulative distribution
function and traditionally in the GLM approach it has been assumed to be the logistic
function G(z) = [exp(z)JI[1 + exp(z)]. The estimation of the parameter vector /3,
say,~, is conducted by quasi-likelihood method (QMLE) by maximising the following
Bernoulli log-likelihood function:
(3.2)
This is the same log-likelihood function used when the dependent variable is a
binary outcome. However, as shown by (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984) the
estimators obtained by QMLE are consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of
the distribution of Y conditional on x, provided 3.1 holds. The standard errors of the
estimators have been computed as in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and are robust
to heteroskedastici ty.
12Thismethodology has been advocated by Kieschnick and McCullough (2003). Comparing dif-
ferent methodologies to fit proportions data, among which the OLS log-odds transformation, the
beta distribution and the quasi-likelihood method, they argue in favour of the latter two.
llti
Table 3.2, in the first two columns, reports the results from the export dummy
and export share regression for all firms (both domestic and foreign). 13 The decision
whether to export or not (i.e, export dummy regression) was estimated by means of
pooled pro bit technique. We made attempts to estimate a panel probit to control for
unobserved individual heterogeneity, but the maximum likelihood did not converge.
As Wooldridge (2002, pp. 22-25; 470-471) underlines, unobserved heterogeneity
in non-linear panel data models, as those estimated in table 3.2, will cause biased
and inconsistent point estimates. However, one can still obtained consistent average
marginal effects. (Wooldridge (2002) calls them average partial effects.)
Indeed, consider the non-linear panel data model
(3.3)
E(Yit) may represent the probability of success in a probit model or the average
export share in a GLM model. Ci represents the idiosyncratic fixed effect, unobserved
by the econometrician; we assume that x and c are independent and c f'V N(O, 7'2).
(Obviously independence between x and c implies Cov(x,c) = 0.)
It is possible to write 3.3 in the latent variable form as Y:t = Xit{3 + '"'ICi + Cit,
so that if Yit ~ 0, Yit = 0 (both in the export dummy case and in the export share
regression) and if Yit > 0, Yit = 1 (in the export dummy case) or Yit > 0 (in the export
share regression). We assume that el(x, c) f'V N(O, 1), therefore the combined error
term '"'Ie + c is independent from x and is normally distributed with mean zero and
13Note that there are 27 fewer observations in the export dummy regression than in the export
share regression. This is because all firms in the SIC92 industry "Tobacco" (industry number 16)
export. These firms are dropped in the export dummy regression since there is not variation in the
dependent variable (i.e. in the export dummy), but they are retained in the export share regression
since they have different export intensity.
variance (J2 = "12,2 + 1, i.e. ("Ie + E)lx '" N(O, ,,?,2 + 1). Given this ." ,
that
E(Yitlx) = Probability("(Ci + Eit > -Xitf3) = <1>(Xitf3)
a
Then, the estimates we obtain neglecting the unobserved heterog.:t-
ward biased since the probability limit of S is f3 / a (where a > 1). If w. ! '
in the marginal effects of, say, variable xi on E(Yit), we want to obt..u I.
of 8E(Yitlx, e)/8xi = f3i4>(Xitf3 + "Ie), for various values of x and I
the first derivative of <1>(.). However, from the probit estimates it i~;,
f3i/(J 4>(xitf3/a). Nonetheless, the latter quantity is useful since, as WUf ':"
pp. 471) shows, this is the marginal effect of variable xi averaged ;1' :
bution of e,
Thus, although pooled estimation will only provide lower bounds I ,
of interest from them it is possible to derive consistent and mean i I.
effects. In addition, although the estimates are biased, they are :1 I:
same figure (i.e. a); thus it is still possible to gauge the relative n..:
true parameters. 14
14It is worth stressing that throughout we assume zero correlation between tlu- II, I
geneity and the observed variables. Some authors have tried (Bernard and Jens .. l.
and Wagner 1997) to correct for possible endogeneity problems. This has inv("'·
linear probability model, to apply the first difference or within transformation, ill '
the unobserved fixed effect, and instrumental variables in order to correct for t.h.:
However, we think that this method, although simple, may exacerbate the hi.e- ,
simply because the data generation process used (i.e. the linear model) is patent J
same reason the standard errors thus obtained are unreliable, so no valid inference f II,
This methodology to correct bias in the estimates (l.e. endogeneity), which is only !ii
a fault in the estimation (i.e, wrong data generation process), which is certain.
117
-ve have
, down-
erested
.itimate
'0 get
2002,
listri-
(3.4)
Inates
ginal
v the
'ietcro-
·rnard
JIg a
ilatc
i.ius.
,lates
I the
.cted,
-Iuces
Ll~
From table 3.2 it is possible to observe that the estimates for the finn level vari-
ables are in line with those found in previous studies (Bleaney and Wakelin Hl99;
Wagner 2001; Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller 2004). According to the results from
the first regression in the table export firms are more productive, larger and more
skilled intensive than non-export firms. These same variables also matter for the
export share. Firms that are more productive, larger and more skill intensive export
a higher proportion of their total production. The significance of the firm level vari-
ables are usually interpreted as reflecting sunk costs of export market entry; product
compliance, market studies, marketing necessary to penetrate foreign markets and to
maintain international sales networks and product quality.
Conditional on these firm level variables we still find however, that the foreign
indicator is positive and strongly significant in both regressions. This suggests that
foreign firms are both more likely to export than domestic firms and to export more
than domestic companies, even after controlling for the sort of firm level variables
used in previous studies to model the export behaviour of firms. Foreign firms are
different in their export behaviour from domestic firms.
In table 3.2, from columns three to five, we explore these results further in two
ways. Firstly, we ask whether the firm level characteristics found to be important in
the previous regressions predict export behaviour in the same way as for indigenous
firms. This is done by splitting the sample according to the country of origin of the
parent company. The results in table 3.2 suggest that there are differ-uces between
domestic and foreign firms. With respect to the export decision, firm level variables
appear important for domestic firms (all coefficients have the expected sign and are
strongly significant), whereas these variables all less important for foreign firms (only
size is significant). The differences are less marked for the export sh.. n: regressions.
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Firm level variables playa similar role in the two sets of firms. Overall these results
might be seen as consistent with the models of Grossman et at. (2003), where both
firm level characteristics and strategic motives are important.
From a policy perspective, these results suggest that in the planning and evalu-
ation of those incentives and policies aimed at turning non-exporters into exporters
or at increasing exports, the ownership of firms should be take into consideration.
Indeed, foreign affiliates may respond differently from indigenous companies to such
initiatives given the apparent importance of strategic motives in their export deci-
sions.
As underlined before and summarised in table 3.1, strategic motives may be im-
portant for the type of FDI firms undertake. These strategic motives differ across
countries, therefore we would expect that foreign affiliates from different countries
will make different export decisions. To distinguish whether or not this is the case we
performed the export dummy and export share regressions substituting the foreign
indicator with dummies indicating the country/area of origin of the corresponding
firm. (The UK dummy was excluded so that the estimates of the country/area dum-
mies take UK firms as a reference.) In addition, to account for differences in the
relationship of firm level variables with respect to exporting across foreign and do-
mestic firms found above, we allow the coefficients on these variables to vary across
the two different types of firm.
As it was discussed before, the estimates in table 3.2, although useful to infer the
direction (positive or negative) of the impact of the relevant variables and to and
to gauge their relative magnitude, may be biased downward because of unobserved
individual heterogeneity. However, meaningful and consistent marginal effects can be
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retrieved from these estimates, which are averaged across the distribution of the firm
unobserved effects.
Table 3.3 exhibits the marginal effects of the relevant variables for the export
dummy and export share regressions derived from the results in the first 2 columns in
table 3.2. Standard errors were computed with the delta method. As it is possible to
see, being foreign adds to the probability of exporting and to the export share 3.8 and
4.3 percentage points respectively. Among the other firm level variables employment
(i.e. size) and productivity appear to have the strongest impact on the likelihood
of selling overseas. A 1 percent increase in these variables adds to the probability
of exporting 4.9 and 4.6 percentage points respectively. Productivity and wages (i.e.
skill) seem to have the highest marginal effects on the export share. If they rise by 1
percent, this adds 4.2 and 2.9 percentage points to the export share. Thus, although
the marginal effect of the foreign dummy is not strictly speaking comparable with the
marginal effects of the other (continuous) firm level variables, these figures suggest
that the foreign status raises substantially the degree of participation of firms in the
international markets through exports.
In table 3.4 we disaggregate the foreign dummy from table 3.2 into the various
countries of origin of the parent company. In this regression we also control for
differences in the effect of firm level characteristics on the decision to export and the
export share. Again a number of these country effects are significant, confirming that
the export decisions (entry and share) of foreign multinationals does not just reflect
the superior underlying performance characteristics of these firms.
There are few consistent patterns in the export behaviour of countries, where
this might be considered to match the complex integration strategies of MNEs as
highlighted in theoretical models by Yeaple (Yeaple 2003), Grossman et al. (2003)
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Table 3.3: Marginal effects of export dummy (column 1 in table 3.2) and export share
(column 2 in table 3.2) regressions.
Exp. Dummy Exp. Share
(1) (2)
Size .049 .018
(.002)·· ('001)"·
Size-squared -.006 -.0002
('001)·· (.0007)
Skill .035 .029
(.Oll)· · (.013)·
Productivity .046 .042
(.006)·· (.005)··
Foreign .043 .038
(.oosr-: (.005)··
Notes:
(i) Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses;
(ii) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
(iii) Marginal effects were computed at the mean of the relevant variables; standard errors were cI, ; .ved by means of
the delta method.
and Ekholm et al. (2003). Foreign multinationals from the US, Canada and other
countries are both more likely to export and have significantly higher export shares
than domestic firms. Asian firms, who all export (and are therefore not ii.cluded in
the probit regressions) do not have significantly higher export shares. l:IIUS from
non-Elf European countries and Japan are no more likely to export tkll: domestic
firms, conditional on the underlying characteristics, but ~e more exj.or: intensive
than domestic firms when they do. Firms from the EU countries are Hot 1I10relikely
to export than domestic firms (the coefficient is positive, but insignlficautj, but have
significantly lower export shares, and finally Australian firms are less likelv to export
but do not have significantly lower export shares.
That said, the strong significance of the non-Elf indicators (bar Australia and
Asia) in the export share regressions suggeststhat tariff jumping and, possibly, strate-
gic motives, along with country characteristics, are important for the export behaviour'
123
Table 3.4: Regression results of the export dummy (probit) and expor I ::I;, ~'t: (quasi-
likelihood method for fractional response). _
Export Dummygxport Share
--~~(~1)--~-------
Size .2033
(.0093)··
-.0331
(.0049)··
Size-squared
Skill
Canada
.1335
(.0453)··
.1991
(.0264)··
-.0921
(.0324)"·
.0412
(.0149)"·
-.0127
(.1302)
-.139
(.0717)+
0.243
(3.73)**
0.705
(3.83)**
0.038
(0.77)
0.100
(0.87)
Productivity
Foreign*Size '·.nill(,
(,0'.>'1 "
Foreign*Size-squared ,02;;1
/ i): ~'1\ •
Foreign*Skill
,\' ','
Foreign*Productiv. .O;;,:q
I ,!
us 0,1',.2
(11:;,:( \"
EU ··n.l,'r,;·
Europe not EU () .11.l
'r: 'I I, ~-,
\'J 1 "
Asia . () 11 t I
((i, I:' I
Constant
-0.150
(1.12)
-0.613
(3.09)**
0.575
(3.25)**
-0.052
(1.03)
26860
(J.:Y I!Japan
Australia -O.2L)
Others (). · l:{(:,
Observations 26920
_.------ ...._
---.-- .. -._--
Notes:
(i) Absolute value of robust z-statistics in parentheses;
(ii) + significant at 10%; significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
(iii) Europe not EU includes Switzerland and Norway; Asia includes Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore;
(iv) Firm level variables are lagged one year: size is measured as number of employees, skill as W;\1:<:' I)('r \«,1 h~r;
prodUctivity as value added per worker; .
(v) Year and industry dummies (2 digit level) included.
i ',' J
of foreign firms in the UK. Foreign affiliates of multinationals with headqu.. 1';\1: 'I'
the EU are less export oriented than affiliates of firms with headquarters \)lll:,i'!1 j}(;
EU. However, if tariff jumping is the only motive of FDI in the UK we would "\'>( j
that firms whose headquarters are outside the EU will have similar export P'''j',;;il
among them. If more complex integration strategies were undertaken, WIc: 1\ ('I ,i, !
pect that firms from different,countries would have different export intensities. J: I 'I) i-
situation the export intensity would depend on different strategic motives Jilt: ..«:«.
such as productivity and market size differentials between the UK and tho \",,' 1\ I:'
of origin and transport costs. Our analysis support this view.
Table 3.5 shows some figures that allow us to assess the importance of fir:! 1,\'\'[
variables relative to country/area of origin dummies, given the estiJlluI.. '\-- :,;, \:,
3.4 column 2. For each country/area of origin whose dummy is signilic.u» .: "!\
export share regression of table 3.4 we computed the predicted export share « J()l(!~',"
firms setting the relative geographic dummy to one and the firm level vnri.: :)!('; \' I
their mean values (computed considering only those foreign affiliates \V h. ):-:1';, i
company is headquartered in the respective country). This value was subtr. II ! I'; ! I.';'
the predicted export share, setting, one at a time, the variables in the CO]1111IW' 1/', ! .i:
3.5 (i.e. geographic dummies, size and productivity) to the mean level of UJ< hill,
"
and the dummy to zero. The differences so computed let us gauge the dl;Ug,' III
the predicted export share of foreign firms caused by setting firm level v;,lri;ti ,h'~, (,1
the geographic dummy to the average value for UK firms. Where foreign ('(lI11P:lllii'~
are larger, more productive or more export intensive than domestic firms, we \,,(>'11'·
expect the figure in table 3.5 to be negative. IS
15Marginal effects are of no help in this instance since we want to compare the effect or H i It:~, ",t,
variable with the effect of continuous variables
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Table 3.5: Effect of geographic dummies and firm level variables on the predicted
export share
Origin Geographic Dummy Size Productivity
DSA -.091 -.007 -.008
Canada
-.300 -.008 -.025
ED .022 -.000 -.003
Europe not ED
-.085 -.OlD -.009
Japan
-.055 -.012 .001
As one can see, the country/area dummies have a bigger effect than firm level
variables; indeed, setting the respective geographic dummies to zero (and given the
estimates in table 3.4) would decrease the export share of US foreign affiliates by 9.1
percentage points, of Canadian firms by 30, of European firms not in the EU by 8.5
and Japanese firms by 5.5 percentage points. By contrast, the export share of foreign
affiliates whose parent company is headquartered within the EU would increase by
2 percentage points. The effects of the main firm level variables, namely size and
productivity, on the export share appear to be smaller for all foreign countries. The
highest refers to productivity for Canadian firms and it is just 2.5 percent. This
finding would suggest that strategic motives related to countries differences in costs,
productivity and market size may be more important than firm level variables in
determining the export intensity of foreign firms.
The results in table 3.4 column 2 have been obtained assuming that the decision
whether to export or not and how much to export are the same and, consequently,
can be modelled in the same way. This is unlikely to be true. For this reason we
estimate an export share regression allowing for the fact that the two decisions may
be different. This involves estimating an endogenous sample selection model, also
known as Tobit type II model (see Hsiao (2003, pp.229-230) and Duncan (1980)).
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This methodology is similar to the Tobit or truncation model, insofar as it deals with
a censored or truncated variable (a censored one, i.e. export shares, in this case), but
in addition it allows to treat the censoring or truncation value as endogenous.
Two equations are estimated: a latent response function, yit = X~t,B + Uit (export
share regression); a selection equation, dit = Zit, + Vt (export decision) where d; = 1
if d; > 0 and dt = 0 if d; ::; 0; besides Y; = Yt if dt = 1 and Yt = 0 if d, = O. Thus, the
observed export share (Yt) is zero when the firm decides not to export (dit=O) and
assumes a positive value when the firm decides to export (dit = 1). The distribution
of the error terms (Uit' Vit) is assumed to be bivariate normal with correlation p. The
two equations (i.e. decisions) are related if p =f O. In this case estimating only the
export share regression would induce sample selection bias in the estimate of ,B since
the error term uu, and the regressor x would be correlated. To avoid this problem
both equations must be estimated. The estimation can be conducted via maximum
likelihood or two-step method proposed. We employed the former since it is more
efficient than the latter.!"
The vectors of covariates Xu and Zit may be the same. If this is the case and
, = ,B and U = v the model reduces to the Tobit: the two choices will be the same.
The explanatory variables will affect exporters and non-exporters in exactly the same
way. In this instance, the model is, in principle, identified, but identification relies
exclusively on the model and the normality assumption concerning the two error
terms being correct. These assumptions are in most of the cases too weak (Johnston
and DiNardo 1997, pp. 450).
16The two-step methodology involves estimating first the probit of the export decision (i.e. selec-
tion equation), computing the inverse of the Mills ratio and inserting it as regressor in the export
share regression. Although, this method is easy and intuitive is less efficient with respect to the
maximum likelihood method.
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For this reason, we estimated the two equations adding in the selection equation
the lagged export dummy. This allows to identify the model more easily and take into
account the state dependence of the export behaviour related to sunk costs (Bernard
and Jensen 2004b).17
From the results exhibited in table 3.6 it is evident that sunk cost of exporting
are important. Indeed, the lag of the export dummy in the export decision equation
is positive and strongly significant. This is consistent with previous empirical evi-
dence (Bernard and Jensen 2004b; Bernard and Jensen 1999) and recent theoretical
models (Melitz 2003). The other firm characteristics determining the export decision
have in general the same sign and statistical significance of the estimates in table 3.4,
with the notably exception of the USA dummy that is now insignificant. Thus, USA
firms do not seem to be more likely to export than UK companies when we control
for the state dependence in the export behaviour. The results from the export share
equation, in column 2 of table 3.6, have a similar pattern of those in table 3.4, al-
though they appear to be smaller (in absolute value). US, Canadian, European not in
the EU, and Japanese firms have higher export propensity than domestic businesses,
whereas EU companies are less export intensive.
In addition from the results in table 3.6 it is worth noting that rho (the correlation
coefficient between the error terms of the two structural equations) is estimated to
be significantly different from zero. This means that linear regression would yield
biased results because of sample selection; in addition since rho is also estimated to
be different from one the model does not reduce to the Tobit.
17Jt is worth stressing that we pooled the cross sections. Simple and tested estimation methods
of selection processes that account for firms or individuals heterogeneity have not yet been properly
developed. Some of them are quite involved since require non-parametric estimations (Hsiao 2003,
chapter 8). However, as discussed before to gain an understanding of the relative magnitude of
variables and their marginal effects it suffices to pool the cross sections together.
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Table 3.6: Heckman selection model
Export Dummy EXp(;(i ~hare
-=~~~~--~~--------(1) I ~ I
Lagged Export Dummy 3.0935
(.0329)**
Europe not EU
.0654
(.0153)"
-.0181
(.0078)*
-.0606
(.0589)
.1142
(.0424)**
-.0247
(.0436)
.0056
(.02)
-.0284
(.2014)
-.1156
(.1053)
.0653
(.0837)
.7366
(.2428)**
-.0269
(.0765)
.1327
(.1912)
\1" 'J
Size
Size-squared
Skill
Productivity
Foreign*Size
Foreign*Size-squared
Foreign*Skill
Foreign*Productiv.
US
Canada
EU
Asia
Constant
-.0974
(.2083)
-.4347
(.1259)"
-.0721
(.226)
-.9205
(.2249)**
1\Japan
I II
Australia
Others ,j; Ii
Observations
Censored Obs.
-0.3107
(.0172)*'
25854
5299
Rho
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) + significant at 10%; • significant at 5%; • • significant at 1%
(iii) Europe not EU includes Switzerland and Norway; Asia includes Hong Kong, Malaysia and :.;i ,.... I'
(iv) Firm level variables are lagged one year: size is measured as number of employees, skill .IS v '''' .,,,rker;
producitivity as value added per worker. Year and industry dummies (2 digit) included.
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To compare the effect of firm level variables and country/area of origin dummy
table 3.7 shows results computed in an analogous way to those presented in 3.5. As
it is possible to see, the country/area of origin still matters relatively to other firm
level characteristics, such as size and productivity, albeit less than what appears from
table 3.5.
Table 3.7: Effect of geographic dummies and firm level variables on the predicted
export share (Heckman model).
Origin Geographic Dummy Size Prod uctivity
USA -.033 -.053 -.003
Canada -.OBI -.071 -.007
EU .012 -.035 -.001
Europe not EU -.031 -.053 -.003
Japan -.029 -.052 .000
Indeed, setting the respective geographic dummy to zero (and given the estimates
in table 3.7) would cause a decrease in the export share of US foreign affiliates by 3.3
percentage points, of Canadian firms by B, of European firms not in the EU by 3.1 and
Japanese firms by 2.9 percentage points. The export share of foreign affiliates whose
parent company is headquartered within the EU would increase by 1.2 percentage
points. Size appears to have a bigger impact than geographic origin dummies by
around 2 percentage points, whilst the impact of productivity is less than 1 percent.
This finding along with those in table 3.7 indicate that strategic motives related
to countries differences in costs, productivity and market size are important in deter-
mining the export behaviour of foreign firms.
Table 3.B exhibits the results of the Heckman selection model estimated consider-
ing total factor productivity (TFP) instead of value added per worker as in table 3.6.
130
18 This productivity measure allows to capture the role of capital and intermediates
in the production process, not only of labour as in labour productivity indexes. The
two productivity measures (l.e, TFP and value added per worker) are highly corre-
lated, their correlation coefficient being 0.52. The results obtained considering TFP
corroborate those obtained using labour productivity in table 3.6. The only differ-
ences concern the significance of the productivity variable, of the US and Australia
dummies in the export decision regression. Indeed, whereas labour productivity is
significant in table 3.6 TFP is not in table 3.8. This may be caused by the fact
that TFP, unlike labour productivity, takes properly into account the contribution of
capital and intermediates.l?
Again, to compare the role of strategic motives, embedded in the country/region
dummies, with that of firm level variables, table 3.9 reports results computed in a
similar way to those in tables 3.7 and 3.5. It is worth noting that the effect of the
geographic dummies and size are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those in
table 3.7. On the contrary, the effect of productivity appears to be much smaller,
being virtually zero. This confirms the importance of strategic motives related to
differences among countries concerning costs, market sizes, producitivity ... for the
export behaviour of foreign firms.
3.4 Acquisition
In the previous section we have seen that foreign affiliates are more export oriented
than domestic companies. One interesting question related to the literature on foreign
t8More details on how TFP was calculated can be found in the appendix
19Firms with high labour productivity may well be highly capital intensive. In this case, since
TFP controls for the use of capital, if labour productivity is significant, TFP will be insignificant.
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Table 3.8: Heckman selection model with total factor productivity
Export Dummy Export Share
(1) (2)
Lagged Export Dummy 3.1497
(.0361)"
Europe not EU
-.0146
(.0087)+
.0641
(.0436)
.0824
(.0778)
-.1119
(.05)"
.0205
(.0245)
-.1875
(.1983)
.0117
(.1112)
.2145
(.0907)'
1.0236
(.3205)"
-.0223
(.0816)
.1999
(.2196)
.0045
(.002) •
.0029
(.0011)--
Size .0615
(.0168)"
Size-squared
Constant
.0331
(.2831)
-.0919
(.1678)
-.1036
(.2426)
3.4456
(.3569)··
.0419
(.0145)"
.0364
(.011)"
.0028
(.(062)
-.0011
(.0027)
-.0097
(.0236)
-.0431
(.0207)'
.0896
(.0099)"
.259
(.0402)"'
-.0256
(.0091)'-
.074
(.0191)"
-.0768
(.0676)
.1078
(.0242)"'
.0025
(.0371)
.0423
(.0248)+
.3532
(.1509)"
Skill
TFP
Foreign*Size
Foreign*Size-squared
Foreign*Skill
Foreign*TFP
US
Canada
EU
Asia
Japan
Australia
Others
Observations
Censored Obs.
-0.3017
(.0179)'
22746
4570
Rho
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) + significant at 10%; • significant at 5%; • • significant at 1%
(iii) Europe not EU includes Switzerland and Norway; Asia includes Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
(iv) Firm level variables are lagged one year: size is measured as number of employees, skill as wage per worker; TFP
is total factor productivity. Year and industry dummies (2 digit) included.
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Table 3.9: Effect of geographic dummies and firm level variables on the predicted
export share (Heckman model with total factor productivity).
Origin Geographic Dummy Size Productivity
USA
-.034 -.054 .00002
Canada
-.094 -.074 -.00001
ED .010 -.037 -.00004
Europe not EU
-.028 -.053 -.00009
Japan
-.041 -.057 .00002
acquisition is whether foreign MNEs that set up an affiliate in the UK are more likely
to acquire domestic firms that have already some export experience or not.
This question is of relevance since foreign acquisition is the main mode of entry
in a foreign market as opposed to greenfield investment. As reported in the World
Investment Report (UNCTAD 2000) the share of total cross border merger and ac-
quisitions in world total FDI flows has risen from 52 percent in 1997 to 83 percent
in 1999. The most important mode of entry by foreign firms into the UK is through
cross border mergers and acquisitions. Griffith et al. (2004) report that foreign ac-
quisitions accounted for 80.9 percent of total FDI in all UK manufacturing sectors in
the 1999-2001 period.
The literature on foreign acquisition has mainly focused on productivity. Previ-
ous work has indeed looked at whether foreign multinationals "cherry pick" domestic
firms (Le. acquire the best domestic firms) or improve their productivity after ac-
quisition. The findings have not been unequivocal. Conyon et al. (2002), using UK
firm level data, report that foreign acquisitions lead to an increase in labour produc-
tivity; Harris and Robinson (2002), using UK plant level data, find evidence that
high productivity plants are acquired by foreigners and that total factor productivity
declines after takeovers. Criscuolo and Martin (2004), using the same data as Harris
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and Robinson (2002), argue that the productivity advantage of foreign uffiliates is
explained by both "cherry picking" and post-acquisition productivity "Iii i ucernent,
In addition, they find that there are differences according to the couui i of origin
of acquiring companies since US firms seem to be able to acquire the l)(~,: .lomestic
plants.P"
Here, we are concerned with the export status of acquired domesti. I. "~so Given
the high export propensity of foreign affiliates an interesting questi.» .'-'whether
foreign acquisitions target target domestic firms with export experience ," ,1 irn firms
that previously served just the domestic market into exporters, and if it! . 110 former
what happens to the export share in these acquired firms?
We compare the characteristics of acquired versus non-acquired (If ",tic firms
using a probit regression.f! The dependent variable is one when the III' \ has been
foreign acquired and zero otherwise. The probability of foreign acqui-i: ii depends
on a set of firm level variables. Economic theory is not clear concerning \' I
may be important. Along with the export share we included other fiJI
,ariables
acteris-
tics used in previous empirical works, namely wage per employee (to l''''.' "for the
education of the workforce), employment (as a proxy of size), material ,111<; ital per
employee, age, and labour productivity (computed as value added IWi \1": '1'). Af-
ter some experimentation with the data we decided to include the squ.uvu . .d cubic
terms for the export share and the square of productivity to control for '1<' II, ,I: -arities
in these variables.
20For the US, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) find that acquisitions are aimed al iii. ' " .luctive
plants; furthermore productivity improves after the acquisition. Lichtenberg and Siq'l'l j '" ) argue
that ownership changes are driven by low productivity levels and that total fact" i ' ' rctivity
increases under the new management.
21The sample period used for the probit regression reaches the year 1996 only :iill( ii! foreign
acquisition dummies is available only up to this year (see the data appendix at the I':".j ,,' ( .hapter
1).
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Table 3.10 presents a comparison between the estimates obtained with random
effects probit and the pooled probit estimates. As it is possible to see they are all
remarkably similar. Foreign firms tend to target domestic firms with export experi-
ence, compared to their distribution in the population of domestic firms, even after
controlling for other firm level characteristics. In addition there appear to be some
non-linearities in the effect of export share on the probability of being acquired.
With regard to the other firm level variables, it is possible to see that firms that
pay higher wage, that are larger and that use more more capital and intermediates
are more likely to be acquired. Furthermore, firms that have high labour productivity
are less probable to be the target of foreign takeovers. These results are consistent
with those reported recently by Griffith et al. (2004) for the UK. They note that the
value-added per employee of firms taken over by foreign enterprises is 6 percent below
the corresponding industry average; however, such firms are three times as large as
the average firm in the industry and are more capital and intermediate intensive.
Overall, it seems that the random effects model has little to offer more than the
pooled model. The parameter estimates and standard errors are nearly the same
whereas the log likelihood is only slightly higher for the random effects model. Given
the considerable time necessary to estimate the random effects probit model, we will
concentrate on the pooled results knowing that they are qualitatively and quanti-
tatively similar to the random effects model.P In addition, as underlined in the
previous section from the pooled estimates it is still possible to obtain consistent
marginal effects.
22The estimation of the random effects model required more than one day. Note that the long
time necessary for the maximumlikelihood to converge is not due to the number of observations
(around 20000), but to the industry fixed effects, which increase notably the number of regressors.
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Table 3.10: Comparisons between random effects probit and pooled probit estimates
RE probit Pooled probit
(1) (2)
Export Share .8473 0.8572
(.4082)· (.3802)·
Export Share?
-1.3856 -1.3996
(.8211)+ (.7194)+
Export Share" .5291 0.5334
(.4249) (.2853)+
Wage .5398 0.562
(.1325)·· (.1169)··
Employm. .0758 0.0743
(.0212)·· (.019)··
Material/Employment .2631 0.2653
(.0414)·· (.0367)··
Capital/Employment .0715 0.0695
(.0288)" (.0257)"·
Age
-.0635 -0.0648
(.0241)·· (.022)··
Labour Productivity -.1498 -0.1563
(.0691)" (.0629)··
Labour Productivlty'' -.0615 -0.0647
(.0474) (.0354)+
Constant -2.3625 -2.3499
(.1491)·· (.1397)··
Observations 18560 18560
Log-likelihood -1454.812 -1457.627
Notes:
(i) Standard errors in parenthesis (they are only robust for the pooled probit);
(ii) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;
(iii) Firm level variables are in log (bar export shares) and lagged one year. Export Share~ and Export Share3 are
export share to the power of two and three;
(iv) Year and industry dummies (2 digit level) included.
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In table 3.11 we split the sample of foreign acquisitions to consider the effect of the
region/country of origin of the parent company. Owing to a relatively small number
of acquisitions for some countries and our interest in the differences in behaviour of
countries inside and outside the EU we consider only EU and non-EU acquisitions.
It is noteworthy that the export share seems to be an important determinant
of acquisition only for those MNEs that will establish high export intensive foreign
affiliates, namely those with headquarters outside the EU. Indeed, non-EU MNEs
appear to target firms with previous export experience, whereas this is not the case
for EU MNEs. The export share coefficients are strongly significant in the non-
EU acquisition regression, whereas they are much smaller (in absolute value) and
insignificant in the EU acquisition regression. Thus, whereas non-EU multinationals
seem to acquire UK companies with export experience the same is not true for their
EU counterparts.
EU and non-EU firms also target different UK companies according other firm
level variables. EU acquisitions seem to prefer enterprises with a skilled workforce (Le.
high wages), high intermediates and capital usage per employees, but low productivity.
This may reflect under-performing firms (signalled by low labour productivity levels),
with good growth potential (given their skilled workforce and their high levels of
materials and capital usages). Non-EU acquisitions appear to involve UK companies
with skilled workforce and high intermediates and capital use per employees, like EU
acquisitions. In addition, large (in terms of employment) and younger firms seem to
be preferred.
Overall these differences may be caused by different post-acquisition costs, non-
EU and EU firms face to integrate the newly acquired firms in their operations. These
137
Table 3.11: Pooled probit regression of foreign acquisitions
EU acquis. Non-EU acquis.
1 2
Export Share -.4621 1.8861
(.595) (.4759)--
Export Share- .2023 -2.7468
(1.1315) (.8733)--
Export Share" .0704 .9767
(.4203) (.3353)--
Wage .4519 .6467
(.1757)- (.1425)--
Employm. .0249 .1047
(.031) (.0235)--
Material/Employment .2916 .2495
(.0568)·- (.045)--
Capital/Employment .1156 .0548
(.0414)·- (.0325)+
Age -.0083 -.0985
(.0372) (.0262)·-
Labour Productivity -.3078 -.079
(.1016)-- (.0769)
Labour Productlvity? -.1025 -.0608
(.0539)+ (.0518)
Constant -2.4752 -2.6577
(.2262)" (.1709)--
Observations 15262 17905
Log-likelihood -659.2131 -938.7099
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parenthesis;
(ii) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; .* significant at 1%;
(iii) Firm level variables are in log (bar export shares) and lagged one year. Export Share2 and Export Share:' are
export share to the power of two and three;
(iv) Year and industry dummies (2 digit level) included.
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costs may be higher for non-EU firms, for cultural and legislative reas.» I: .
they might prefer to acquire UK firms with characteristics more SiWIL.
theirs (I.e. large firms, with a more skilled workforce, high capital ar«] .:
usage) since they can be integrated in their international operations n r...
'. fore
I~ of
I::tte
These results, along with those in table 3.4 and 3.6, show that the (" 1)1' .our
of foreign affiliates in the UK not only differ according to the area of 'II;' • tis
also an important determinant of their entry in the UK market throll;,J.,m.
Foreign affiliates that are highly export intensive (i.e. those from outsi : .ire
more likely to enter the UK market through the acquisition of firn.s « ! IUS
export experience, whereas for those that have low export share (i.e. IL, he
EU), their entry does not appear to be affected by the export share of 'Ii m.
The coefficients of the models estimated thus far are not margin: d ICy
can only indicate whether the marginal effect is positive or negative he
marginal effect of, say, variable Xj for firm i at time t in the probit 11III ' .ly
non-linear since they are the product of the parameter ((3j) of interest ;I: ; 11
density evaluated at a certain data point.
Marginal effects vary across observations, therefore average margin. I; "!' ' Es)
of the variables of interest were computed calculating the marginal eff('(' I : 1 a
points and averaging them. This way of computing marginal effects w..« i" I)
calculating them at a particular value of a variable since the latter 11](':): il': .
volves the choice of such value (usually the mean) which might pertain I I' ':
or absurd observations.23 Standard errors were obtained through dclt.: :,11
23Knowing that P(y = 11x) = F(x{3') where F(z) is the cumulative normal (lie: ii"
average marginal effect of, say, variable Xi were computed as AM Ei = (liT) '£k h(x'
is the normal density evaluated at observation k.
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Green (2000, pp. 357)).
Table 3.12 exhibits the marginal effects for the EU and non-EU acquisitions. The
pattern of statistical significance is similar to that in table 3.11. More specifically,
the marginal effects of export share are significant for non-EU acquisitions, but in-
significant for EU acquisitions. Given the parameter estimates, an increase in the
export share by 1 percent in wages will determine a rise in the probability of non-EU
takeovers by 1.2 percent, on average, (this effect is significant at the 1 percent confi-
dence level).24 The same variation in export share will decrease the probability of EU
acquisition by 0.3 percent, on average (this effect is not statistically significantj.f
With regards the other firm level variable, an increase by 1 percent in wages raises
the probability of takeovers by EU firms by about 0.9 percent points. The other
significant marginal effects for EU acquisitions concern material, capital usage and
labour productivity. An increase by 1 percent in the first two variables determine
an increase in the probability of EU acquisitions by around 0.6 and 0.25 percent,
respectively. For labour productivity, an increase by 1 percent will determine, ceteris
paribus, a decline in the probability of foreign acquisitions by EU firms by about
0.8 percent. All firm level characteristics, except labour productivity, have a positive
impact on the likelihood of foreign acquisitions, the larger being wage (1.7 percent).
To check whether these marginal effects are robust to changes in the methodology
of estimation we estimated the same regressions as those in table 3.11 using panel
probit. For the sake of brevity we report only the marginal effects, which are shown in
24An increment in the probability of acquisition by 1 percent means that the on "average" the
probability of acquisition increases from, say, 5 percent to 6 percent.
25The total average marginal effect of export share was obtained as average of the sum of the
marginal effect of export share, export share squared and export share to the power of three. Their
standard error for hypothesis tests was estimated considering the covariance between the estimators.
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Table 3.12: Marginal effects of pooled probit regressions
EU acquis. Non-EU acquis.
1 2
Export Share -.0010 .0480
Export Share''
(.0124) (.0124)·-
.0046 -.0651
(.0235) (.0226)--
.0014 .0292
(.0087) (.0087)--
.0088 .0175
(.0036)- (.0038)--
.0006 .0026
(.0006) (.0006)··
.0061 .0065
(.0012)-- (.0012)--
.0025 .0014
(.0009)-- (.0009)+
-.0001 -.0025
(.0008) (.0007)--
-.0059 -.0019
(.0022)-· (.0020)
-.0020 -.0015
(.0011)+ (.0013)
Export Share''
Wage
Employm.
Material/Employment
Capital/Employment
Age
Labour Productivity
Labour Productivlty"
Notes:
(i) + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
table 3.13. As it is possible to see the point estimate and the statistical significance of
these marginal effects are very close to those obtained with the simpler pooled probit
shown in table 3.12. Thus, firm random effects do not seem to playa significant role in
the decision concerning which firms are acquired. This is consistent with the previous
comparison between the pooled and panel probit results reported in table 3.10, where
no relevant differences between the two sets of estimates were found.
In the final set of results we explore this strategic behaviour further by considering
what happens to the export intensity of acquired firms in the post acquisition period.
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Table 3.13: Marginal effects of panel probit regressions; these were estimated using
the same variables as in table 3.11
EU acquis. Non-EU acquis.
1 2
Export Share
-.0091 .0481
(.0116) (.0130)··
Export Share'' .0046 -.0700
(.0234) (.0246)··
Export Share'' .0011 .0249
(.0113) (.0119)·
Wage .0088 .0166
(.0037)· (.0043)··
Employm. .0006 .0027
(.0006) (.0007)··
Material/Employment .0055 .0064
(.0012)·· (.0014)··
Capital/Employment .0023 .0014
(.0008)·· (.0009)
Age -.0001 -.0025
(.0007) (.0008)··
Labour Productivity -.0057 -.0020
(.0020)·· (.0022)
Labour Productivity? -.0019 -.0015
(.0014) (.0016)
Log-likelihood -656.3683 -938.3737
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors in parenthesis;
(ii) + significant at 10%; • Significant at 5%; • • significant at 1%;
(iii) Firm level variables are in log (bar export shares) and lagged one year. Export Share2 and Export Share3 are
export share to the power of two and three;
(iv) Year and industry dummies (2 digit level) were included in the regressions;
(v) The log-likelihood refers to the panel probit estimation whose estimates are not reported for the sake of brevity.
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Table 3.14: Post acquisition export share.
After acquisition
EU
non-EU
-.1645
(.1088)
.5378
(.0931)**
If multinationals from non-Elf countries target exporters for strategic reasons we
might expect the export intensity to rise over time. We measure this effect relative
to the export intensity of non-acquired domestic firms. The evidence is presented in
table 3.14.26 Again we separate acquisitions according to the broad grouping of ED
and non-ED.
In combination with the results from the previous table the evidence would appear
to suggest that firms from ED countries do not target export firms, and when they do
acquire exporters these firms do not tend to change their export propensity relative
to domestic firms. In contrast firms from non-ED countries appear to both target
exporters and then increase the export intensity of these acquisitions over time.
3.5 Conclusions
A well-known fact in the empirical literature concerned with FDI is the superior
performance of foreign firms compared to domestic companies with respect to em-
ployment, wages and productivity. In this paper we investigate the export behaviour
of foreign affiliates in the UK. Our findings show that foreign firms are more likely
to export than indigenous ones, when they do so they are more export intensive and
contribute disproportionately to total manufacturing exports from the UK.
26These results are derived from the pooled probit estimates.
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In some regards this is surprising. Traditional theories of FDI (Mmk'l" 11 2002)
suggest that FD I and exports are alternative means of serving foreigi .:I +s not
complementary and they do not predict exporting activities by foreign cJ III : Only
recently, theoretical models have tried model the export behaviour of Lilt, Ites of
MNEs established in foreign countries (Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusci. ';ross-
man, Helpman, and Szeidl 2003; Yeaple 2003).
We find that the export behaviour of foreign firms is determined ov. ']' .mingly
by strategic considerations involving the differential in costs, productiv ii, iarket
size between the UK and foreign countries. If there is complemei I', " tween
exports and FDI we would not expect the significant differences in boh.» ' .cross
countries we find in the data. In this sense the evidence might b. ~ -xl to
be more consistent with export platform FDI. In this literature the I' nain
motives for export platform FDI: vertical and horizontal. There is SIlo ,; renee
of horizontal motives in the data: firms from non-EU countries are mu.l. ' ikely
to export than firms from EU countries located in the UK. Howeve I not
provide a full explanation: vertical motives are also important. Then :e of
this not only from the fact that non-EU firms use the UK as an expor: !J " but
that EU firms also use the UK to export back to mainland Europe.
While strategic motives appear to dominate the explanation, we ;II,(i " that
firm level variables are important. Our results show that the larger ;I!; I i I. uore
productive are foreign firms the more export oriented they are. Howc-«: I', tid,
it is also clear from our analysis that what drives foreign firms to expor 1" " '.'ut
from domestic firms. Even conditioning on firm level characteristics, whi. 1: ::" .ves
appear to have a smaller role in the export behaviour offoreign firms than lu: ,i, stic
companies, foreign firms are more export intensive than domestic firms. T ore,
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foreign firms may respond differently from domestic firms to policies devised to spur
firms to start exporting or to increase their exports.
Policy markers within the UK clearly view exporting as a good thing. Foreign
firms contribute disproportionately to exports from the UK, and could, given their
favourable underlying performance characteristics, potentially offer a larger share. If
policymakers aim to improve the export performance of the UK manufacturing sector
this fact may provide an additional motive to invest public funds to attract affiliates
of foreign multinationals to locate in the UK.
In addition, anything that threatens the permanence of foreign companies - for
example it has been suggested by some that the UK's membership of the EU might
be such a variable - could have significant consequences for the export performance
of the UK manufacturing sector.
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3.6 Appendix
To compute productivity levels the index number approach was chosen as suggested
by Diewert (1992). The chosen method allows to eschew the difficulties involved in
estimating flexible production functions and to obtain transitive comparisons among
the productivity of firms in a multilateral setting.
The particular index used is a Tornqvist-type index. This index was first intro-
duced by Tornqvist (1936) to make binary comparisons (i.e. comparison between two
entities) and was subsequently used as output, input and productivity index. Two
main advantages of the binary Torniqvist index are that it is superlative and tran-
sitive. Transitivity is one of the desiderable properties, set by Fisher (1922), index
numbers should respect. Diewert (1976) introduced the concept of superlative index
numbers, which are those that can be directly derived from flexible functional forms.
The binary Torniqvist index is superlative since it can be derived from a translog
function.
In economics we are mostly interested in multilateral comparisons (i.e, compar-
ison between more than two agents). The binary Torniqvist index could be used in
this case as well to generate the set of all possible binary comparisons, but transitivity
would not be necessarily respected. In time series studies to bypass this difficulty the
Tornqvist index has been employed chain-linking observations so that to attain, in
addition to transitive bilateral comparisons between adjacent observations, bilateral
transitive comparisons between non-contiguous ones, the latter by means of interven-
ing observations. In cross section studies this method cannot be easily applied since
there is not a inherent way of arranging observations.
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For this reason Caves et al. (1982) introduced a modification of the binary Torn-
qvist index, which preserves its transitivity in a multilateral context even when there
is not a precise ordering of the observations, as in cross section data sets. This mul-
tilateral Tornqvist index allows to construct a total factor productivity (TFP) index,
which, in the one output case, is computed as the log of output of, say, plant f (ex-
pressed as difference of the log output of this plant from a reference point) minus
the cost share weighted sum of the log of inputs (expressed as cost share weighted
difference of the log of input from a reference point). The log of output and inputs are
expressed as differences from a reference point to indeed ensure transitivity among
all comparisons.
The reference point is constructed as a hypothetical firm whose output and inputs
levels are calculated, respectively, as the log of the geometric mean, across all firms,
of the output and inputs levels. By the same token, the cost share of a certain input
is computed as the arithmetic mean, across all firms, of the cost share of that input.
Thus, the index can be represented by means of the following expression,
- 1~ -In TFPI = (In YI -In y) - 2 ~(sil - si)(ln XiI -In Xi)
i=1
1M __ 1M 1M
In Y = M LIn YI; In Xi = M L In XiI; In Si = M LIn sil
/=1 /=1 /=1
where Y indexes the output of the M firms; X and S index respectively the N
inputs and their cost share. The terms with an upper bar represent the log of the
output, inputs and their cost share of the reference firm. It is worth stressing that
this reference point is not chosen arbitrarily. Indeed, it descends from the fact that
the multilateral Tornqvist index proposed by Caves et al. (1982) compares the pro-
ductivity of firm f with respect not to another single firm, hut with respect all the
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other firms. This comparison is conducted subtracting the mean across all firms of
their productivity, in log, from the productivity, in log, of firm f Assuming a translog
functional form it is possible to show that the mean of the logarithmic productivity
across all firms is equal to the productivity of the reference firm (Caves, Christensen,
and Diewert 1982).
The above index is suited for cross section studies (all firms are compared to the
refernce firm). Good et at. (1995) have modified it to deal with panel data sets. These
feature both time series and cross section characteristics. In this situation both the
chaining over time and the reference firm approaches, the former used in time series
settings, whereas the latter in cross sections, have appealing facets.
The authors proposed an index that uses both methodologies since the hypothet-
ical firm for each cross section is chain-linked over time as in time series studies. The
index above then becomes
In TFPjt
_ 1~ --(In Yjt - In Y.t) - 2 ~(Sijt - si.t)(ln Xijt -In Xi.t) +
i=l
T 1 T N __
+ 2::(ln Y·t - In Y·t-l) - 22:: 2::(Si.t - Si.t-l) (In Xi·t - In Xi.t-l)
t=2 t=2 i=l
The first part of this index is equal to the Caves ei al. (1982) index. The second
part, instead, allows to chain the reference firm through time.
In this study the above index has been used to calculate the productivity level of
each firm for each year and its yearly productivity growth rates. The inputs used are
labour, material and capital. The labour factor is measured as the total number of
workers employed by the firm and its cost as the total wage bill. The cost of material
is the cost of production of goods sold. The capital is the fixed capital stock. Due
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to the lack of reliable measure of the user-cost of capital its expenditure share was
calculated assuming constant return to scale so that it can be computed as one minus
the cost-share of the other inputs.
To allow for fixed industry effects, the productivity index was computed sepa-
rately for each 2 digit SIC92 sector. In this way the reference was constructed for
every 2 digit industry and the productivity of all firms in the same industry was com-
puted relative to it. Thus, the systematic productivity differences among industries
is captured by the reference firms, and by the productivity of individual firms since
this is measured as distance from the reference firm. This characteristic allows us to
control for the fact that exporters and multinationals could be concentrated in highly
productive sectors.
In addition, it permits to undertake sensible productivity comparisons across firms
operating in different industries whose outputs are not obviously comparable given
their different nature. Productivity of firms in the ship building sector is not com-
mensurable with that of companies in the chocolate bars sector. However, if the
productivity of firms operating in different industries is computed taking as a ref-
erence the average firms of the respective industry, meaningful comparisons can be
conducted. For instance, firm A operating in the ship building sector has a produc-
tivity level that is 2 percent higher than the average ship building companies; firm B
in the chocolate bars industry has a productivity level that is only 1 percent higher
than the respective average firm. Then, it is possible to say that firm A is more
productive than B (with respect to respective the average firm).
Chapter 4
Exports versus FDI: A
Non-Parametric Empirical Test
4.1 Introduction
One feature of the rising integration of the world economy evident both in the present
and previous rounds of globalisation is the simultaneous increase in arms-length trade
(exporting) and foreign direct investment (see Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Mad-
dison (2001) for further details). In traditional theories of international trade and
multinationals these are substitute methods of serving overseas markets: domestic
firms either export or establish foreign production facilities. Brainard (1993) pro-
vides an appealing characterisation of the FDI/export decision facing firms. Firms
export when there are cost advantages to concentration (economies of scale), and
establish foreign production facilities when proximity to local markets is more im-
portant. Empirical support can also be found for this model: the share of exports is
increasing in scale economies and decreasing in trade costs and foreign market size
(Brainard 1997).
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The recent development of theories in which firms are heterogeneous in their un-
derlying characteristics has added fine detail to this model of trade and FDI (Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004; Melitz 2003).
There, firms within each industry face the same industry costs but make different
choices about market entry. Firm heterogeneity leads to self-selection in the struc-
ture of international commerce (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004, henceforth HMY).
Only the most productive firms within an economy find it profitable to meet the higher
costs associated with FDI; the next set of firms find it profitable to serve foreign mar-
kets through exporting; while the least productive firms find it profitable to serve
only the domestic market.
In this chapter we test whether the export/FDI and export/no-export decisions
are ordered according to the productivity of firms as in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004). The empirical question under test can be expressed as comparisons between
the productivity distributions of different kinds of firms (namely, multinationals, ex-
porters and purely domestic market oriented firms).
The theoretical framework of HMY predicts a strict relationship between the
productivity of a firm and its choice about market entry that we might not expect to
find in the data however. Firms with productivity above a given cut-off value enter
exports markets or become multinational with certainty. The productivity level of all
multinational firms must therefore be greater than that of all exporting firms, which
in turn must be greater than that of all non-exporting firms. In practice we might
expect that shocks to the level of productivity of the firm, uncertainty surrounding the
fixed costs of entering export markets, undertaking FDI or the productivity level of
the firm may lead some firms with identical characteristics to make different choices.
The relationship between FDI and productivity becomes blurred.
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The Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) model assumes that the choice to establish
foreign production facilities is based purely on considerations of market access. All
FOI is horizontally motivated. Head and Ries (2003) demonstrate that when there
are factor price and market size differentials across countries, firms invest abroad for
vertical motives also. They take advantage of low factor costs, such as wages, in some
countries. As a result firms that become multinationals may no longer be the most
productive within the industry. The most productive firms undertake market-seeking
FOI, whereas the least productive conduct factor-seeking FOI. By implication we test
their extension to the HMY model.
For these reasons to test whether firm productivity is associated with the struc-
ture of international commerce we apply Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests of stochastic dom-
inance. Establishing stochastic dominance implies that one cumulative distribution
lies to the right of another. These tests therefore go beyond tests for differences in
mean productivity that are typically found in the literature. Delgado et al. (2001)
have previously applied these Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests to data on Spanish exporters
and non-exporters, while building on the ideas developed in this chapter Girma, Gorg
and Strobl (2004) report on results for Irish data.
As in Delgado et al. (2001) we also report evidence on the issue of self-selection
versus learning. Heterogeneous firm models predict a causal relationship between
foreign market entry and productivity that is one directional, from productivity to
exporting and FOI. Empirical evidence also exists for causation in the opposite direc-
tion however. The evidence on learning effects from export market entry, knowledge
spillovers to domestic firms from the co-location of multinationals, and the effect on
firm performance after the acquisition by foreign multinationals, appears dependent
on the chosen sample frame and methodology. This chapter provides the first evidence
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on this issue for the UK using tests of stochastic dominance.
Finally, our empirical analysis relates to the literature on whether exports and FDI
are complements or substitutes. The current evidence would appear to depend on the
level of aggregation used. In the single product setting of the type discussed above
exports and FDI are substitute methods of serving foreign markets. Complementarity
between them is generated as we use higher levels of aggregation. For example, within
the firm complementarity is possible once we allow for multiple products and cross-
product dependence of demand (Lipsey and Weiss 1984), or strategic motives in the
location decisions of firms (Choi and Davidson 2004).
A similar pattern of substitution at low levels of aggregation (albeit with net-
complementarity) and complementarity at higher levels would also summarise the
empirical evidence on this point. Using industry trade data Lipsey and Weiss (1984),
Clausing (2001) and Graham (2000) all find strong evidence of complementarity. Ex-
ports tend to rise with sales by foreign affiliates. In contrast using product level data
for trade in Japanese automobile parts between the US and Japan Blonigen (2001)
finds clear substitution effects in nine of the ten product lines examined and verti-
cal complementarity effects from Japanese automobiles in nine product lines. Finally,
Head and Ries (2001) using firm level data find evidence of net complementarity in the
most vertically integrated firms and substitution for the least integrated. If evidence
of stochastic dominance is found then the results may be thought of as consistent
with the idea of substitution between exports and FDI within the industry.
We find in this chapter strong support for the ranking of the productivity distri-
butions predicted by the HMY model. The cumulative productivity distribution of
multinational firms lies to the right of that of exporting firms, which in turn is to the
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right of that of non-exporting enterprises. The same ordering of firms is also found to
exist when we replace domestic multinational firms with foreign multinational firms.
Establishing the direction of causality between productivity and the structure
of commerce using this methodology produces less clear results. Firstly, evidence
is found to suggest these differences in productivity amongst groups of firms are
permanent, there are no significant differences in the growth rate of productivity
across firms. This is consistent with the idea that firms involved in exporting or FDI
do not experience faster rates of economic growth, in line with Bernard and Jensen
(1999) for the US. There is no evidence of learning.
Secondly, we explore the idea of self-selection by using information on firms that
transit between states, they become exporters or multinationals (through brownfield
FDI), in the pre-entry period. From this we find weak evidence of self-selection. The
cumulative productivity of new-exporters lies to the right of that of non-exporters but
does not stochastically dominate it. Similarly, there is only weak evidence that the
cumulative productivity distribution of firms acquired by foreigners dominates that of
other domestically owned export firms. Overall new exporters and new multinationals
do not clearly display productivity characteristics that are different from firms that
do not then go on to become exporters or multinationals. This is supportive of the
idea that firms are uncertain as to the costs and benefits of becoming an exporter
or a multinational, such that firms with similar productivity characteristics make
different choices. This argument is also consistent with the evidence of knowledge
spillovers following from the co-location of existing exporters and multinationals on
the probability of first time export market entry found in Greenaway et al. (2004),
Aitken et al. (1997) and Greenaway and Kneller (2004b).
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2 the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the subsequent statistical tests are elucidated. Section 3 contains a
description of the empirical approach used, the database and the methodology em-
ployed to compute TFP. The results are discussed in Section 4 and finally section 5
concludes.
4.2 The productivity of multinationals and export-
ing firms
In this section of the chapter we provide a brief description of the HMY model; in so
doing we draw on that paper. The properties of the model of interest are generated
through the assumptions of different costs (largely fixed costs) associated with serving
the domestic market, and serving foreign markets (through FDI or exports), along
with heterogeneity in the level of productivity across firms and imperfect competition.
Before a firm can enter the industry it pays a fixed cost f D. Upon entry it receives
a level of labour productivity a drawn from a known distribution G( a). Using its
knowledge about the level of labour productivity the firm then chooses whether to
serve the domestic market only, in which case it bears the fixed cost f D, or to bear
additional costs and serve foreign markets also. A productivity draw below the level
necessary to make positive profits (zero for the marginal firm) leads the firm to exit
the industry.
If the firm chooses to serve foreign markets it has the choice over whether to do
so through exporting or FDI. This is known as the proximity-concentration trade
off. Exporting incurs both additional fixed and variable costs, while FDI incurs only
additional fixed costs. The fixed costs of exporting are labelled f x . while f I represents
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the additional fixed costs associated with setting up a foreign subsidiary. The fixed
costs of FDI are assumed to be greater than those of exporting, i.e. 1[ >1x- The
sunk-costs of exporting are typically thought to include fixed costs of research into
product compliance, distribution networks, advertising and so on. The fixed costs
of FDI are the duplication of costs in 1D (the domestic set-up cost) as well as the
building of new production facilities or acquisition of an existing firm. Goods that
are exported are also subject to transportation costs, modelled as melting iceberg
transport costs rij, where i indexes the domestic country and j the foreign country.
FDI therefore eliminates the variable transport costs of exporting, but involves higher
fixed costs.
After entry firms engage in monopolistic competition. The demand side of the
model is assumed to be of a form such that there is a demand function Aip-E for
every brand of the product and the brand of a producer with labour productivity a
is offered for sale at a price p = a/a, where l/a represents the mark-up factor. The
level of profits (11"), associated with serving the domestic market, exporting or setting
a foreign subsidiary are then given by the following expressions
( k 1) i l-E (1 - a) Ai 1domestic mar et on y 11" - a - DD - a1-E
(exporting) ij ( )1-E (1 - a) Ai f1I"x = ra 1 - Xa -E
(FDI)
These expressions confirm that the profitability of each of these activities is in-
creasing in the productivity of the firm. The slopes of these lines are such that the level
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of profit a firm receives from each of these forms of commerce also differs according
to the productivity level of that firm. Firms with productivity below (ab)1-f choose
not to enter the domestic market, while firms with productivity between (ab)1-£ and
(a1)1-f make positive profits from serving the domestic market, but would make
negative profits if they chose to serve foreign markets. Firms with productivity be-
tween (a1)1-f and (a1)1-f make positive profit from serving the domestic market and
from exporting, but not from FDI, and therefore serve foreign markets by the former.
Finally, firms with productivity levels above (a1)1-f can make positive profits from
either exporting or FDI, but profits are greater if they choose to undertake FDI. Firms
above this level therefore serve foreign markets through their foreign subsidiaries.
While the above is presented such that exporting and FDI are substitute choices
it is worth noting that the ordering of productivity and commerce holds when export
platform FDI is allowed.' That is, as we find in the data, multinationals also export.
In this case the good is produced by the domestic firm in the foreign country to be
sold therein and to be exported to other foreign countries.
For the case of symmetry in the level of fixed costs and the productivity distribu-
tion G(.), HMY produce a useful diagram that summarises the predictions regarding
productivity and international commerce. For the probability density of Y]«, fig-
ure 4.1 suggests that firms with a productivity level to the right of a given cut-off
point(aD' ax, or a[ ) must strictly be more productive than all firms to the left of the
same cut-off. The multinational enterprise with the lowest productivity level must
be more productive than the exporter with the highest productivity level. Similarly,
the least productive business must have a higher productivity level than the most
lSee the appendix of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) for this proof.
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productive firm choosing to exit the market. A test of this model could therefore be
applied through a productivity comparison of these marginal firms.
Figure 4.1: Export FDI decision with no uncertainty
Probability density
Domesticonly Export FDI
Productivity
The relationship between productivity and international commerce can be made
more complex, such that firms with similar productivity make different choices, within
the current model if the fixed costs of exporting and FDI or the distribution from
which productivity is drawn are not symmetric across countries. Firms may therefore
choose to export to some countries but not others, or to serve some countries through
foreign affiliates and some through exports.
There are a number of changes in the assumptions of the model that would gen-
erate similar predictions. For example, firms might make different choices despite
similar productivity levels if the assumption that productivity is fixed across time is
removed. If instead the productivity of the firm is subject to random shocks, then the
existence of fixed costs associated with entry may result in the firm choosing not to
enter or exit in a given period in order to avoid paying these fixed costs in the future.
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Alternatively there may be uncertainty surrounding the parameters of the model. For
example, firms may be uncertain about the fixed costs of entering export markets or
undertaking FDI and the degree of uncertainty differs across firms. Similarly, the firm
may observe its productivity level with error. Finally, firms may differ in their degree
of risk aversion, discounting expected future profits from entry into new markets at
different rates. One possible representation of such a model that has parallels with
figure 4.1 is given by figure 4.2.
In figure 4.2 there exist regions around each of the definite cut-off points in figure
4.1 in which firms of similar productivity levels make different choices regarding the
market entry decision. For example, in the region around l/ax firms that would
choose to become an exporter in figure 4.1 might not make the same choice in figure
4.2. By the same token in the region around the fixed cost l/aI firms that became
multinational with certainty in figure 4.1 may instead choose to serve foreign markets
through exporting in figure 4.2. The relationship between productivity and interna-
tional trade is not therefore as deterministic as in figure 4.1. Despite the existence of
some uncertainty as to the choice of market entry made by firms in figure 4.2 there re-
mains a precise ordering of the productivity distributions among the different type of
enterprises. Hence a possible method of testing this model would be to compare the
cumulative productivity distribution function of firms that serve domestic markets
only, export or are multinational.
In addition, Head and Ries (2003) demonstrate that the ordering of the productiv-
ity distribution between multinationals and non-multinationals can even be reversed
if one allows for differences in wages (i.e. factor costs) and market sizes across coun-
tries. If the foreign country is small and offers some cost advantage, for a certain
range of the parameter of the model, least productive firms locate production abroad
159
Figure 4.2: Export FDI decision with uncertainty
Probability density
\
\ Domestic
\ only
1
\
Export
Productivity
whereas more productive ones concentrate production in the home country. In this
case, low productivity enterprises have the greater incentive to pay the FDI related
sunk cost because they use more intensively the production factor whose price in the
foreign country is low.
Finally, the above models consider the case of single product firms. Multi-product
firms face a more complex array of choices as the FDI/export decision may be product
specific. If market demands, factor costs and firm productivity differ for each of the
goods produced, firms will find it profitable to produce some products in the home
country and export others. In this case, firms with a sufficiently high productivity
level will serve foreign market through exports and/or FDI. If in addition we allow
for differences amongst foreign countries, such as market size and factor costs it is
apparent that even single-product firms could make different export/FDI choices to
serve different countries (or groups of countries). These two cases would allow for
firms that are both multinationals and exporters.
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Given the theoretical discussion above it is clear that the question concerning the
ordering of productivity distributions among purely domestic, exporting and multina-
tional firms is mainly an empirical one. It is possible to blur or even reverse the order
predicted by HMY. It is also clear that the test necessary to evaluate the general
prediction of the model goes beyond simple comparisons in mean productivity and
would require tests of the entire distribution for each type of firm.
Ranking the productivity distribution of different kinds of firms is also important
from a policy perspective. Indeed, improving the efficiency and productivity of firms
have figured prominently in the mind of policymakers, especially in the UK. High
productivity levels and growth rates are considered highly beneficial since they lead
to a better use of scarce resources and, in the long-run, to high standard of livings.
For this reason, UK government agencies have been offering financial incentives to
attract foreign multinationals and to facilitate export.f
Given these goals and the financial resources spent to achieve them, it would be of
great interest to unambiguously rank different types of firms according to their pro-
ductivity. Are multinationals unequivocally "better" than exporters, and the latter
"better" than non-exporting firms, in terms of productivity? Our intent is to answer
these questions without relying on unrealistic assumptions concerning productivity
distributions and the objective function, supposedly maximised by policymakers.
Comparisons of means does not allow to accomplish this task, whereas the concept
2Tax breaks, duty drawbacks, investment allowances and so on have been offered to foreign
multinationals to establish affiliates in the UK. Two cases in point refer to Samsung and Siemens,
which were offered, respectively, the equivalent of $30000 and $50000 per employee to invest in
North East England and Newcastle (UNCTAD 1996). By the same token, public money is spent in
a number of export promotion activities such as free supply of information about foreign markets,
financial helps for foreign market researches and participation in trade fairs, as well as export credit
insurance.
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of first order stochastic dominance does. First order stochastic dominance implies that
the productivity distribution of one type of firms lies to the right of another." If found
to hold, the means of the two distributions also differ. It therefore provides a stricter
test than simply comparing mean levels of productivity and one that does not rely
on strict assumptions.
4.3 Empirical methodology, description of the data
base and construction of TFP
4.3.1 Empirical methodology
In this chapter we test the rank ordering of the productivity distribution of firms
which differ in their involvement in international markets. Specifically, we employ
the nonparametric one-sided and two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (e.g, Conover
(1999); Sprent (1989)). These test for first order stochastic dominance between ran-
dom variables. This methodology was first employed by Delgado et al. (2001) in a firm
level data context; however, they limit their analysis to exporters and non-exporters.
As we have seen in the previous section, productivity comparisons across differ-
ent kinds firms have usually involved means. However, comparing just the mean of
two general random payoffs does not allow to conclude that one is unambiguously
"better" than the other. To reach such a conclusion one has to make very restric-
tive assumptions about utility functions or the distribution of random variables. For
instance, means are sufficient statistics to rank unambiguously random prospects if
the objective function (i.e. the utility function or, alternatively, the social welfare
3The inverse is not true. Difference in means does not imply necessarily that the distribution,
whose mean is larger, stochastically dominates the other.
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function) used to grade them is quadratic or if probability distributions are normal
(e.g. Wolfstetter (1999)). Both assumptions may be deemed too restrictive, since
slightly altering them may lead to different orderings.
Contrariwise, stochastic dominance allows to reach unequivocal rankings of ran-
dom variables without requiring precise knowledge of the objective function and their
probability distributions. It only requires that the objective function belongs to a
more general class with some common properties." That is, stochastic dominance
permits to judge two random prospects, irrespective of who is the judge. If one pay-
off (or choice) first stochastically dominates the other, then that payoff is preferred
by all agents with increasing, monotonic utility function (Wolfstetter 1999, pp. 135).
This is the only assumption needed to rank random payoffs using first order stochas-
tic dominance and for this reason we may say that such a choice is unambiguously
"better" than the other.
Given the discussion in the preceding section, rankings based on stochastic dom-
inance are more suited in this context than those based on means for two reasons.
Firstly, from a policy standpoint we want to assess whether or not firms participating
in international markets, through FDI or export, are "unambiguously" better than
firms that do not, with respect to productivity. This is of interest given the consid-
erable amount of public money spent in promoting export and/or attracting FDI,
and the emphasis on improving productivity. First order stochastic dominance allows
to rank the different types of firms considered without specifying a precise objective
function, bar that is monotically increasing. Secondly, from a theoretical viewpoint
4The theory of stochastic dominance has indeed been developed to analyse the economic be-
haviour of agents facing uncertain prospects, without making too restrictive assumptions (Hadar
and Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969). Analogously, this approach has been subsequently used
to rank income distributions to undertake welfare analysis independently of specific social welfare
functions (e.g.: Anderson (1996)).
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we want to encompass the possibility that firms of the same productivity level may
choose different forms of commerce around a given cut-off point, but restrict the test
such that there must be statistically robust differences between the distributions.
That is, the degree of different behaviour among firms and the size of random shocks
cannot be too large that the structure of commerce and firm heterogeneity are no
longer meaningfully related.
To perform this test we define two cumulative distribution functions F and G. The
latter corresponds to the group of interest, for example domestically owned exporters,
and the former to the comparison group, for example UK multinationals. First-order
stochastic dominance of F with respect to G is defined as: F{z) -G{z) :::;0, V z E ~,
with strict inequality for some z.5 To establish first order stochastic dominance we
need to conduct the one-tailed and two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
The two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic tests the hypothesis that the two
distributions are different. The null and alternative hypotheses can be expressed as:
Ho: F{z) - G{z) = 0 V z E ~
HI: F{z) - G{z) # 0 forsorne Z E ~ (4.1)
The two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov alone is not sufficient to establish stochastic
dominance. On the one hand, if the null is not rejected, the two distributions are
not statistically different; therefore none dominates the other. On the other hand,
if the null is rejected, the two distributions are statistically different. However, this
could be caused by the fact that F{z) dominates G(z) [i.e, G(z) ~ F{z) for all
5The same can be expressed in terms of probabilities: first order stochastic dominance of F with
respect to G entails that for any chosen value z=z, P(ZF > z) ~ P(zG > z), where ZF and ZG are
realizations drawn from F and G, respectively.
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z) or alternatively that G(z) dominates F(z) (i.e. G(z) :::;F(z) for all z). Another
possibility is that, for certain values of z, F(z) > G(z), whereas for others F(z) < G(z)
(i.e. the cumulative distribution functions cross each other).
To establish first order stochastic dominance of F(z) with respect to G(z), the
one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test must be conducted. It can be expressed as:
Ho: F(z) - G(z) :::;0 'v' z E ~
HI: F(z) - G(z) > 0 for some z E !R (4.2)
To establish first order stochastic dominance of F(z) with respect to G(z) requires
the rejection of the null hypothesis in the two-tailed test in 4.1, and not rejection of
the null in 4.2.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depicts two imaginary productivity distribution functions for
illustrative purposes. In figure 4.3, F(z) dominates G(z), since the former lies beneath
the latter. In this situation we would expect to reject the null of the two-sided test
(Le. equality of the distributions), and not to reject the null of the one sided test
with difference favourable to F(Z).6 In figure 4.4, the two distributions still differ, but
they cross in addition. Thus, for "low" productivity levels, to wit, for productivity
levels to the left of the intersection point, G(z) dominates F(z), whereas for "high"
productivity levels the opposite is true. In this instance, we would expect to reject the
null of the two-tailed test, and if the differences favourable to F(z) and G(z) are both
large enough, we would reject both one-tailed tests, and first stochastic dominance
would not be not established. It should be noted that in this situation, means are
60bviously in this case, the null of the one-sided test with difference favourable to G(z) would
be rejected.
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not necessarily the same. Depending on the exact shape of the distributions and the
point where they cross, one of the means may be statistically larger than the other;
hence, comparisons of means may induce erroneously to conclude that one type of
firms is unequivocally "better" than the other.
For the one-sided and two-sided test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are, re-
spectively:
where nand m are the sample sizes from the empirical distributions of F and
G respectively, and N = n + m. As it is possible to see the two statistics are
very similar. The only difference is that the two-tail test considers the absolute
value of the maximum value of the difference (i.e. vertical distance) between the two
cumulative distribution functions, whereas the one-tail test does not. This is because
the two-sided statistics tests for any statistically significant difference between the
two distributions; this may be due either to the fact that G(z) dominates (l.e. is
down) F(z) or the other way round. The one-sided statistics testing the hypothesis
that G(z) dominates F(z) considers the maximum value of the difference F(z) -G(z);
if this difference is large enough the hypothesis will be rejected.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test requires independent observations. Given the panel
structure of our data set, observations related to the same firm in different years can-
not be deemed to be independent. Therefore the tests have bee conducted separately
for each year.
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Figure 4.3: Example of first stochastic dominance.
Cumulative distribution function
Productivity (z)
Figure 4.4: Example of different productivity distributions with no first order stochas-
tic dominance.
Cumulative distribution function
Productivity (z)
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4.3.2 Data sources and construction of variables
The United Kingdom is a relatively large industrialised economy, the fifth largest ex-
porter of manufactures globally and the second largest host to FDI. Unfortunately the
UK production census (the Annual Respondents Database) does not collect informa-
tion on exporting activity of firms. In order to make progress on this issue, instead we
employ the firm level survey OneSource which does. Further details on the OneSource
dataset can be found in Oulton (1998); a full description of the data set is provided
in the data appendix at the end of Chapter 1. 7 OneSource provides information on
employment, physical capital, output and cost of goods sold in a consistent way both
across firms and across time." The data were screened to select those firms for which
there are a complete set of information about the value of output, factors of produc-
tion and export. Companies that are dissolved or in the process of liquidation were
also excluded. This left a total sample of 11,824 observations containing information
on some 3,799 domestic manufacturing firms, of which more than 50% were observed
for 5 or more years.? We did not deem outliers to be a major obstacle in this exercise
70neSource uses a non-stratified sample with an oversampling of large firms. Given that exporters
and multinational firms have consistently been found to be larger than non-export firms this might
be expected to bias the tests against finding a significant difference in the cumulative distribution
with respect to non-exporters. Given the results found below this bias does not seem of concern.
Tests between exporters and multinationals are less likely to be affected by this bias.
sFor this study we used the OneSource CD-ROM entitled "UK companies, Vol. 1", for October
2000.
9The number of observations in the original data set that can be used for econometric analysis is
greatly reduced because of missing values. This is a problem common to all firm level data sets. On
the one hand, this problem can in principle create a sample selection bias if missing values follow
some deterministic process whereby some firms report missing values and some others do not. To
correct for this one would need to devise a selection rule, which determines what firms report missing
values. This is notoriously difficult since there are missing values in all the variables in the data set
and not only in the dependent variable of interest. On the other hand, if the missing values are due
to a complete random process, no sample selection bias will arise. We did not correct for sample
selection bias, because it is not clear how this can be done applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Besides, to author's knowledge, none of the papers that have used firm level data sets have ever
undertaken such a correction.
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since productivity is treated as a random outcome by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test;
outliers are therefore dealt with as extreme random outcomes.
OneSource does not provide information on the multinational activity of U.K-
owned firms, but it proved possible to merge OneSource with a newly created database
of foreign multinational activity to generate this indicator: the European Linkages
and International Ownership Structure (ELIOS) database built at the University of
Urbino.'? This was available for 1996 which we backcast to the start of the sample
period. The information obtained from ELIOS was also complemented with a list of
U.K firms that made foreign acquisitions, compiled from various issues of Acquisitions
Monthly. Backcasting the UK multinationals indicator works against out hypothesis
that UK MNEs are more productive than non-multinational domestic companies; this
is because we are likely to classify some non-multinational enterprises as multination-
als.
In accordance with the theoretical model and its extensions we separate domestic
firms into one of three types; domestically owned firms that export in all years of the
sample (labelled domestic permanent exporters - DPE); domestically owned firms
that do not export during the sample period (labelled domestic never exporters -
DNE); and UK multinational firms (UKMNE), where these latter firms mayor may
not export. We exclude firms that switch into or out of export markets or overseas
production during the sample period, preferring to view these as separate groups of
firms that might provide insight into the question of learning versus self-selection.
From OneSource, output was measured using total turnover deflated by 4-digit
producer price indices. Labour inputs were measured using the total number of
lOr wish to express my gratitude to Davide Castellani and Antonello Zanfei for allowing me to use
some information from this database.
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workers employed by the firm and their cost is the total wage bill. The cost of
intermediates was measured as the cost of production of goods sold and capital as the
net book value of fixed assets. The cost of intermediates were deflated using highly
detailed producer price indices of materials and fuels purchased, while because of the
lack of deflators for fixed capital and investment goods, capital was deflated using
the GDP deflator of fixed capital formation.!' The expenditure share of capital is
calculated as one minus the cost-share of the other inputs.
Levels and growth rates of total factor producitivity (TFP) were constructed using
the index number (i.e. non-parametric) approach (e.g.: Caves et al. (1982); Good et
al. (1995)) and previously employed among others by Aw et al. (2000) and Delgado et
al. (2001). The principle advantage of this methodology over alternatives, such as the
econometric estimation of the production function, is that it allows transitive multi-
lateral comparisons of productivity growth rates and levels between firms. Further
information on the construction of the index employed can be found in the Appendix
of chapter three. In order to take into account fixed industry effects, the index was
calculated for each 2 digit SIC92 industry separately.
In table 4.1 we report the basic productivity characteristics of the various groups
of firms used in the subsequent analysis. It is noteworthy that exporters are the most
numerous in our sample. This is consistent with evidence for the UK found in Girma,
Greenaway and Kneller (2004) and for other OECD countries of a similar size such
as Italy and Germany (Castellani 2002; Bernard and Wagner 1997).
The mean productivity differences reported in the table are in line with previous
11All the producer price indexes used to deflate the nominal output and the price indexes of
materials and fuels purchased are at disaggregate industry levels. They were provided by the Official
of National Statistics.
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evidence for the UK and other countries. Mean productivity of multinational firms
is higher than that of exporters which in turn is higher than that of non-exporting
firms. The mean productivity level of new export firms is close to that of non-export
firms, while mean productivity of domestic firms acquired by foreign multinationals
is close to that of firms which export throughout our sample period. The last column
of table 4.1 reports the mean export share by type of firms. It is worth observing
that the export share of UKMNEs is nearly as high as that of export-only firms. This
observation suggests a departure from HMY, but is consistent with its extensions
highlighted in the previous paragraph (i.e. the existence of multi-product firms and
foreign markets with different characteristics).
It is worth noting that this methodology of computing productivity (but also the
regression based approach) may yield negative values. This is because the productiv-
ity is computed in log. As it is clear from the appendix of chapter 3, the methodology
we employ, but also any regression based method, computes TFP as In (y/X) where
y is the output (assuming one product) and X is a index aggregating the n inputs.
Obviously the ratio inside the parenthesis is always positive, but since we are taking
the log, a negative TFP arises if the ratio is less than 1.
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Differences in productivity among multinationals, ex-
porters and purely domestic firms
In table 4.2 we report the results using Kolmogrov-Smirnov test on the cumulative
productivity distributions of TFP levels for various types of firm.P The results are
12The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted using Stata 8.
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reported on a cross-section by cross-section basis. We adopt this approach firstly
because the limiting distribution of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics is only known
under independence of observations. Secondly, we might reasonably expect the sunk-
costs associated with exporting and FDI to change across time as a result of policy
changes, such as the tax treatment of multinationals, as well as cross-time changes in
the exchange rate and reductions in transport costs. Finally, it overcomes problems
associated with the observed transition of firms between groups, for example starting
to export. We consider the productivity distribution of these transition firms below.
The findings for export firms and domestic multinationals relative to firms that do
not export match those from the previous literature, albeit where the literature has
centred on differences in the mean productivity level (for example Girma et al. (2004)).
In all seven years of the sample we reject the null of the one tailed test that that
distribution of non-exporters dominates that of exporters, but we are able to accept
the null from the one-tailed test that the distribution of exporters dominates that
of non-exporters.P From the two-tailed test we find we can reject the null that
the distributions are identical in six of the seven comparison years. Overall we can
conclude that the productivity distribution of exporters stochastically dominates that
of non-exporters.
We can draw a similar conclusion about the cumulative productivity distributions
of non-exporting firms and domestic multinationals. We can reject the one-tailed test
that the distribution of non-exporters lies to the right of multinationals in all years bar
1990, but accept the null of the one-tailed test that the distribution of multinationals
dominates in all years. From the two-tailed test we conclude that the distributions
13It should remembered that the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, tests for differences in the distribution
at each level of productivity. For this reason the value of the test statistic is positive when the
cumulative productivity distribution is to the left of the alternative distribution.
""~ O)~ O)~
t-~ C'";)~ ~g
o C> ....... 0> ....... 0>
0"";" 0"";" 0"";"
I I
* ~
* C'I0)8
0"";"
o
~
~~ ~~
8~ 5~
I I
* - * ,_
* 8 * §~.~.
~....... ....... .......
....... ~
....... .......
* ~
* ....
",,8
....... ....;..
00
.......
* ,......
C'";)~
00000"";"
o
* ,......C'";)t-
oo~00 .......
o
LQ
00
~
173
174
are different in every year except 1990. Stochastic dominance is therefore established
in six of the seven years of the sample.
The cumulative productivity distribution of domestic multinational firms is also
found to lie to the right of firms that export in every year of the sample period. The
productivity distribution of UKMNE's dominates that of exporters. This relationship
has not previously been investigated in the literature for UK firms. The cumulative
productivity distribution of domestic multinational firms is found to lie to the right of
firms that export in every year of the sample period from the one-tailed tests, but the
null that the productivity distribution of exporters dominates that of multinationals
is rejected for only six of the seven years. From the two-tailed test we reject the null
that the distributions are identical in five of the seven sample periods. This evidence
for the UK is consistent with that for Irish firms in Girma et al. (2004).
In figure 4.5 we provide a graphical example of the productivity distributions of
domestic export firms and UKMNE for 1992. Even with relatively small sample sizes
available a clear difference in the position of the cumulative productivity distribution
is evident from this graph. Overall there is no evidence that low productivity firms
become multinationals.
While in table 4.2 there is clear support for the modified HMY model we inves-
tigate more closely the failure to accept stochastic dominance in 1990 for a number
of the tests. Figure 4.6 displays the graphs of the productivity levels for this year.
There is evidence from these graphs that in two of the three cases the ordering of
productivity distributions is as expected, specifically the cumulative distribution of
UKMNE lies to the right of that of DPE and DNE. This is confirmed by a simple
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Figure 4.5: Productivity levels differences between DPE and UKMNE in 1992 .
o • +
-2 -1 o
Log of TFP levels
1 2
• Domestic permanent exporters • UK multinational enterprises
t-test for difference in means. The null of no difference in the mean of the two dis-
tributions is rejected for UK multinationals versus exporters (p-value 0.015) and UK
multinationals versus non-exporters (p-value 0.008) but not between exporters and
non-exporters (p-value 0.276). While this may suggest some caution in the complete
acceptance of the heterogeneous firm assumption the relatively low number of ob-
servations available could provide one possible explanation for the lack of statistical
significance in table 4.2.14
As an extension of the results just discussed and in order to increase the size of
14Conover (1999) underlines as the p-values of limiting distribution are too conservative in small
sample.
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the sample we employ information on foreign affiliates operating within the UK from
the OneSource database. Symmetry within the model implies that foreign multi-
national firms operate within each industry and that these firms have productivity
levels akin to those of domestic multinationals. OneSource contains information of
foreign-ownership for the latest year only, so to track the dynamics of ownership we
matched the population of manufacturing firms to a list of U.K. firms acquired by
foreignmultinationals.P Foreignmultinational firmsare labelled FOR in the tables."
The results are in table 4.3. It is evident that the ordering of the producitvity
distributions is not different from that in table 4.2. The evidence is strongest for
the comparison of foreign multinationals and non-exporters. We do not reject the
null of the one-tailed test that the distribution of foreign multinationals dominates
that of non-exporters in every year, while we reject the same one-tailed test that the
productivity distribution of non-exporters dominates in every year. We also reject
the null from the two-tailed test for all years. Comparing foreign multinationals and
domestically owned exporters we accept the null that the distributions are identical
only for 1991, while we accept the null that the productivity distribution of foreign
multinationals dominates in all seven years.
While consistent with the self-selectionhypothesis ofHMYthe above results might
also be interpreted as evidence of learning. Fiercer competition and imitation of
15This information which is in hard copy format is obtained from the Office of National Statistics
upon special request. The matching process required considerable effort, and I wish to thank Mehtap
Hisarciklilar for helping me in this regard.
16As Helpman eta al. (2004) underlines in footnote 6, the problem of the productivity of foreign
affiliates compared to domestic companies is only indirectly related to the research question examined
here. However, knowing that the bulk of FDI inflows to the UK is from other countries close to
the technology frontiers (most of the FDI flows is indeed between OECD countries) and if we are
ready to assume there is technology transfer from the parent to foreign affiliates, we would expect
the latter to have similar productivity characteristics to UKMNEs.
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superior technologies raises the productivity of exporters and multinationals relative
to non-export firms. We attempt to discriminate between these two hypotheses in
the remainder of the chapter.
In table 4.4 we test for stochastic dominance for the annual growth rate of TFP.
The HMY (2004) model assumes that once the productivity of the firm is drawn
from the productivity distribution there is no time variation in its value. The differ-
ences in the productivity distribution across firms in table 4.2 should be a long-run
phenomenon. Learning might take two forms: firstly those involved within foreign
markets might somehow benefit from their exposure to foreign firms. Secondly, do-
mestic firms may learn from other domestic firms. The convergence literature suggests
that technology transfer across firm over time should lead to convergence of produc-
tivity levels between domestic firms. The greater the size of the technological gap
then the faster the rate of growth will be in a given period. Given the ordering of
productivity levels in Table 4.1 we would expect if absolute convergence holds that
the annual growth rate of TFP in non-exporters should lie to the right of firms that
export, which should in turn dominate that of domestic multinationals. We might
expect the reverse ordering if domestic firm productivity growth is increasing in their
degree of exposure to foreign firms.
We find from 4.4 however that the differences in the level of productivity evident
from table 4.2 are persistent across time. From the one-tailed test, differences in the
growth rates of productivity amongst the three types of firm considered are never
significant. We cannot therefore establish from these results which distribution dom-
inates. This is confirmed from the two-tailed tests where we find evidence that the
growth distributions are similar for the different groups of firms. Firms do not learn
from either domestic or foreign firms with higher productivity levels in our data. This
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result confirms evidence against convergence in the manufacturing sector {Bernard
and Jones 1996; Carree, Klomp, and Thurik 2000; Togo 2002} and are consistent
with the evidence of no difference in mean growth between established exporters and
non-exporters as in Bernard and Jensen {1999}.
4.4.2 New exporters and recent foreign acquisitions
Within the data set there are a number of firms that transit between states of com-
merce. The possibility of transition by firms is allowed in the HMY model only if there
is a change in the level of fixed costs associated with market entry and cannot ex-
plain the simultaneous movement of firms in both directions. An interesting question
that arises out of the results in table 4.2 is whether these firms display significantly
different productivity characteristics in the period before the change in export or
multinational status takes place. That is, are these firms the marginal non-exporting
or exporting firms with the highest/lowest productivity levels respectively?
We provide some evidence on this point. In table 4.5 we compare the distribu-
tion of productivity levels of first-time exporters with domestically owned firms that
never export in the period before the former start exporting. Unfortunately we do
not have data on UK multinational firms in the period before they become multina-
tional and so we use instead information on firms before they are acquired by foreign
multinationals (brownfield FDI). The information on foreign acquisition was retrieved
from data supplied by the Office of National Statistics. We matched the population
of manufacturing firms in Onesource to the list of U.K. firms acquired by foreign
multinationals provided by the ONS.17
17Information on foreign acquisitions obtained from the Office of National Statistics is in hard
copy format. The matching process required considerable effort, and we wish to thank Mehtap
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From table 4.5 there is no evidence that the productivity distribution of first time
exporters stochastically dominates that of firms that never export. While positive, the
test of differences in the distribution is not significant in any years of the sample for
the two-tailed test. While again from the one-tailed test it is not possible to establish
which of the distributions dominates. New exporters are more productive but there
are other equally productive non-exporters that do not enter export markets. Delgado
et al. (2001) find similar results for large firms, but not small firms. This is consistent
with what we find since the the data set used in this study over-represents large firms.
The fact that large firms do not self select in the export market may be interpreted
as evidence of uncertainty about sunk costs and returns from starting exporting. This
is consistent with the hypothesis of informational spillovers about export markets
from multinationals to domestic firms, whereby non-export firms benefit from the
experiences in foreign markets of other firms encouraging them to enter. Greenaway
et al. (2004), Aitken et al. (1997) and Greenaway and Kneller (2004b) all have found
significant results corroborating this hypothesis in regressions of the determinants of
export market entry.
The evidence that the cumulative productivity distribution of newly acquired
foreign firms stochastically dominates that of domestic export firms is while also,
suggestive, not overwhelming. Using tests of stochastic dominance we find that the
cumulative productivity distribution of acquired domestic firms lies to the right of
their non-acquisition exporting counterparts, but statistical significance is established
in only 3 of the 6 years. The two-tailed test that the distributions are identical is
rejected in the same years. Therefore while there is some weak evidence for self-
selection for new (foreign) multinational firms the evidence in the case of export
Hisarciklilar for helping us in this regard.
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firms is weaker. Empirical studies of brownfield FDI by Conyon et al. (2002) and
Harris and Robinson (2002) report that foreign MNEs tend to acquire UK firms with
above average performance characteristics. This is perhaps one area that requires
further empirical research before strong conclusions are drawn.
4.5 Conclusion
Recently developed theoretical models link the heterogeneous productivity level of
firms with their involvement in international trade. These models predict that most
productive firms will become multinationals, those in the middle range will self select
into the export market, whereas least productive companies will focus on the domestic
market only. Central to these theoretical results is the assumption about sunk costs
of entry in the export market and establishing foreign affiliates in other countries.
However, as highlighted by Head and Ries (2003), when factor prices and size
among countries differ such ordering can be reversed. Indeed, if the foreign country
is small and has some cost advantage (e.g, low wages), the least productive firms will
open foreign affiliates therein, whereas most productive companies will concentrate
production at home. This happens because less productive enterprises will gain most
from FDI since they use intensively the factor whose price is low in the foreign land.
Furthermore, the above models consider the case of single product firms only.
Multi-product firms face a more complex array of choices as the export-FDI decision
may be product specific. If market demand, factor costs and firm productivity differ
for each of the goods produced, companies will find it profitable to produce some
products in the home country and sell them therein; others will be produced at home
00 0
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and exported or produced in foreign countries. In this case, firms with sufficiently
high productivity levels will serve foreign markets through exports and/or FDI. If in
addition to this we allow for differences amongst foreign countries, such as market size
and factor costs, it is apparent that even single product firms could make different
export/FDI choices for different countries (or group of countries). These two cases
would allow for firms that are both multinationals and exporters.
Therefore, the question concerning the ranking of the productivity distribution of
multinationals, exporters and purely domestic firms, is an empirical one. From a pol-
icy perspective this question is important given the fact that increasing productivity
figures prominently in the agenda of policymakers. To this end, government agencies
have attracted foreign multinationals in the UK and facilitated the entry of UK firms
in export markets, by means of various financial incentives.
In this chapter using a data set of manufacturing firms, based in the UK, covering
the period 1990-1996, we deploy the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of stochastic dom-
inance to rank the cumulative distribution for non-exporters, exporters and multi-
nationals. First order stochastic dominance is a stricter test than that based on
comparing means since it takes into account all moments of the distribution. If one
distribution is found to dominates another, then its mean is larger, whereas the inverse
is not always true.
From a policy standpoint, the main advantage of this statistical methodology
is that it allows to "judge" different types of firms, according to their productivity,
without making unattainable assumptions about the objective function policymakers,
supposedly, maximise, bar that is monotonic and increasing. If the distribution of
one kind of firms dominates that of another, the latter may be deemed to be "better"
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by all agents for whom "more is better" (no other assumptions about the shape of
the utility function are necessary).
In addition from a theoretical perspective, the non-parametric approach employed
allows for the likely possibility that productivity distribution of different types of firms
overlap. This is because of uncertainty surrounding parameters of the models (such
as sunk costs), different degree of risk aversion across firms, multiproducts firms, and
foreign markets with different characteristics.
From the results, we conclude that the cumulative productivity distribution of
multinational enterprises dominates (lies to the right of) that of non-multinationals,
while that of exporters dominates the one of non-exporters. The findings of this
investigation support the theoretical insights of Helpman et al. (2004). Only the
most productive companies find it profitable to pay the higher costs associated with
exporting and building/acquiring production facilities abroad. In so doing we provide
a clear acceptance of the heterogeneous firm framework over alternatives such as those
using the idea of a representative firm.
These same patterns were found to hold when domestic multinational firms were
replaced with information on foreign multinationals. In addition, the comparison of
the distribution of productivity growth rates suggest there are differences are perma-
nent, there is no significant difference among the three type of firms in their growth
rates.
These patterns of stochastic dominance lend support to the conclusion that multi-
national enterprises are "better" firms than exporters and the latter "better" than
"non-exporters" , in terms of productivity. This may be deemed to be consistent with
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favourable policies towards multinationals and exporters undertaken by policymakers
whose aim is to increase overall productivity.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of results
This thesis contributes to the burgeoning literature on microeconometric analyses of
firm-level adjustment to globalisation. This literature has been spurred by the recent
availability of large firm-level data sets, which have provided new insights on how
heterogeneous firms react to globalisation processes. This has been instrumental in
shifting the attention of trade economists from the representative firm, referring to
countries and industries, to heterogenous firms. This change of focus has already
improved our understanding on how globalisation (intended as FDI and trade flows)
affects firms in dissimilar fashions, according to their characteristics, and how firm
level responses determine aggregate changes at the industry and country-level. Each
chapter of this doctoral dissertation has dealt with one particular aspect of the firm-
level adjustment to the increasing internationalisation of national economies.
Chapter two has tackled the issue of the elasticity of the demand for labour and
trade. Recently it has been argued that trade should make the demand for labour
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more elastic; empirical tests to date, at the industry and firm-level, have failed to iden-
tify any significant effect of trade liberalisation policies on labour demand elasticities.
Our theoretical and empirical analysis provide a reason why empirical research, thus
far, has not found any relationship between trade and the elasticity of the demand
for labour.
The first contribution of this chapter is to extend the Allen-Uawa formulation to an
imperfectly competitive setting and allow for a non-homothetic production function.
We argue that the Allen-Uzawa relationship, which all studies have invariably referred
to, is inappropriate at the firm-level and when production function is characterised
by non-constant return to scale. Indeed, this relationship was devised considering a
representative firm operating in a perfectly competitive industry with constant-return
to scale. In this setting, the elasticity of labour demand depends positively on the
elasticity of labour with respect to all the other inputs (substitution effect) and the
elasticity of product demand (scale effect). We show that, in homogeneous sectors,
because of the strategic interaction among firms, the scale effect can be divided in
two elements, of which one is reducing it, in absolute value. This term is a novelty.
It is the result a the strategic behaviour, whereby firms react to an increase in wages
not only firing workers, but also reducing their mark-up. This term softens the scale
effect, thereby decreasing the responsiveness of the demand for labour to wages.
The empirical analysis of this chapter, using a firm-level data set of UK manufac-
turing firms operating in homogeneous industries, proceeds in two fashions. Firstly,
we approximated the elasticity of labour demand by the discrete annual changes in
employment and wages. This was regressed against variables, function of the cost
share of labour and the market share in order to estimate the three different com-
ponent of the elasticity identified in the theoretical section. This regression posed
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particular problems because of measurement errors and non-linearities in the coef-
ficients. However the results seem to corroborate, at least partially, the theoretical
framework. In the long-run, the elasticity of substitution of labour, its cost share
and the firm's market share have the expected effect on labour demand elasticities.
However, of the two term characterizing the scale effect, only one appears to have an
explanatory power.
The second empirical exercise is based on a cost function approach. Different
cost functions were estimated; from their parameters it was possible to derive all the
components of the total labour demand elasticity. We find, consistently with theory,
that the scale effect is composed by two terms of which one, the pro-competitive effect,
reduces it. From our estimates, it appears that this term is substantial. Indeed, scale
effect seems to add only 0.03 percentage points to the total elasticity of the demand
for labour, estimated to be around 0.50, at the median of the factor share of labour.
Thus, this empirical exercise seems to confirm the presence of a pro-competitive effect,
which is reducing the absolute value of the elasticity of the demand for labour.
In addition, we were able to infer the magnitude of the elasticity of the demand
for labour at the industry-level, and the impact of imports on it, aggregating the
firm-level results. For the only sector and year our data set allows us to compute, our
estimates suggest that an increase in the import penetration rate by 10 percent will
add only about 0.004 percentage points to the total labour demand elasticity. This
appears to be a rather small impact of imports on the elasticity of the demand for
labour. This result may be attributed to the scale effect reducing pro-competitive
term we have identified.
Chapter three has examined the export behaviour of foreign affiliates in the UK.
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A well-known fact in the empirical literature about FDI concerns the superior perfor-
mance of foreign firms with respect to domestic companies along several dimensions,
such as employment, wages and productivity. However, an overlooked aspect of this
literature concerns the export decisions of foreign affiliates compared with those of do-
mestic companies. Our microeconometric analysis, conducted considering firm-level
data of the UK manufacturing sector, shows that foreign firms are not only more
likely to export than indigenous ones, but also, when they do, they export a higher
share of their total output. In addition, they appear to contribute disproportionately
to the total export of manufacturing industries in the UK.
There are different theoretical arguments behind the export strategies of foreign
affiliates. Exports and FDI are, in general, seen as substitute methods of selling in
foreign markets. Exporting foreign firms may be contemplated in three situations:
the final good is exported to a third country being part of a free trade area as the
host country (this results in tariff jumping FDI); multinational enterprises undertake,
so called, complex integration strategies, which involve export to a third country and
intra-firm trade; this happens when there are more than two stages of production
and more than two countries; firms produce multiple products that are sold in foreign
markets through different means and there is a positive correlation in demand across
these products (cross-product complementarity). In this chapter we have tried to
assess which one of these explanations is explains better the UK experience.
Overall, our data shows that strategic motives, possibly involving differential in
costs, productivity and market size between the UK and foreign countries/regions, are
strong determinant of the export strategies of foreign affiliates. The export strategies
of foreign firms depend, indeed, on the country/region of origin. Complementar-
ity between exports and FDI does involve significant differences in behaviour across
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countries that we find in the data. In this sense, the evidence we report, might be con-
sidered more consistent with export platform FDI. In this literature export platform
FDI may be undertaken because of two motives: vertical and horizontal. Horizontal
motives seem to be most important: affiliates from non-EU countries are much more
likely to export than firms from EU countries. However, this is not the end of the
story: vertical motives appear to be also relevant. There is evidence of this from the
fact that EU firms also use the UK as export platform, since they have roughly the
same export propensity as domestic firms.
We also find that firm level variables are important, in addition to strategic mo-
tives. The larger and the more productive are foreign firms the larger their export
share. However, our results indicate that what drives foreign firms to export is differ-
ent from domestic firms. Even controlling for firm level characteristics, which appear
to have a smaller role in the export decisions of foreign firms than for domestic com-
panies, foreign affiliates appear to be more export oriented than domestic firms. The
country/area of origin seems to be one of the most important determinant of their
export strategies.
Exports seem also to be important for the mode of entry of foreign firms in the
UK. The evidence we present would appear to suggest that firms from EU countries
do not target export firms, and when they do acquire exporters these firms do not
tend to change their export propensity relative to domestic firms. In contrast firms
from non-EU countries appear to both target exporters and then increase their export
intensity over time.
In chapter four, we have conducted a series of non-parametric tests to rank the
productivity distributions of non-exporters, exporters and multinationals. In the
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literature it has been argued that exporters and multinationals have higher produc-
tivity levels than purely domestic firms. This conclusion is based on comparisons
in means of productivity distributions, which belie the tremendous heterogeneity in
productivity among firms. The approach followed in this chapter is different in that
comparisons among firms have been conducted considering their entire productivity
distribution. Comparing the productivity distribution of different kinds of firms al-
lows to rank them correctly, taking into account the dispersion in productivity across
firms. Our results using firm-level data for the UK manufacturing sector, show that
the cumulative productivity distribution of multinational enterprises dominates (lies
to the right of) that of non-multinationals, while that of exporting companies domi-
nates that of non-exporting firms. The findings of this investigation corroborate the
theoretical model of Helpman et al. (2004): only the most productive companies find
it profitable to pay the higher costs associated with exporting and building/acquiring
production facilities abroad. These same patterns were found to hold when domes-
tic multinational firms were replaced with information on foreign multinationals. In
addition, the results of this chapter highlight that differences in productivity levels,
among the three type of firms considered, appear to be permanent since there are no
significant difference in the distribution of productivity growth rates.
5.2 Policy implications
The results of the microeconometric analysis of the firm-level adjustment to globali-
sat ion conducted for this doctoral thesis have important policy implications as well.
In chapter two we examined the relationship between trade and labour demand
elasticities. From a policy perspective, the results obtained underline the fact that
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to gauge the impact of international trade on the elasticity of the demand for labour
of a particular sector is important to consider its industrial microstructure. At the
firm-level the impact of import competition on the labour demand may be ambiguous;
however, assuming that the market share of domestic firms will decrease because of
import competition, opening to trade will increase the absolute value of the elasticity
of the demand for labour of firms, because of the scale effect. The extent of the
increase will depend on the market power of firms; firms with high market power will
be able to pass an exogenous increase in wages to consumers, through higher product
price. This ability is reducing the scale effect, because firms will decrease their output
less than what they would do if product prices were considered as given. Aggregating
firm-level labour demands to the industry-level, import competition increases unam-
biguously the industry-level elasticity of the demand for labour, since it reduces the
total market share of domestic firms. However, the degree of the increase may be
limited if the firm-level scale effects are small because of the pro-competitive term.
Therefore, different markets are likely to experience different increases in the elas-
ticity of the demand for labour, according to their industry microstructure. Highly
competitive and homogeneous sectors are those that are going to face high rises in
the elasticity of the demand for labour as import penetration rises, whereas the elas-
ticity of the labour demand of those sectors, where domestic firms have more market
powers, are going to undergo more limited increases. These results may inform better
policymakers about the likely effects of further trade liberalisation policies on the
demand for labour of different industries.
The empirical analysis conducted in chapter three has shown that foreign firms
contribute disproportionately to exports from the UK. Therefore, if one of the aim of
policymakers is to enhance the export performance of the UK manufacturing sector,
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this fact may provide another motive to grant financial incentives to foreign multi-
nationals in order to locate affiliates in the UK. Furthermore, since foreign affiliates
appear to be in general highly export oriented, it is possible to argue that a busi-
ness and macroeconomic environment conducive to high exports may reinforce the
UK position as one of the preferred destination of FDI inflows. This may be one
of the reason why the UK has consistently received, during the latest years, higher
FDI inflows than other European countries, albeit being smaller than other potential
destinations such as France and Germany. Macroeconomic policies and a business
environment favorable to export are likely to become even more important in attract-
ing FDI, in the near future, as more multinational enterprises undertake complex
integration strategies (UNCTAD 1998) involving shipping of intermediates and final
goods. Finally, we have shown the different importance that firm-level variables have
in determining the export behaviour of foreign and domestic firms. This may be
important in devising effective export promotion policies, which should take into ac-
count the fact that foreign firms are likely to respond differently from domestic firms
to such initiatives.
In chapter four we have ranked the productivity-level and growth rate distributions
of exporters, non-exporters and multinationals. Unlike tests based on comparisons of
means, this type of analysis allows to judge which of these firms is "better" without
specifying a particular objective function to be maximised. From a policy point of
view, this is noteworthy given the public money spent in attracting FDI. With regard
to productivity levels our results suggest that foreign firms are are "better" than
exporters, which are in turn "better" than non exporters; the same is not true for
productivity growth rates: none of the type of firms considered seem to be "better"
than the others. Therefore, financial resources used to attract FDI seem to be justified
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if we look at productivity levels, but not if consider productivity growth rates. The
problem is what the objective function of policymakers is. If they aim at increasing
productivity levels, then FDI consistent with their objectives, since foreign firms are
to be preferred to non-exporters, in this respect. If they aim at increasing productivity
growth rates, then such policies seem to be unjustified, since foreign companies do
not seem to be "better" than non-exporters, in this respect.
More caution is needed in interpreting these results to justify those policies imple-
mented to promote exports and outward FDI from the UK. According to our results
such policies do not seem to encourage higher productivity growth rates. Indeed,
although we found that both UK exporters and MNEs are more productive than UK
firms with no involvement in the international trade we found no difference in their
productivity growth rates. Therefore, difference in their productivity levels must
have arisen before firms started exporting or established affiliates in foreign lands.
The best companies seem to self select to become exporters and multinationals. Af- ii
!
ter they do so they do not appear to experience higher productivity growth ares than
other enterprises.
In general, globalisation processes, which involve high volume of exports, over-
seas investment and inward FDI inflows, and policies sustaining them are likely to
contribute positively to the overall UK productivity-level (through reallocation ef-
fect), but not to the productivity growth rate. This would be better achieved with
more targeted policies towards those firms and sectors that probably will experience
higher productivity growth rates, such as research and development intensive firms
and industries.
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5.3 Further research
The research in this dissertation can be extended in many directions. The relationship
between trade and the elasticity of the demand for labour deserves to be further
investigated considering unskilled and skilled workers separately. This is an important
difference, which may improve our understanding on how trade makes different types
of jobs more responsive to wages. In addition, in our analysis we considered only the
effect of imports on the elasticity of the labour demand; another related topic worth
investigating concerns the impact of export. How is the labour demand elasticity likely
to be affected by export? And are skilled and unskilled workers affected differently?
This research agenda will clarify better how the demand for labour adjusts, overall,
to liberalisation policies.
The export behaviour of foreign affiliates also warrants additional research. The
classical distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is becoming increasingly
blurred as multinationals undertake more complex FDI strategies, which involve ex-
port of intermediates and export platform FDI. This is a relatively new area of inves-
tigation where both empirical and theoretical works are needed. Theoretical works,
building on those already existing (Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl 2003; Ekholm,
Forslid, and Markusen 2003; Yeaple 2003), should aim at providing clear and testable
hypotheses in an heterogeneous firms setting. The model of Grossman et al. (2003)
adopts this framework, but not clear testable hypotheses are derived, since it seems
that everything can happen. For the UK, future empirical works might try to explain
the different export strategies of foreign affiliates of different countries with variables
controlling for country-size, productivity and cost differentials, transport costs and
other industry and country characteristics. Besides, data on export destination would
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make possible to identify the proportion of output exported back to the home coun-
try and to third countries. 1 This would allow to compare the export strategies of
domestic and foreign firms and investigate the determinant of the export behaviour
of foreign companies in more details.
The analysis in chapter four concerning the ranking of productivity distributions
of non-exporters, exporters and multinationals can be further extended considering
bivariate empirical distributions and ranking them using appropriate tests as explored
by Crawford (1999). This would involve taking two characteristics of firms policy-
makers are interested in, such as productivity-level and growth rate or employment,
compute their empirical bivariate distribution functions and conduct tests of stochas-
tic dominance. From a policy point of view, this is important since firms are judged
considering their contribution to national economies along several dimensions, such
as productivity, employment, export, to cite a few. Bivariate tests would allow us to
judge what type of firms is "better" considering two dimensions, not only one. Addi-
tional research in this area may employ microsimulation techniques to assess how the
entire productivity distribution of firms, involved differently in international trade,
shifts according to policy changes, like tariff reductions, exchange rate movements
and so on. This would permit analysts to assess the likely impact of policy changes
without relying on the unrealistic representative firm, but taking into account the
heterogeneity of firms responses.
IThe HM Customs and Excise possesses these data; they are not publicly available for confiden-
tiality reasons. However, we plan to ask permission to access them in due course.
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